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ABSTRACT 
 
Kraig Beyerlein: EXPLAINING U.S. CIVIC ACTION: DISPOSITIONS, NETWORKS, 
RELIGION, AND SEPTEMBER 11 
(Under the direction of Kenneth Bollen and Christian Smith) 
 
 
This dissertation advances our understanding of the enduring theoretical question of 
why certain people participate in activism while others do not.  Contrary to prior theoretical 
and empirical models of differential participation, it specifies and tests a synthetic model of 
activism, integrating dispositional and relational perspectives.  Because these perspectives 
have generally been pursued in isolation, our knowledge of the processes that explain activist 
participation has been limited.  Combining dispositional and relational perspectives offers a 
more comprehensive view of activism by showing how these perspectives work in concert to 
mobilize people to participate in volunteer efforts in communities.  My synthetic model of 
activism has the additional strength of addressing the important issue of selection versus 
influence concerning social network and organization effects.  This dissertation also 
examines the demobilizing character of social networks and organizations, which has 
generally gone unnoticed in scholarship on activist participation until recently.  It does so for 
the case of religious-based activism, considering the hindering effects of integration into 
quiescent clergy-led congregations and embeddedness in “bonding” religious networks.  In 
addition, this dissertation explicates the pathways through which congregations promote 
participation in civic engagement in communities, focusing on exposure to encouragement 
from activist clergy, location in activist religious peer networks, and cultivation of 
 iii
transposable skills.  Last, this dissertation focuses on the nature of civic response after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, investigating whether tragedy-related factors promoted 
involvement in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as 
others in communities.  It also considers how prosocial dispositions shaped Americans’ 
responses to 9/11 and how these responses in turn affected post-9/11 helping behavior as well 
as the precise dimensions of social networks and organization that were most important for 
mobilizing participation in helping behavior after the 9/11 tragedy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
From participation in episodes of major political unrest—such as the U.S. civil rights 
movement in the 1960s or the East German revolution in 1989—to routine acts of civic 
engagement—such as volunteer efforts to help the homeless or to lobby to get particular 
policies passed—one of the most enduring theoretical questions in the social sciences is why 
do certain people participate in activism while others do not.  Given that studies have shown 
that activism can have meaningful and lasting effects on the lives of those involved as well as 
broader consequences for communities and societies (see, for example, Andrews 2004; 
McAdam 1989; McAdam and Su 2002; Sherkat and Blocker 1997), understanding what 
accounts for differential participation is an important topic of scholarly inquiry.  There is no 
single perspective for explaining variation in individual activism.  Rather, myriad 
perspectives have been proposed to explain what differentiates participants from 
nonparticipants.  In general, these perspectives fall into one of two categories.  On the one 
hand are those that emphasize the “push” of internal factors, while on the other are those that 
stress the “pull” of external factors.  Because these perspectives tend to be the product of 
different intellectual commitments and disciplinary fields, they are often viewed in isolation 
or even opposition.  The lack of any systematic effort to combine and integrate the internal 
and external perspectives of activist participation has substantially limited our understanding 
of the processes that explain why certain people get involved in activism while others do not.
 
To broaden our knowledge of the dynamics of activism, my dissertation develops a 
synthetic model that integrates a dispositional and a relational perspective of activism.  In 
particular, this model focuses on how an activist orientation serves as a conduit, driving 
people to embed themselves in activist networks and organizations, which in turn induce 
participation in activism.  My synthetic model of activism therefore shows how dispositional 
and relational perspectives of activism are complementary, working together to advance our 
understanding of differential participation.  This is the first contribution of my dissertation. 
My synthetic model of activism has the additional strength of addressing the 
important issue of selection versus influence concerning social network and organization 
effects.  Given the adage that “birds of a feather flock together,” people who are 
psychologically disposed toward activism should be very likely to embed themselves in 
activist networks and organizations.  This has important implications for the relational 
perspective that has thus far been advanced to explain activist participation.  Although 
scholars from a relational perspective have assumed the causal significance of social 
networks and organizations for mobilizing people to participate in activism, they have 
generally not considered, let alone tested, the alternative explanation that homophily 
accounts for the observed social network and organization effects.  Based on extant studies, 
then, we do not know whether the widely accepted robust effects of social networks and 
organizations on activist participation are mainly due to social influence from activist peers 
and organizational leaders as relational scholars claim, or to the fact that people who are 
committed to activism intentionally choose to be friends with each other and join activist 
organizations.  Demonstrating whether the relational effects of activism are due to social 
influence or spurious due to homophily is the second contribution that my dissertation makes. 
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Although social networks and organizations have been central explanations for 
differential participation in the literature, there has been surprisingly little attention devoted 
to identifying the exact types of social networks and organizations that are the most 
important for mobilizing activism.  In many cases, prior scholarship has simply modeled the 
effect of the overall number of network connections or organizational memberships on 
activism, positing a general “integration” effect.  But given the heterogeneity of different 
types of social networks and organizations, this is theoretically and empirically inappropriate.  
Because the likelihood of being exposed to the relational factors that promote activist 
participation should differ considerably depending on whether networks and organizations 
are activist in nature or not, this analytical distinction seems crucial.  For instance, people 
who are embedded in activist networks should be especially susceptible to be encouraged to 
get involved in activism compared to those who are embedded in non-activist networks.  
However, activists may exert different types of social influence on friends, which may affect 
how likely they are to respond to peer social influence and thus get involved in activism.  My 
dissertation distinguishes among different types of activist social influence that peers exert on 
friends and tests whether these distinctions have explanatory consequences.  By making the 
general distinction between activist and non-activist networks and organizations as well as 
finer-grained distinctions among activist ties, my dissertation explicates the specific types of 
social integration that matter most for mobilizing people to participate in activism.  This 
represents the third contribution of my dissertation.   
Differentiating social networks and organizations that are activist in nature from those 
that are not helps us recognize not only that certain networks and organizations are more 
likely to facilitate participation in activism than others, but also that, under certain conditions, 
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non-activist networks and organization can actually constrain people from getting involved 
in activism.  The demobilizing character of social networks and organizations has generally 
gone unnoticed in scholarship on activist participation until recently.  In the last decade, 
certain social movement scholars have begun to acknowledge that networks and 
organizations have the potential to hinder involvement in activism (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin 
and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).  But the understanding of this 
potential has been very limited.  Hence, identifying the types of non-activist networks and 
organizations that inhibit participation and developing a theoretical account to explain their 
inhibiting effects significantly advances our knowledge about relationship between social 
embeddedness and activism and thus is the fourth contribution of my dissertation. 
Recent disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, the Tsunami in South East Asia, and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, have renewed interest in the question of how tragedy 
shapes activism.  Given the nature of the September 11 terrorist attacks, its mobilizing scope 
has been of particular interest.  But as with studies of responses to other disasters, data 
limitations have prevented a systematic evaluation of whether 9/11 mobilized a broad or 
narrow civic response.  To address the mobilizing scope of 9/11, my dissertation examines 
the extent to which tragedy-generated factors—such as knowing victims, patriotism, sorrow, 
or commemorative gatherings—motivated Americans to get involved in efforts to help others 
in communities in addition to efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers in 
the months following the attacks.  By doing do, my dissertation identifies whether 9/11 
helped revitalize U.S. civic life as certain scholars have posited (Putnam 2000:402; 2002).   
There is also the important issue of explaining why certain Americans got involved in 
activism after 9/11 while others did not.  I bring my synthetic model of activism to bear on 
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activist responses after 9/11, focusing specifically on how the “push” of orientations and the 
“pull” of networks and organizations work together to explain variation in helping efforts not 
only for victims of the tragedy but also for others in communities.  Like the literature on 
activism in general, disaster scholarship on participation in relief efforts has neglected this 
integrated approach of activism.  The case of volunteerism after 9/11 provides an opportunity 
to extend my synthetic model of activism in an important way, exploring whether an activist 
psychological disposition shaped interpretations of responses to the 9/11 tragedy and 
potential consequences this had for involvement in helping efforts after 9/11.  Finally, 
because the disaster literature has not been careful to distinguish between activist and non-
activist networks and organizations, we do not know whether this is a relevant analytical 
distinction for understanding the effect of social embeddedness on helping efforts after 
tragedies.  Exploring the effects of this distinction will clarify the relational factors that are 
most important for inducing activist responses after disasters.  Understanding the mobilizing 
scope of 9/11 and the processes through which Americans got involved in activism after 9/11 
constitute the final two contributions of my dissertation.  
 What exactly is activism?  There is no universally agreed upon theoretical definition 
of activism.  Reflecting this fact, studies of differential participation have focused on forms 
of activism diverse as petition campaigns (Oegema and Klandermans 1994) and collective 
riots (McPhail 1971; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Paige 1971).  Often, activism is defined 
in terms of its nature, such as low-risk/cost or high-risk/cost (McAdam 1986), or its targets, 
such as single corporations or entire nations.  My dissertation defines activism as unpaid 
activity that, in some capacity, serves the interests of the broader community.  For people to 
be counted as activists, then, they must be engaged in some sort of volunteering effort that 
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benefits or has the potential to benefit communities and their residents.  In this sense, the 
target of activism is crucial, while its nature is not.  Importantly, studies have shown that, 
unlike other forms of civic engagement (Putnam 2000), rates of community activism have 
not declined, but have rather remained stable or actually increased over time (Sampson et al. 
2006; Wuthnow 2002b).  Hence, understanding the factors that mobilize as well as constrain 
participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities has important implications for 
how to preserve and strengthen U.S. civil society. 
Concerning methodology, my dissertation employs advanced quantitative techniques 
to analyze a nationally representative survey of American adults.  Conducted in the spring 
and early summer of 2002, the Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) contains 
detailed modules on community activism, social networks, voluntary organizations, 
dispositions toward activism, and 9/11 reactions and responses, making it an ideal survey to 
evaluate the substantive issues outlined above.  As I demonstrate in the forthcoming chapters, 
Structural Equation Models (SEMs) allow me to model appropriately the synthetic nature of 
dispositional and relational perspectives of activism as well as to test empirically the 
important analytic distinctions previously mentioned.  By doing so, I am able to evaluate 
thoroughly the validity of my specified theoretical approach for understanding why certain 
people participate in activism while others do not. 
My dissertation comprises three related but distinct chapters, each of which 
contributes to one or more of the substantive themes noted in the prior paragraphs.  The first 
chapter lays the basic theoretical foundation of the dissertation, articulating my synthetic 
model of activism.  In this chapter, I discuss the conceptual integration of a dispositional and 
a relational perspective of activism and significance of this integration for helping to resolve 
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the important issue of selection versus influence concerning relational effects on activist 
participation.  Based on this theoretical integration, I derive and test empirical models of my 
synthetic perspective of activism.  My first dissertation chapter also evaluates whether 
different types of activist personal networks and the different types of social influence that 
they generate have differing effects on community activism.  Specifically, I test whether 
there are differences among passive behavioral social influence (learning about friends’ 
activist participation), active behavioral social influence (receiving direct requests from 
friends to participate in activism), and attitudinal social influence (knowing that friends 
approve of activist participation) for mobilizing people to get involved in activism.  The final 
part of my first dissertation chapter explores whether network density—the extent to which 
individuals in a person’s network know each other—alters any of the effects of activist 
networks on participation in activism. 
My second dissertation chapter uses the case of religious-based activism to address 
two important themes.  First, I focus on the largely overlooked issue of the demobilizing 
effects of social networks and organizations.  Because of the importance placed on caring for 
the social and spiritual needs of fellow members, it is expected that people who are integrated 
into quiescent clergy-led congregations and embedded in “bonding” religious networks will 
be very unlikely to participate in volunteer efforts that serve others in communities outside of 
their religious group.  However, when congregations and networks established in them are 
activist in nature, they should promote participation in community activism.  Explicating how 
integration into activist congregations and networks induces participation in volunteer efforts 
that benefit those in the broader community is the other important issue that my second 
dissertation chapter addresses.  Although scholars of civil society have increasingly come to 
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recognize the mobilizing potential of religious organizations, their understanding of this 
potential has generally been limited to description.  Moving toward actual causal explanation, 
by contrast, I specify three distinct pathways—encouragement from activist clergy, 
embeddedness in activist religious peer networks, and cultivation of transposable skills—
through which congregation integration can mobilize activist participation.  This chapter thus 
connects to broader concerns about how organizations can mobilize as well as demobilize 
participation. 
My final dissertation chapter explains the nature of activist responses in the aftermath 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  First, I specify the precise dimensions of social 
networks and organizational memberships that mobilized people to get involved in volunteer 
efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in 
communities after 9/11.  The majority of studies explaining variation in helping efforts after 
disasters have focused simply on the overall number of organizations or social ties.  Through 
a more fine-grained analysis, I am able to identify more precisely the types of social 
networks and organizations that were most important for mobilizing civic action after the 
national tragedy of 9/11.  Second, I consider how a psychological disposition toward 
activism shaped people’s responses to 9/11 and how these responses in turn promoted 
involvement in volunteer efforts to help.  Finally, I examine whether 9/11-generated factors 
facilitated participation exclusively in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue 
workers of the tragedy, or whether these factors also facilitated participation in efforts to help 
others in communities after the 9/11 attacks.  By doing so, I establish whether 9/11 mobilized 
a broad or narrow civic response and thus the extent to which this national tragedy helped 
revitalize U.S. civic life. 
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 CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING AMERICANS’ PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE 
CIVIC ACTION: INTEGRATING DISPOSITIONAL AND RELATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
Why certain people participate in activism while others do not is a core question in 
the field of collective action.  For decades, this question has attracted the attention of scholars 
from various sociological disciplines, most notably scholars of social movements, altruistic 
behavior, volunteerism, and rational choice.  The broad interest in differential participation 
has produced a wealth of empirical studies, focusing on such diverse forms of collective 
action as petition campaigns (Oegema and Klandermans 1994), volunteer efforts (Wilson 
2000; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1999; Wuthnow 1991), organization-based activities 
(Barkan, Cohn, and Whitaker 1995; Kitts 1999; Oliver 1984; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and 
Giugni 2001), activist projects (McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Nepstad 2004; 
Nepstad and Smith 1999; Smith 1996; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991), protests against 
political policies and regimes, (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 
1993), and riots and other civil disorders (McPhail 1971; McPhail and Wohlstein 1983; Paige 
1971).  Given the scope of scholarship on collective action, it is not surprising that myriad 
factors have been proposed to explain what differentiates participants from nonparticipants. 
Two perspectives that have emerged among the many factors as important 
explanations of differential participation are a dispositional perspective and a relational 
perspective.  While a dispositional perspective emphasizes the push of certain orientations to 
explain individual variation in collective action, a relational perspective stresses the pull of 
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 social ties to explain this variation.  These perspectives tend to be discipline specific, with 
scholars of altruistic behavior and volunteerism advancing the former perspective and 
scholars of social movements advancing the latter perspective.  Furthermore, these 
perspectives are often perceived as competing and perhaps incompatible explanations for 
differential participation, especially by some social movement scholars (McAdam 1986; 
McAdam and Paulsen 1993;  but see Snow and Oliver 1995).  Because of this perception and 
the fact that these perspectives generally represent different disciplines, there has been little 
systematic effort to combine them in models of collective action, producing a truncated view 
of processes that underlie the formation of collective action. 
To advance our knowledge of the dynamics of collective action, I develop 
theoretically and test empirically a synthetic approach that integrates these two important 
perspectives.  As I argue below, people who have activist psychological orientations tend to 
embed themselves in social relations that are supportive of collective action, and this, in turn, 
increases the likelihood of participation.  By not incorporating a relational perspective in 
their models, scholars emphasizing a dispositional perspective have missed an important 
pathway through which activist orientations promote collective action.  On the other hand, 
because scholars stressing a relational perspective have not included activist orientations in 
their models, it is difficult to accept the explanatory weight that they place on social network 
effects.  Despite the fact that this is rarely acknowledged, let alone tested, the observed 
positive relationship between social networks and collective action could partly or entirely 
reflect selection, in which people disposed toward activism choose as friends people who 
share their commitment to collective action.  Consequently, a relational perspective of 
collective action leaves open the possibility that the effects of social networks on collective 
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action are spurious, attributable to activist psychological orientations.  By modeling activist 
orientations and thus a basis on which collective action networks form and remain intact, this 
chapter addresses a problem that potentially undermines the robustness of the observed social 
networks effects, but has to date not received adequate conceptual attention or empirical 
investigation. 
This chapter also contributes to our understanding of why social networks mobilize 
people to participate in collective action.  Calls from social movement scholars to develop 
and test theoretical accounts of social network effects notwithstanding (McAdam and 
Paulsen 1993), this issue largely remains unresolved.  As a move toward addressing this 
issue, I draw on analytic concepts and theories from broader scholarship on peer network 
effects and conceptualize social ties as sources of social influence inducing participation in 
collective action.  Based on this scholarship, I also differentiate among attitudinal, active 
behavioral, and passive behavioral forms of social influence to assess whether different 
dimensions of social influence have different effects on participation in collective action.  By 
conceiving of personal ties as sources of social influence and identifying the precise 
dimensions of these ties that are the most significant sources of social influence mobilizing 
participation, I help explain why social networks promote collective action.  
To advance further our knowledge of the relationship between social ties and 
collective action, this chapter also considers characteristics of larger networks in which 
people are embedded.  Despite the fact that broader scholarship on social networks has 
demonstrated that network characteristics are important for explaining a range of individual 
behaviors, there has been scant attention paid to network characteristics in micro-level 
models of collective action (but see Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Oliver and Marwell 
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1988 for discussions about network characteristics in macro-level models; Oliver, Marwell, 
and Teixeira 1985).  I address this limitation by focusing on the important network 
characteristic of density.  Following and extending broader scholarship on social networks, I 
analyze the extent to which network density moderates the effect of social influence from 
individual ties on participation in collective action and whether this moderating effect varies 
depending on the dimension of social influence modeled. 
Before proceeding to the theoretical sections of this chapter, it is necessary to discuss 
briefly the form of collective action on which I focus.  As the above examples attest, 
collective action takes various forms.  This chapter, however, focuses on one particular, 
important form:  collective civic action.  Although specific claims and grievances can 
characterize collective civic action, purposes more commonly characterize this form of 
collective action (McAdam et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2006).  Collective civic action 
mobilizes for purposes of serving and benefiting those in the larger community, such as 
projects to raise funds to repair dilapidated houses or programs to distribute food and 
clothing to the needy.  Unlike protest forms of collective action that use disruptive or even 
violent tactics, collective civic action employs non-disruptive and nonviolent tactics.  
Importantly, contrary to claims of social capital theorists (Putnam 2000), collective civic 
action has not declined over time and currently constitutes the most vigorous form of 
collective action in the United States (McAdam et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2006).  
Consequently, explaining the nature of collective civic action is a crucial task that has broad 
implications for our understanding of U.S. community life and civil society.  Nevertheless, 
because collective civic action is only one of the many possible forms of collective action, I 
discuss in the conclusion of this chapter the consequences that this focus has for explaining 
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differential participation in other forms of collective action, especially contentious and 
disruptive forms. 
 
A Dispositional Perspective of Collective Civic Action 
One important answer to the question of why certain people participate in collective 
action while others do not comes from the altruistic behavior and volunteerism tradition of 
research.  According to this tradition, certain orientations or dispositions differentiate 
activists from nonactivists.  As far as collective civic action is concerned, a prosocial 
orientation seems most crucially important.  Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526)  define a 
prosocial orientation as “an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other 
people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to act in a way that benefits them” (see 
also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995).  Studies have shown that a prosocial orientation is 
generally the product of a combination of genetic and early socialization factors, such as 
parental emphasis on or modeling of benevolence, and that this orientation tends to be stable 
over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and Franzoi 1991; 
Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; Grusec 1981; 
Hoffman 1981; Koestner, Franz, and Weinberger 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; 
Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125). 
Penner and colleagues developed the Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB) to 
operationalize and test the effect of a prosocial orientation on activism.  Studies using the 
PSB have generally shown that the greater the prosocial orientation, the greater the likelihood 
of participation in volunteer efforts.  For instance, Penner and Finkelstein (1998) found that a 
prosocial orientation significantly predicted the amount of time people spent volunteering at 
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an AIDS service organization and the amount of time people personally spent interacting 
with AIDS patients.  Although not specifically employing the PSB, a large body of research 
has demonstrated a robust relationship between measures reflecting a prosocial orientation, 
such as commitment to contributing to the well-being of others, and being involved in 
various kinds of civic activity (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary, Snyder, and Stukas 1996; Elshaug 
and Metzer 2001; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; 
Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991).  Thus, a prosocial 
orientation seems to be an important factor for explaining differential participation in 
collective civic action. 
 
A Relational Perspective of Collective Civic Action 
While the field of altruistic behavior and volunteerism has generally advanced a 
dispositional perspective to account for individual variation in collective action, the field of 
social movements has generally advanced a relational perspective.  Voluminous empirical 
literature has demonstrated the significance of social networks for explaining differential 
participation (see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; 
Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Snow, Zurcher, and 
Ekland-Olson 1980).  However, this literature identifies that strong, not weak, ties are crucial 
for distinguishing participants from nonparticipants.  Several notable examples demonstrate 
this pattern.  First, Opp and Gern (1993) found that having friends who were ideologically 
critical of and politically active against the regime were a significant determinant of 
participation in the 1989 East German Revolution, while having critical co-workers was not.  
Second, McAdam (1986) showed that applicants to the Mississippi Freedom Summer project 
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who had preexisting close relationships with other applicants and activists were more likely 
to participate in this project than those who did not.  But he reported that having preexisting 
distant relationships with other applicants and activists did not differentiate applicants who 
journeyed to Mississippi to participate in the project from those who withdrew and stayed 
home.  Last, Passey (2001) documented that embeddedness in activist friendship networks, 
but not activist acquaintanceship networks, had a robust effect on getting involved in 
organizations affiliated with the Swiss solidarity movement (Passy 2003; Passy and Giugni 
2001). 
Theoretical accounts to explain the observed strong ties effects on collective action 
have been slow to develop and have not generally tapped into the broader scholarship on peer 
network effects.  This broader scholarship, however, brings to bear important insights on the 
difference between strong and weak ties for collective action, identifying social influence as 
the key mechanism through which social networks facilitate behavior (see, for example, 
Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Friedkin 1998; 
Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham, Marks, and Hansen 1991; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 
1991).  Although not developing a theory of social influence to explain social network effects 
on collective action, McAdam and Paulsen (1993:655) alluded to its importance over a 
decade ago, stating that “the significant positive relationship between strong ties and 
participation and the absence of any relationship between weak ties and involvement 
suggests that, at the microlevel, ties are less important as conduits of information than as 
sources of social influence.”  Weak ties may provide exposure to more diverse information 
and communication than strong ties (c.f. Granovetter 1973) and thus help explain variation in 
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the diffusion of movements once in motion, but they lack the necessary social persuasion that 
induces people to participate in collective action (see Kitts 2000).  If individuals do not feel 
personally close to activists, they will not feel pressure to respond to the recruitment request.  
Hence, the mobilizing strength of strong ties lies in their ability to exert social influence on 
those to whom they are closely linked. 
Unlike information or other theoretical approaches, social influence comports with 
the theoretical account that currently has the most momentum and widest attraction in the 
social movement literature for explaining social network effects.  According to this account, 
which instrumental or rational choice theorists originally articulated, people who are 
embedded in activist networks—exposed to activist social influence to use the language from 
above—participate in collective action to receive social approval and avoid social 
disapproval from peers.  Importantly, strong ties to activists solve Olson’s (1965) classic 
dilemma, as they function as nonmaterial selective incentives, eliminating the desire to free 
ride and abstain from participating.  As Chong (1991 :34-35) states, “the desires to gain or 
sustain friendships, to maintain one’s social standing, and to avoid ridicule and ostracism are 
all social goals that constitute selective incentives for individuals to participate in collective 
action.”  More culturally centered theorists of collective action also share this view, though 
they highlight the emotional nature of selective incentives from strong ties.  Goodwin, Jasper, 
and Polletta write (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001 :8) that “we accept a friend’s 
invitation to a rally because we like her, or because we fear her disapproval if we turn her 
down…. It is affective ties that bind and preserve the networks in the first place, as well as 
give them much of their causal impact.”  Individuals can reap the public benefits of collective 
action without personally participating, such as the legal rights for entire groups of people 
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that social movements have won, but they cannot receive rewards and avoid punishments 
from activist peers unless they personally engage in activism. 
Empirical evaluations of the social influence or selective incentive account for the 
impact of strong ties on collective action have been rare.  However, the few studies that do 
exist seem supportive.  Opp (1989:43-82) reported that expecting to receive positive 
reinforcement from important others was a significant determinant of engaging in legal and 
illegal protest activities.  Similarly, della Porta (1988) found that individuals joined Italian 
left-wing terrorist groups because they sought approval of friends who were in the process of 
joining or who had already joined.  Last, Chong (1991:56-57) recounts how despite his desire 
to sneak out, Jim Farmer, leader of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), participated in 
the dangerous freedom rides in Mississippi to preserve his image and reputation in the eyes 
of the other freedom riders (for a similar analysis, see Goodwin and Pfaff 2001). 
As valuable as the above theoretical account and empirical studies supporting it are 
for advancing knowledge of why social ties promote collective action, they are limited in two 
significant respects.  First, they neither analytically nor empirically distinguish different 
dimensions of social influence that peers exert on friends, but rather conceptualize and 
operationalize social influence as one broad construct that captures all types of social 
influence to which people respond to receive social approval and avoid social disapproval.  
Second, they do not explore whether different dimensions of social influence vary in terms of 
mobilizing participation.  As I describe below, there is good reason to think that the 
likelihood of people responding to social influence and thus participating in collective action 
depends on the type of social influence that peers exert on them.  These limitations largely 
seem to stem from the fact that social movement scholars have generally been able to include 
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only one dimension of social influence in their models, with strong ties to activists being the 
most available measure (Kitts 2000).  Because the correlation between the different 
dimensions of social influence is likely high, including only one measure very likely 
conflates the dimensions of social influence and thus muddles interpretations of the 
dimension or dimensions of social influence that matter most for inducing participation. 
Broader scholarship on peer networks distinguishes several distinct dimensions along 
which peers can exert social influence on friends.  This scholarship specifically differentiates 
attitudinal social influence from behavioral social influence as well as active behavioral 
social influence from passive behavioral social influence (Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; 
Graham et al. 1991; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991).  Drawing on 
this literature, I specify how these different dimensions of social influence apply to collective 
action. 
First, attitudinal social influence consists of approval from strong ties to participate in 
collective action, such as friends’ verbal support for participating in a community project.  
Second, active behavioral social influence consists of explicit offers or encouragements from 
strong ties to engage in collective action.1  This type of behavioral social influence calls for 
an immediate response to accept or reject the offer or encouragement to participate in 
collective action.  Third, passive behavioral social influence consists of the observation or 
knowledge of strong ties’ involvement in collective action.  Unlike active behavioral social 
influence, this type of behavioral social influence does not call for an immediate response of 
acceptance or rejection to participate in collective action, though one may occur.  More often, 
there is a delay in the response to passive behavioral social influence.  Empirical studies on 
                                                 
1 I drew particularly on Graham et al.’s (1991) discussion of active and passive behavioral social influence for 
deviant behavior in developing how these two types of social influence operate for collective action. 
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behaviors other than collective action have generally shown that behavioral social influence 
has stronger effects than attitudinal social influence (Graham et al. 1991; Warr and Stafford 
1991), though the difference between active behavioral social influence and passive 
behavioral influence has not been rigorously investigated. 
In the models that follow, I operationalize and test whether there are differences in 
the effects of attitudinal, active behavioral, and passive behavioral social influence on 
participation in collective civic action.  By doing so, I identify the types of social influence 
that are most significant for explaining differential participation in collective civic action and 
thus contribute to the long-standing concern in social movement scholarship of explicating 
the precise dimensions of social ties that are most consequential for mobilizing activism 
(McAdam and Paulsen 1993). 
 
Strong Tie Effects on Collective Civic Action: Social Influence or Selection? 
Based on the previously developed theoretical account, we would expect strong ties to 
activists to be powerful sources of social influence, inducing people to participate in 
collective civic action.  However, an alternative explanation calls into question this 
interpretation of strong tie effects.  Given the nonrandom nature of friendship formation, 
instead of strong ties causing people to participate in collective action because of social 
influence, it is entirely possible that individuals purposively seek out and select as friends 
people who share their commitment to collective action.  As James Jasper (1997:61-62) 
expresses, “many networks result from conscious, often political, decisions: comrades are 
those we have chosen because we share with them some image of social justice or social 
change.”  If activists choose to become friends with other activists, then the relationship 
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between strong ties and collective action would be attributable to selection, not social 
influence.  Given the old adage that “birds of a feather flock together,” homophily represents 
a plausible competing explanation for the observed strong tie effects on collective action. 
Despite its importance, social movement scholars have largely neglected the selection 
process when modeling the effect of strong ties on collective action.  For instance, revisiting 
an example from above, Opp and Gern (1993) documented that people who had friends who 
were critical of and acted politically against the regime were more likely to participate in the 
East German Revolution of 1989 than those who did not have such friends.  Although these 
scholars attribute this finding to the positive incentives that critical friends provided to 
participate, it is just as likely that selection explains this finding as people who shared a 
commitment to overthrowing the regime were drawn to each other and became friends.2  
Supporting this view, broader scholarship on social networks has shown that selection is an 
important explanation for the observed behavior homogeneity among peers (see, for instance, 
Bauman and Ennett 1996; Cohen 1977, 1983; Ennett and Bauman 1994; Jussim and Osgood 
1989; Kandel 1978; Matsueda and Anderson 1998).  In light of this evidence, we need to 
account for selection before we can be confident that strong ties to activists promote 
participation in collective action as scholars of social movements claim. 
Incorporating a dispositional perspective into network models of collective action 
allows us to address directly this important issue of selection.  As discussed above, this 
perspective emphasizes the push of a prosocial orientation to explain differential 
participation in collective civic action.  Besides encouraging involvement in collective 
action, the homophily principle predicts that people who are prosocially oriented will embed 
                                                 
2 Opp and Gern (1993) seem to recognize this possibility, stating, “Theory and research on social exchange 
indicate that personal networks develop on the basis of similarity.  Thus, critical respondents are likely to have 
critical friends.”  However, they dismiss this possibility and give it no more attention. 
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themselves in social relations that are supportive of collective civic action.  In other words, a 
prosocial orientation constitutes an important basis on which activist friendships form and 
remain intact.  It is important to point out that although a prosocial orientation should directly 
lead people to form friendships with others who are committed to collective action, 
organization involvements are likely to mediate this formation.  That is, people who have a 
prosocial orientation are likely to be attracted to organizations that reflect this orientation, 
such as ones that engage in charitable activity, and these organizations, in turn, provide the 
necessary opportunity for people who have a prosocial orientation to interact with each other 
and become friends (c.f. Feld 1982).  Numerous studies have shown that voluntary 
organizations are among the most important social spaces in which people develop close 
relationships with similar others (Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).  Consequently, the effect of a prosocial orientation on 
selection of activist friends is likely to be direct and indirect through involvement in certain 
types of organizations.  In sum, by modeling a prosocial orientation, I will identify whether 
the effect of strong ties is robust to the inclusion of this orientation and thus the extent to 
which strong ties to activists represents a spurious effect due to homophily or a significant 
effect due to social influence. 
Besides evaluating the significance of selection and social influence for a relational 
perspective of collective action, bringing together a prosocial orientation and social 
embeddedness will advance our knowledge of a dispositional perspective of collective action.  
Because dispositional models of collective action have not included social ties, they have 
likely missed an important mechanism through which a prosocial orientation channels 
involvement in collective action.  Although scholars from a dispositional perspective have 
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documented a direct link between a prosocial orientation and collective action, it is possible 
that a prosocial orientation’s importance is mainly as a conduit, guiding people to form close 
bonds with others who are committed to collective action and thus sources of social influence 
inducing participation.  By specifying whether this is true or not, this chapter makes a 
significant contribution to our understanding of how a dispositional perspective generates 
collective civic action and connects to the larger issue in the social movement literature of 
explicating the precise pathways of participation (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
Figure 2.1 summarizes my synthetic model of collective civic action.  A relational 
perspective of collective civic action assumes that strong civic activist ties are significant 
sources of social influence inducing participation (see bolded arrow in Figure 2.2).  But as 
discussed above, the homophily principle predicts that people who have a prosocial 
orientation will embed themselves in activist social relations.  This may be direct or indirect 
through voluntary organizations since these institutions provide the requisite social spaces for 
similar people to meet and develop close relationships.  The bold arrows in Figure 2.3 
represent the possible homophily effects.  By incorporating a prosocial orientation into 
network models of collective action, my synthetic model helps identify whether the effect of 
strong civic activist ties represents a spurious effect due to homophily on a prosocial 
orientation (see dashed arrow in Figure 2.4), or whether the effect of strong civic activist ties 
represents a significant effect due to social influence (Figure 2.2).  In addition, my synthetic 
model makes an important contribution to a dispositional understanding of collective civic 
action.  It does so by specifying whether a prosocial orientation’s importance for collective 
civic action participation is entirely indirect, driving people to integrate themselves in social 
networks that are sources of social influence encouraging participation (see bolded arrows 
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and dashed arrow in Figure 2.5), or whether a prosocial orientation still directly affects 
participation in collective civic action after adding these important mediating relational 
effects (Figure 2.6). 
 
The Possible Moderating Effect of Network Density 
Beyond strong ties to individual activists, the network structure of these ties may be 
important for explaining differential participation in collective civic action.  As Klovdahl 
(Klovdahl 1985 1204) states, “the structure of a network has consequences for its individual 
members and for the network as a whole, over and above effects of characteristics and 
behaviors of the individuals involved.”  One particularly important network characteristic 
linked with a range of behaviors is network density (see, for example, Wellman 1979).  
Network density is the extent to which individuals in a person’s network have direct ties to 
each other and is formally operationalized as the number of actual direct ties among people 
in a person’s network divided by the possible number of direct ties among people in a 
person’s network (Scott 2000 :70-71).  When each member in a person’s network knows 
every other member, network density is at its maximum value of one, and when none of the 
members in a person’s network knows each other, network density is at its minimum value of 
zero. 
It is conceivable that embeddedness in more dense networks should increase the 
likelihood of conforming to the behaviors and expectations of network members relative to 
embeddedness in less dense networks.  Because people who are in more dense networks 
interact and communicate more frequently with each other than people who are in less dense 
networks, rejecting or accepting the social influence that members exert on each other likely 
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carries with it a greater risk of collective punishments or a greater gain of collective rewards 
(Coleman 1988, 1990).  For example, if a member of a network with a density of one refuses 
to participate when asked to do so by other members, this person may face negative sanctions 
that are far more extensive and perhaps intense than a member of a network with a zero 
density.  Because members of perfectly dense networks are likely to communicate and 
interact with each other, the chances are good that the member’s refusal will become widely 
known.  As the other members discuss with each other how their fellow member turned them 
down, the negative feelings that each held for this member are reinforced and heightened in 
collective awareness.  However, in a network with a density of zero, if a person turns down 
friends’ requests to participate in collective action, the negative sanctions that this person 
faces are not collectively corroborated and thus not intensified since members in the network 
do not know each other.  This line of reasoning and explanation is consistent with the 
previously mentioned selective incentive account for explaining social network effects on 
activism, though it emphasizes the structure giving rise to collective social approval and 
disapproval of strong ties. 
Broader scholarship on social networks confirms this theory, finding that network 
density considerably moderates the effect of social influence of individual peers on behavior 
(see, especially, Haynie 2001).  However, this scholarship has tended to focus only on 
passive behavioral social influence.  We thus do not know whether network density also 
moderates other forms of social influence.  In what follows, I draw on broader scholarship on 
social networks and test whether network density moderates the effect of social influence of 
individual ties on collective civic action.  I also extend this scholarship by examining 
whether this moderating effect varies depending on the dimension of social influence tested.  
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Data, Variables, and Models 
Data 
To test the synthetic model of collective civic action proposed in this chapter, it was 
necessary that the employed survey data included measures of a prosocial orientation, strong 
ties to civic activists, civic participation, and demographic variables to account for possible 
confounding effects.  The 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) contains 
measures that capture all of these concepts.  Given that commonly used survey data for 
analyzing civic engagement, such as the General Social Surveys, Independent Sector, or 
National Election Studies, do not, the RAPAS is unique in its design and is the only dataset 
of which I am aware that allows for testing the proposed synthetic model of collective civic 
action.  The 2002 RAPAS was a telephone survey representing English-speaking Americans 
18 years of age and older who resided in households in the United States, conducted by FGI 
Research Inc., a national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  The 
survey was conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-dial method, employing 
a sample of randomly generated telephone numbers representative of all telephones in the 50 
United States.  The survey was conducted with English-speaking households only.  In order 
to randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure representativeness of age and 
gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the adult in the household who had 
the most recent birthday.  All non-household numbers (business, government, nonprofit, etc.) 
were screened out of the sample through direct calling dispositions or ascription of contact 
and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes based on proportions of household 
numbers among working telephone numbers.  Survey respondents were offered an incentive 
of 10 dollars to complete the survey.  The final sample size for this survey was 2,898 and 
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response rate based on AAPOR’s RR3 method was 47 percent (American Association for 
Public Opinion Research 2006).3,4
In the next part of this section, I describe how I operationalize each of the variables 
used in the synthetic model of collective civic action.  In this description, I distinguish 
between measures of endogenous and exogenous variables.  The final part of this section 
discusses the statistical method employed: Structural Equation Models (SEMs).  I first 
explain the reasons why SEMs were the optimal choice of the available statistical methods to 
test my synthetic model of collective civic action.  I then briefly elaborate technical 
mechanics involved in using SEMs to estimate this model (for a full description of these 
mechanics, see Appendix A).  
 
Endogenous Variables 
The first endogenous variable in the model was a binary measure for participation in 
collective civic action.5  I coded this variable as one if respondents volunteered for a 
                                                 
3 The formula for AAPOR’s RR3 method is (I )/((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed 
Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is 
Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of 
unknown eligibility that are eligible.  For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they 
were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC’s percentage of 
working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000).  For non-contacted numbers 
after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren’s 
(2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call 
attempts that are residential numbers. 
 
4 Because the RAPAS was unable to collect information on individuals who did not participate in the survey 
(since they refused to participate), there was no way to investigate whether those who responded to the survey 
were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who did not.  Given the focus of this chapter, if those who 
were more civically active were more likely to respond than those who refused, this could be an important 
source of bias.  While it is true that people who are more civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate 
in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an incentive generally negates this difference (Groves, 
Singer, and Corning 2000).  Incentives generally produce greater survey representativeness without any 
deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; Singer, Van Hoewyk, and 
Maher 2000).  Regarding demographic differences between the RAPAS and Census averages, older, more 
educated, and female respondents were over represented.  The RAPAS constructed a weight based on these 
demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions 
matched those of the Census for American adults. 
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community project during the last year, and I coded this variable as zero if respondents did 
not volunteer for a community project in the last year.  A prosocial orientation was the 
second endogenous variable in the model.  Following the conceptualization of a prosocial 
orientation as a concern for the welfare and rights of other people (Penner 2002; Penner and 
Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995), I used two five-category ordinal variables that tap this 
conceptualization. The first variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel 
to help other people who are in need.  The second variable measured how responsible 
respondents personally feel to take action against wrongs and injustices in life.  Each variable 
ranges from one (not responsible at all) to five (extremely responsible). 
My third and fourth endogenous variables measured participation in charitable and 
non-charitable organizations.  The RAPAS asked respondents the number of groups or 
organizations in which they were involved during the past 12 months.  Respondents who 
reported being involved in any organization were then asked to report the number of 
organizations in which they were involved.  For each organization reported, respondents 
were then asked whether the organization sponsored efforts that serve the needs of people in 
the community.  I used this information to construct a variable for the number of 
organizations in which respondents were activity involved that serve needs of people in the 
community (charitable organizations) and a variable for the number of organizations in 
which respondents were activity involved that do not (non-charitable organizations). 
                                                 
5 Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial orientation, 
such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others.  For these variables, it would be preferable to not 
have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation.  However, a programming 
limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus I also treated the other control variables as occurring casually 
prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive sense (e.g., working 
full-time).  But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control variables to underlying 
propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors with the measure for a 
prosocial orientation.  Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, seems to violate the 
least number of assumptions.  But since it is not without flaws, I do not interpret the effects of the control 
variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation. 
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My fifth, sixth, and seventh endogenous variables measured attitudinal, passive 
behavioral, and active behavioral social influence that strong ties exert for collective civic 
action.  The RAPAS asked respondents to nominate up to five people to whom they felt 
closest who were not members of their household, and then asked numerous questions about 
the characteristics of these people. Attitudinal social influence was measured as the number 
of strong ties who would respond positively if respondents did volunteer work for a social, 
political, or community issue.  Passive behavioral social influence was measured as the 
number of strong ties who regularly do volunteer work, while active behavioral social 
influence was measured as the number of strong ties who asked or encouraged respondents to 
do volunteer work in the past year.  The eighth endogenous variable was a measure of 
network size, representing the total number of strong ties whom respondents nominated. 
My ninth endogenous variable was a measure of network density.  Respondents were 
asked whether each strong tie they nominated knew well each of the other strong ties they 
nominated.  This knowledge was assumed to be nondirectional.  For instance, if respondents 
indicated that strong tie A knew strong tie B well, it was assumed that strong tie B also knew 
strong tie A well, which seems to be a reasonable assumption.  To calculate network density, 
I thus used the formula for nondirectional association among network ties: A/(P[P-1]/2), 
where A is the actual number of strong ties that knew each other well and P is the possible 
number of strong ties that knew each other well (Scott 2000).  Because respondents could 
nominate up to five strong ties, the total number of possible pairs of strong ties that could 
know each other well is 10 (5[5-1]/2]).6  The final endogenous variables measured the 
interaction between density and attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social 
                                                 
6 I follow convention for ego-centric networks and only count the links among strong ties nominated and not the 
links between respondents and each strong tie nominated (Scott 2000:72-73).  
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influence described above, multiplying density and each measure of social influence 
together. 
 
Exogenous Variables 
Because prior studies of collective action have identified that demographic characteristics are 
important factors for distinguishing participants from nonparticipants, I controlled for the 
following exogenous variables that might have otherwise confounded the effect of my key 
explanatory variables: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); race (0 = white; 1 = 
African American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college degree; 0 = less than a 
four-year college degree); region (1 = South; 0 = Non-South); community type (1 = rural; 0 = 
non-rural); working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status 
(1= married;  0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); 
physical health (five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood 
(number of children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and 
household income (eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than 
$100,000).  Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.7
 
Structural Equation Models 
Simply measuring a prosocial orientation with observed variables would likely introduce 
substantial measurement error because they would not perfectly capture what is conceptually 
meant by this concept.  Furthermore, as described above, I have two measures for a prosocial 
orientation.  If we were to form scales for these measures and run a series of regression 
                                                 
7 Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number 
of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above.  
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models, the results would be difficult to interpret since the measurement error in them would 
not be taken into account and thus the coefficients would be biased.  Structural equation 
models (SEMs) with latent variables are well suited to address these problems (Bollen 
1989b).  SEMs allow concepts to be represented as unobserved or latent variables that 
incorporate measurement error.8  Additionally, SEMs can simultaneously estimate numerous 
regression equations, and they facilitate the decomposition of indirect, direct, and total 
effects among these equations.  This is crucial for adequately evaluating my synthetic model 
of collective civic action in Figure 2.1, as it requires not only explicating the direct paths 
strong civic activist ties and a prosocial orientation on collective civic action, but also 
intervening paths, most importantly whether strong civic activist ties mediate the relationship 
between a prosocial orientation and participation in collective civic action (see Figure 2.1). 
Because some of my observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, I could 
not use traditional SEMs to estimate my models of collective civic action because they 
assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous. I therefore used methods 
devised to correct the various problems that categorical observed endogenous variables pose 
for traditional SEMs.  Appendix A provides a more formal presentation of the SEM approach 
that I use.  In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal and dichotomous variables are 
crude representations of normally distributed continuous variables.  The covariance matrix of 
these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is the basis for the analysis.  In the 
case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous outcome variable with exogenous 
explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to probit regression.  However, the 
SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate multiple equations with a mixture 
                                                 
8 Because it is assumed that the other variables have negligible measurement error, any measurement error in 
them should not introduce considerable bias for the results and thus alter any of the substantive interpretations. 
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of ordinal and dichotomous indicators.  See Appendix A.  To compare the magnitude of the 
effects of the different types of social influence, I calculated predicted probabilities for them. 
Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not 
have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; 
Schafer and Olsen 1998).9  MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed techniques 
for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy variable 
adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12).  Moreover, MI assumes only that the 
data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that they are 
missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other commonly 
employed techniques, such as listwise or pairwise deletion.  Five imputations were generated, 
each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values based on their 
predictive distributions.  Identical SEMs were run for each of the five imputed datasets, using 
complete data on all variables.  The results were then combined to produce overall estimates, 
standard errors, and significance levels that take into account uncertainty about missing data. 
My analyses proceed in the following steps.  I first estimate models that replicate a 
dispositional and a relational perspective of collective civic action.  I next estimate a model 
for my synthetic perspective of collective civic action and demonstrate how it improves on 
the two previous models.  I then calculate predicted probabilities for the effects of the 
different types of social influence that strong ties exert and compare the magnitude of these 
probabilities.  This allows me to answer the important question of whether different 
dimensions of social influence have differing effects on participation in collective civic 
action.  I conclude by testing whether network density moderates the effect of social 
                                                 
9 For MI, the MICE program (van Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 
2005) was used, which explicitly handles categorical variables.  
 31
influence on participation in collective civic action and whether this moderating effect differs 
depending on the type of social influence modeled. 
 
Results 
Dispositional and Relational Models of Collective Civic Action 
Table 2.2 replicates the previously discussed dispositional and relational models of 
collective civic action.10  To replicate the former model, I set all parameters that involve 
effects of strong civic activist ties on collective civic action to zero as well as all parameters 
that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on strong civic activist ties, so that the effects 
of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action would occur without the effects of strong 
civic activist ties (see Figure 2.5).11  Replication of the latter model required setting the 
parameter for the effect of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action to zero as well as 
all parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on strong civic activist ties, so 
that the effects of strong ties to civic activists on collective civic action would result without 
controlling for a prosocial orientation (see Figure 2.2).12  Both models control for all 
demographic variables mentioned above.  As the first row in Table 2.2 indicates, the higher 
the prosocial orientation, the greater the likelihood of individual participation in collective 
civic action (β = .255; p < .001) and thus support for a dispositional model of collective civic 
                                                 
10 All models from SEM estimates use unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship and Radbill 
1994). 
 
11  Although they are not the focus of this chapter, the organizational effects are considered to be part of the 
relational model (see Figure 2.2) and thus all parameters that involve effects of organizations on collective civic 
action are set to zero as well as all parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on organizations in 
the dispositional model. 
 
12 All parameters that involve effects of a prosocial orientation on organizations are also set to zero in the 
relational model because organizations are considered to be part of this model (see note 11).  
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action.13  Looking at the second column in Table 2.2, we also see confirmation for a 
relational model of collective civic action.  Replacing a strong non-activist tie with either a 
strong tie who approves of volunteer work (β = .086; p < .001), a strong tie who engages in 
volunteer work (β = .152; p < .001), or a strong tie who requests volunteer work (β = .116; p 
< .001) significantly increases the probability of participating in collective civic action.14  
However, as I argued in the theoretical sections of this chapter, there are important 
limitations when estimating a dispositional and a relational model of collective civic action in 
isolation.  For a dispositional model, this isolation likely means missing an important 
pathway through which a prosocial orientation promotes collective civic action, as it is 
expected that prosocially oriented people will embed themselves in activist social networks, 
which in turn mobilize participation.  In terms of a relational perspective, not taking into 
account a prosocial orientation makes it difficult to accept the position that strong ties are 
sources of social influence inducing participation.  It is just as likely that this effect reflects 
selection rather than social influence, as prosocially oriented people form friendships with 
others who share their commitment to collective civic action. 
The overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the columns in Table 2.2 provide 
empirical evidence of the inadequacy of treating dispositional and relational models of 
                                                 
13 To facilitate interpretation of the prosocial orientation latent variable, I scaled it in the same unit as one of its 
indicators by setting the regression coefficient for feeling personally responsible to help other people who are in 
need to one.  As expected, the regression coefficient for the other indicator—personally feeling responsible to 
take action against wrongs and injustice in life—was positive and statistically significant (p < .001).  In 
addition, the prosocial orientation latent variable explained a substantial portion of each of its indicators 
variability, as evident by the high R2 values for both (.589 and .435).  Overall, then, the latent variable for a 
prosocial orientation achieved an excellent component fit. 
 
14 To hold constant the number of strong ties, an increase in the number of strong civic activist ties of any type 
means that there must be an equivalent decrease in strong non-activist ties.  So, for example, if a person has 3 
total strong ties and gains 2 strong civic activist ties, then this person must also lose 2 strong non-activist ties.  
My substantive interpretation of the effect of strong ties and strong civic activist ties on participation in 
collective civic action incorporates the interdependence of these measures, and thus the measure for the number 
of strong ties (network size) captures the effect for strong non-activist ties. 
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collective active action in isolation.  For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit 
Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a 
good model fit, while values less than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit (Bollen 1989a; 
Bollen and Curran 2006:44-47).  For the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA), values less than .05 generally indicate a very good model fit, while values greater 
than .10 generally indicate a poor model fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993).  The fit statistics 
indicate that the dispositional model of collective civic action achieves a poor fit to the data 
and that the relational model of collective civic action achieves a moderate fit to the data at 
best, which indicates these models are not properly specified.  To address this 
misspecification in these models, I estimate my synthetic model of collective civic action that 
integrates the dispositional and relational models of activism. 
 
Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action 
Table 2.3 reports overall fit statistics and direct effects in the form of probit 
coefficients for my synthetic model of collective civic action illustrated in Figure 2.1.  Each 
column represents a separate probit regression that corresponds to each path in this figure.  
All models control for demographic variables described above (but because demographic 
variables are not the focus of this chapter and to conserve space, their results are only 
displayed in Appendix B in Table B1).  The synthetic model of collective civic action shown 
in Table 2.3 frees the parameters for strong civic ties that the dispositional model in Table 2.2 
constrained to zero as well as the parameters for a prosocial orientation that the relational 
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model constrained to zero.15  Freely estimating these parameters allows me to test 
simultaneously the effects of strong ties and a prosocial orientation on collective civic action. 
Because the dispositional model and relational model are nested in the synthetic 
model, I tested whether the synthetic model improved the fit compared to the other two 
models of collective civic action.  Results from these chi-square difference tests indicated 
that the synthetic model of collective civic action led to a significant improvement in fit 
relative to both the dispositional and relational models displayed in Table 2.2 (χ2 = 115.02; 
df =9; p < .001 and χ2 = 49.56; df =6; p < .001 respectively).16  Furthermore, looking at the 
overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 2.3, we see that, in 
contrast to the dispositional and relational models previously estimated, the synthetic model 
achieves a good fit to the data.  Although the chi-square test statistic is significant, indicating 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test is not suited to 
evaluate model fit with large sample sizes like the one in this case (N = 2,898).  This is 
because the ability of detecting even small differences between the population model implied 
covariance and the population observed variable covariance increases with sample size.  All 
of the other fit statistics indicted a good model fit.  The values for the TLI, IFI, and CFI are 
.991 and the value for the RMSEA is .034, indicating that the synthetic model of collective 
civic action is a good fitting model.  The synthetic model of collective civic action, then, 
improves the fit relative to the dispositional and relational models in Table 2.2 and shows a 
good overall fit to the data.  It is also worth noting that the synthetic model of collective civic 
                                                 
15 The synthetic model of collective civic action also frees the parameters for organizational involvements that 
the dispositional model constrained to zero. 
 
16 These nested tests were done using the DIFFTEST option in Mplus (Muthen and Asparouhov 2006).  
Because the nested tests were conducted on five datasets from multiple imputation, Allison’s SAS marco 
(COMBCHI) was used to produce the final values for these tests. 
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action explains almost 40 percent of the variability in people’s propensity to get involved in 
community volunteer efforts. 
Turning to the first row in Table 2.3, we see that a prosocial orientation leads people 
directly to form strong relationships with individuals who request volunteer work (β = .156; 
p < .001), who participate in volunteer work (β = .224; p < .001), and who approve of 
volunteer work (β = .288; p < .001), thus supporting the theoretical argument that a prosocial 
orientation is an important basis of civic activist friendships. Combining these direct effects 
with its significant positive indirect effects through charitable and non-charitable 
organizational involvements gives a prosocial orientation a total effect of .302 for having 
strong ties who approve of volunteer work, a total effect of .273 of having strong ties who do 
volunteer work, and a total effect of .190 of having strong ties who request volunteer work 
(see Table 2.4).  Notably, even after accounting for the impact of a prosocial orientation on 
strong civic activist ties, this orientation still significantly and positively affects participation 
in collective civic action (β = .163; p <. 001).  In addition to the significance of the 
coefficient for a prosocial orientation, the chi-square difference test showed that the model 
that freely estimates the direct effect of a prosocial orientation on collective civic action has a 
better fit than the model that constrains this effect to be zero (χ2 = 24.5; df =1; p < .001).  
Nonetheless, by not accounting for the effect of a prosocial orientation on strong ties to civic 
activists, as in the case of the dispositional model in Table 2.2, we miss an important 
mechanism through which a prosocial orientation promotes collective civic action.  The 
significance of a prosocial orientation for mobilizing collective civic action is also as a 
conduit, guiding people to embed themselves in strong civic activist networks, which in turn 
facilitate participation.  A prosocial orientation has a total indirect effect of .131 on collective 
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civic action, which is due to its direct effects on different types of strong civic activist ties, its 
indirect effects on these ties through organizational involvements, and its direct effects on 
organizational involvements.  Its indirect effects through strong civic activists ties accounts 
for 26 percent of prosocial orientation’s total effect on collective civic action.17
I next explore the extent to which a prosocial orientation attenuates the effects of 
strong ties to civic activists on collective civic action observed in the relational model in 
Table 2.2, and thus help specify whether these effects are largely due to selection or social 
influence.  While there is some reduction in the effects of the strong civic activist tie 
measures on collective civic action when the parameters for a prosocial orientation that were 
set to zero in the relational model are freely estimated, all of these measures remain as robust 
positive predictors of participation.  This demonstrates that strong civic activist ties affect 
participation in collective civic action above and beyond selection effects due to a prosocial 
orientation, supporting the argument that strong ties are important sources of social influence 
inducing participation.  It is also noteworthy that each strong civic activist tie measure 
significantly and positively affects participation in collective civic action net of the other 
measures and the overall number of strong ties.  Replacing a strong non-activist tie with 
either a strong tie who approves of volunteer work (β = .062; p < .01), a strong tie who 
engages in volunteer work (β = .140; p < .001), or a strong tie who requests volunteer work 
(β = .095; p < .001) significantly increases the probability of participating in collective civic 
action.  This indicates that each dimension of social influence distinctively mobilizes 
participation in collective civic action.  In sum, my synthetic model of collective civic action 
                                                 
17 This was calculated by excluding the portion of a prosocial orientation’s total indirect effect on collective 
civic action that was due to its direct effects on organizational involvements (.056).  Without these direct effects 
included, a prosocial orientation’s total indirect effect on collective civic action is .075 and thus the percentage 
of a prosocial orientation’s total effect on collective civic action that is due to its effects on strong civic activist 
ties is 26 (.075/.294 = .25). 
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substantially improves on the dispositional and relational models estimated in Table 2.2, as it 
detects an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation promotes participation 
and helps establish the significance of strong ties as powerful sources of social influence 
compelling participation. 
 
Which Dimensions of Social Influence Matter Most? 
From Table 2.3 we learned that each dimension of measured social influence 
distinctively contributes to generating participation in collective civic action.  I now turn to 
the issue of whether different dimensions of social influence have differing effects on 
participation in collective civic action.  To do so, I calculated the difference in the predicted 
probability of participation in collective civic action when the number of strong non-activist 
ties was replaced with the same number of strong activist ties for each dimension of social 
influence.18, 19  Figure 2.7 graphically displays these differences.  Comparing the heights for 
the different set of bars, we see in all cases that the difference in the predicted probability of 
participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties 
                                                 
18 The values for the number of strong ties who approve of volunteering, the number of strong ties who request 
volunteering, and the number of strong ties who engage in volunteering are simultaneously set to zero to obtain 
the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for the number of strong non-activist ties.  
For instance, to obtain the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for one strong non-
activist tie required setting the number of strong ties to 1 and number of strong ties who approve of volunteering 
to 0, the number of strong ties who request volunteering to 0, and the number of strong ties who engage in 
volunteering to 0.  Because we are interested in the possible differing effects of the different types of strong 
activist ties, when the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action was calculated for one type 
of strong activist ties the values for the other types of strong activist ties were set to 0.  Returning to the 
previous example, to obtain the predicted probability of participation in collective civic action for one strong tie 
who approves of volunteering required setting the number of strong ties to 1, the number of strong ties who 
approve of volunteering to 1, the number of strong ties who request volunteering to 0, and the number of strong 
ties who engage in volunteering to zero. 
  
19 The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: Pr(yi =1| xi) = 1-Φ(τ1-βxi).  Other 
than the values for the strong ties, which vary from model to model, the predicted probabilities are for white 
married college educated females age 25 who have children under 19 living at home, military experience, attend 
no charitable or non-charitable organizations, live outside the south, live in rural areas, have average prosocial 
orientation, average physical health, and average income. 
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who engage in volunteering is greater than the difference in the predicted probability of 
participation in collective civic action for replacing strong non-activist ties with either strong 
ties who request volunteering or strong ties who approve of volunteering.  We also see that in 
all cases that the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic 
action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties who request volunteering is 
greater than the difference in the predicted probability of participation in collective civic 
action for replacing strong non-activist ties with strong ties who approve of volunteering.  
These differences grow as we increase the number of strong non-activist ties being replaced 
by the number of strong activist ties.  For instance, the difference in the predicted probability 
of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties with five 
strong ties who approve of volunteering is .119, while the difference in the predicted 
probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties 
with five strong ties who request volunteering is .178 and the difference in the predicted 
probability of participation in collective civic action for replacing five strong non-activist ties 
with five strong ties who engage in volunteering is .249.  To summarize, while attitudinal 
social influence is a significant predictor of participation in collective civic action, it has 
weaker effects on this participation than active behavioral social influence and especially 
passive behavioral social influence.  Concerning the difference in participation in collective 
civic action between the behavioral types of social influence, passive behavioral social 
influence has stronger effects than active behavioral social influence. 
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 Moderating Effect of Network Density  
My final model tests whether network density moderates the effect of social influence on 
collective civic action, and if so, whether this moderating effect applies to all types of social 
influence or just certain ones.  To test this possibility, I entered terms for the interaction 
between density and each of the different measures of social influence from strong ties.20  
Looking at the results in Table 2.5, we see that none of the interaction terms were 
significant.21 Contrary to theoretical expectations discussed above, then, it seems that 
network density does not significantly amplify the effect of any of the measures of social 
influence on participation in collective civic action.22
 
Responses to Possible Objections 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, the source of information of 
the strong tie network characteristics, and the timing of the survey, several objections to the 
statistical models and interpretations are possible.  This section reviews and responds to these 
objections.   
First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult 
activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist 
                                                 
20 To reduce collinearity, I centered these terms. 
 
21 The chi-square difference test showed that the model that freely estimates the joint effects of the interaction 
terms fit no better than the model that constrains the joint effects of the interaction terms to be equal (χ2 = 
1.032; df =3; p < .384).  In addition, the nonsignificant findings for the interaction terms were not an artifact of 
jointly entering them in the model, as entering each interaction term while removing the other two produced the 
same nonsignificant results. 
 
22 On conceptual grounds, people who have no strong ties or only one strong tie have a density of zero.  But 
since there may be a concern that coding people who have no strong ties or only 1 strong tie as zero on network 
density would bias the results, I restricted the sample to respondents who had at least two strong ties and 
reestimated the model in Table 2.5.  The results were substantively similar, as were the results when the sample 
was restricted to respondents who had at least three strong ties. 
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friendships promote a prosocial orientation.  But this possibility seems unlikely when judged 
against previous empirical studies.  Research has demonstrated that the forming of a 
prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization 
factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to 
exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and 
Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; 
Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; 
Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125).  Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation 
generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way 
around. 
Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from 
respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have 
inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties.  However, this is less of a 
concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness.  If people are 
unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not 
operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to 
explain.  For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of 
respondents learning of strong ties’ participation in collective action.  Hence, even if 
respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong 
ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are 
aware.  Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the 
objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong 
ties. 
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Third, because the 2002 RAPAS was administered in the months after the September 
11 terrorist attacks and asked questions about activities during a portion of these months, this 
may bias the results regarding participation in collective civic action.  Even if 9/11 affected 
the extent to which people got involved in collective civic action, it is unlikely that this 
would have fundamentally altered the nature of the causal relationships that I observed.  In 
other words, even if September 11 had, for instance, increased the rates of peers who 
encouraged friends to do volunteer work or the rates of volunteering for community projects, 
it seems unlikely that these increases would have changed, for instance, the fact that having 
such peers is a powerful source of social influence inducing participation in collective civic 
action.  Although prior studies have not integrated a prosocial orientation and social networks 
as I have here, these studies have consistently shown the importance of these factors for 
explaining who participates in volunteer efforts and who does not outside of disaster 
contexts.  Consequently, any effects of September 11 on my survey data and results would 
appear to have been exogenous, possibly increasing levels of civic behaviors and 
commitments, but not altering the fundamental processes that I have observed. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, besides strong civic activist ties being 
powerful sources of social influence inducing collective civic action, it is possible that 
participation in collective civic action could also affect the formation of these ties.  The main 
argument for this possibility would seem to be that involvement in collective civic action 
provides opportunities to interact with other activists and form friendships, much in the same 
way that formal organization involvements do.  However, unlike formal organizations that 
have fixed meeting spaces, regular and structured gatherings, and events and activities that 
often span extended periods of time, collective civic action is generally transient, sporadic, 
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loosely structured, and short in duration.  Consequently, it does not seem that participation in 
collective civic action would provide either the quantity or quality of interaction needed to 
create and sustain strong connections among individuals.  Recall that the measures of civic 
activist ties were the five closest people to respondents, not acquaintances or other weak ties, 
which may be likely to develop in the context of collective civic action.  In his ethnography 
of various advocacy groups, Lichterman (2005:82-83) found that participation in community 
efforts did not give rise to close, personal relationships with other activists or people whom 
these efforts served.  When connections did develop from this participation, they were brief 
and impersonal. 
Lichterman’s (2005) evidence suggests that participation in collective civic action 
does not substantially affect the formation of activist ties and thus the exclusion of this effect 
should not undermine my results for the effect of activist ties.  However, given the 
importance of this issue, I conducted sensitivity tests assuming that there was a feedback 
effect of participation in collective civic action on the formation of activist ties to see if the 
effect of activist ties on participation was robust to the inclusion of this feedback effect.23  
Specifically, I estimated models in which I set the coefficient for feedback effect of 
participation on activist ties to varying percentages of the coefficient for the effect of activist 
ties on participation.24  This allowed me to identify whether the feedback effect had to be a 
                                                 
23 Ideally, longitudinal analysis or a nonrecursive model would be conducted to test for the robustness of the 
activist strong tie effects in the presence of this feedback.  However, I am aware of no data over time that 
contain measures of activist networks and activist participation.  Concerning estimating a nonrecursive model, I 
would need two instrumental variables: one that affects participation in collective civic action but not strong 
civic activist ties and one that affects strong civic activist ties but not collective civic action.  Unfortunately, 
with the survey data employed, instrumental variables do not exist for either case.  But this is not surprising, as 
instrumental variables are extremely difficult to identify in general. 
  
24 This was done in four steps.  First, to establish a comparable metric, the standardized coefficients for the 
effects of activist ties on participation in collective civic action were derived.  These standardized coefficients 
were then multiplied by varying percentages.  Third, the products of the standardized coefficients and the 
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low or high percentage of the effect of activist ties on participation for this effect to fall to 
nonsignificance.  If this was a low percentage, say 25 percent, this would seem to call into 
question my results, as it is reasonable to think that the feedback effect could actually be 25 
percent of the effect of activist ties on participation.  However, if this was a high percentage, 
say over 50 percent, this would give me confidence in my results, as it is not very reasonable 
to think that the feedback effect would actually be over 50 percent of the effect of activist ties 
on participation. 
Table 2.6 displays the results of these sensitivity tests.  Looking down the second and 
third column of this table, we see that all the effects of activist ties are robust when assuming 
that the coefficient for the feedback effect is 25 or 50 percent of the value of the coefficient 
for the effect of each type of activist ties on participation in collective civic action.  When the 
coefficient for the feedback effect is set to 75 percent of the value of the coefficient for the 
effect of active behavioral social influence on participation in collective civic action, this 
effect falls to nonsignificance (see the fourth column in Table 6).  But is it plausible to think 
that this feedback effect would really be 75 percent of the effect of active behavioral social 
influence on participation in collective civic action?  Based on my previous conceptual 
discussion and Lichterman’s (2005) empirical finding, this seems unlikely.  Even if we 
assume that the coefficient for the feedback effect is 100 percent of the value of the 
coefficient for the effect of passive behavioral social influence on this participation, the effect 
of passive behavior social influence on participation in collective civic action is still 
                                                 
varying percentages were multiplied by σy/ σx, where σy represents the standard deviation of participation in 
collective civic action and σx represents the standard deviation for activist ties.  This step was necessary to 
convert the values of the feedback effects back to unstandardized coefficients.  Finally, the feedback effect was 
fixed to the product from the third step and the model was reestimated so the robustness of the original effects 
of activist ties on participation in collective civic action could be evaluated when feedback effect of 
participation in collective civic action on activist ties was included. 
 
 44
significant.  The same is true for attitudinal social influence.  Overall, then, even assuming 
that the coefficient for the feedback is a substantial percentage of the effect of activist ties on 
participation in collective civic action does not change the fact that activist ties are robust 
predictors of participation in collective civic action.  This result thus gives me confidence in 
my estimated models showing the important activist ties for inducing participation in 
collective civic action. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the advantages of integrating a dispositional and a relational 
perspective for explaining arguably the enduring question in the collective action literature of 
differential participation.  My synthetic model of collective action offers key insights into the 
dynamics of activism that are missed when these two perspectives are treated in isolation, 
showing how prosocially oriented people select others as friends who share their 
commitment to collective action, and how embeddedness in these friendship networks, in 
turn, induce participation.  Hence, rather than viewing a dispositional and a relational 
perspective as competing and incompatible explanations for differential participation, as has 
often been the case in the past, I see these two perspectives as complementary, working 
together to expand what has been until now a limited view of the nature of collective action. 
 Consistent with a dispositional perspective of collective action that tends to pervade 
the fields of altruistic behavior and volunteerism, the results in this chapter showed that a 
prosocial orientation directly leads people to participate in activism, suggesting that “an 
enduring concern for the welfare and rights of other people and felt empathy for them” 
(Penner and Finkelstein 1998:526) is a sufficient condition for motivating participation.  
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However, by demonstrating an important pathway through which a prosocial orientation 
generates participation in collective action, this chapter moved beyond a static view of the 
relationship between dispositions and activism.  As my empirical models demonstrated, the 
significance of a prosocial orientation for collective action is also a conduit, guiding people 
to embed themselves in activist networks that are powerful sources of social influence 
encouraging participation.  Because scholars from a dispositional perspective have not 
generally included measures of social networks in their models, they have missed an 
opportunity to contribute to the broader call in the collective action literature of specifying 
the precise mechanisms of mobilization (McAdam et al. 2001).  While future research may 
uncover additional mechanisms, we cannot deny the central importance of activist networks 
for mediating the relationship between orientations and participation, which is only observed 
through a synthesis of a dispositional and relational perspective of collective action. 
 Because a relational perspective of collective action was largely constructed in 
opposition to the classic psychological “strain” theory of activism and the fact that this 
perspective has tended to be the leading one for explaining differential participation in the 
field of social movements, the “psychology” of collective action has generally been absent in 
this field.  This has recently begun to change, however, with the “cultural turn” in social 
movement scholarship during the last decade.  Among other things, this turn has sought to 
reintroduce personal motivations and reactions to the study collective action, emphasizing the 
ways in which psychological “shocks” can directly trigger and stimulate participation (Jasper 
1997, 1998; Snow et al. 1998).  For instance, Luker (1984) found that two-thirds of the 
California pro-life activists she studied were “self-recruits,” actively seeking out this 
movement in response to information about abortion that offended and horrified them.  This 
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chapter demonstrates a similar process, but for a more stable, consistent, and enduring 
motivation, explicating how a prosocial orientation indirectly and directly mobilizes 
participation in collective action.  In light of this evidence, future social movement 
scholarship on differential participation would likely benefit by including enduring individual 
dispositions in their models. 
 Besides generally benefiting social movement literature on differential participation, 
incorporating a dispositional perspective specifically benefits a relational perspective of 
collective action, providing a way to evaluate the significance that scholars from this 
perspective have attached to social network effects.  Despite findings from numerous 
relational models of collective action showing the positive effects of social networks, none of 
these models have accounted for the important alternative explanation of selection.  
Consequently, instead of the observed social network effects being the result of social 
influence, they could just as easily be due to homophily, in which people who are committed 
to collective action choose others as friends who share their commitment to collective action.  
As I argued above, controlling for a prosocial orientation helps address selection given that it 
is an important bias on which activist friendships form.  The inclusion of a prosocial 
orientation should thus render social network effects nonsignificant if selection is mainly 
responsible for these effects.  But my empirical models showed that, even after taking into 
account a prosocial orientation, the effects of strong ties to people who engage in, encourage, 
and support collective civic action were robust.  Therefore, while a prosocial orientation 
leads people to form friendships with others who support collective action, these friendships 
are significant sources of social influence that promote participation above and beyond the 
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orientation that is the basis of this friendship.  This supports the view that social networks 
constitute important selective incentives for participation. 
This fact notwithstanding, not all types of social influence are equally important for 
mobilizing participation in collective action.  While my empirical results showed that 
attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral forms of social influence all had distinct 
and positive effects on collective action, comparing the magnitude of these effects revealed 
an important difference: behavioral social influence of both types was more important for 
promoting participation than attitudinal social influence.  Because prior studies modeling the 
effect of social ties on activism have generally only included a single measure of social 
influence, they have not been able to detect this difference.  This has given rise to 
misinterpretations of the exact dimensions of social influence that matter most for mobilizing 
participation.  
Differences in the effects of attitudinal and behavioral social influence on collective 
action are most likely due to differences in the positive and negative sanctions that follow 
from these two types of social influence.  Although people who are merely supportive of 
activism are likely to reward friends who participate, people who actually participate are 
likely to reward friends more who participate.  This is because people who actually 
participate are presumably more committed to activism than mere attitudinal supporters, and 
thus place more value on friends’ participation.  Actually engaging in what others practice 
therefore should generate stronger social approval than doing what others simply support 
attitudinally.  Moreover, we would not expect people who simply support activism to 
disapprove of friends who do not participate since they themselves are not participants.  By 
comparison, we would expect individuals who themselves participate in collective action to 
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be more likely to disapprove of nonparticipating friends, given their strong and public 
commitment to activism and desire of the same from friends.  Therefore, individuals have 
more to gain from participating in collective action and much more to lose from not 
participating when they have friends who actually participate in activism compared to being 
merely attitudinal supporters of activism. 
Similar differences in gains and losses are evident in the case of friends who 
explicitly request or encourage activism versus friends who simply support activism.  People 
who participate in activism in response to the actual direct request of friends are likely to 
receive various forms of praises for doing so, since they have responded positively to their 
friends’ request.  This scenario cannot occur when friends merely support activism.  In terms 
of the negative sanctions discussed above, not participating carries with it relatively little risk 
of falling from good graces with friends who only support activism.  Again, we would not 
expect people who do not participate themselves to disapprove of friends who also do not 
participate.  However, not participating carries with it a great deal of risk of falling from 
good graces with friends who directly request participation.  This is because the fact of 
failing to participate is more obvious and potentially more slighting when a direct request has 
been made and then not acted on.  But relative to attitudinal social influence, active 
behavioral social influence had weaker effects on participation in collective civic action than 
passive behavioral social influence.  Based on the logic just outlined, it is not clear why this 
would be the case.  Future research should examine this difference in more detail.  In sum, as 
far as the mobilizing power of social influence is concerned, it appears that “actions speak 
louder than words.” 
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Contrary to arguments that people in more dense networks communicate with each 
other more frequently and thus rejecting social influence from activist strong ties to 
participate carries with it the threat of more severe sanctioning than does this rejection for 
people in less dense networks, the empirical models in this chapter did not identify any 
significant interactions between the number of activist strong ties and network density.  
Based on this finding, network density does not amplify the effect of any type of social 
influence on participation in collective civic action.  It thus seems that connections among 
friends provide no additional incentives for inducing participation.  It is having individual 
friends who exert social influence that is crucial for mobilizing people to participate in 
collective civic action.   
Given that there are various forms of collective action, an important issue that needs 
to be addressed is the extent to which the findings for collective civic action, which is a form 
of low-risk/cost activism, generalize to forms of high-risk/cost activism, such as protests.  
Despite the fact that social movement scholars have long argued that different dynamics 
explain participation in low-risk/cost activism and high-risk/cost activism (McAdam 1986), 
closer inspection suggests that, at least in this case, there should be very few differences in 
the mobilization processes of these types of activism.  Whether people are embedded in 
social networks that focus on protesting to overthrow political regimes or social networks 
that focus on volunteering to improve the broader community, both provide selective 
incentives that induce participation.  In fact, numerous studies of disruptive collective action 
have demonstrated that social ties are important for mobilizing participation (della Porta 
1988; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993).  It is 
thus difficult to see why the effects of social networks observed for collective civic action 
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would change for more contentious forms of activism.  Moreover, the level of risk and cost 
of activism should not alter the finding that attitudinal social influence is less important for 
mobilizing participation than behavioral types of social influence or the moderating effect of 
network density on behavioral social influence.  This chapter proposed general explanations 
for these effects, which are unlikely to vary for different forms of collective action. 
However, when the collective action studied is of a high-risk/cost nature, there may 
be two important differences for the effects of dispositions in general and a prosocial 
disposition in particular.  First, although a prosocial disposition may be associated with 
protest action (c.f. Keniston 1968; Loveman 1998; Smith 1996:169-208), other dispositions 
may show stronger associations with protest action, such as a tendency for radicalism and 
social change.  Second, regardless of the disposition that is most correlated with protest 
activism, the high-risk/cost nature of protest activism may render this disposition insufficient 
for participation.  If this were the case, this would run counter to the finding that a prosocial 
orientation is a sufficient condition for motivating participation in collective civic action, 
suggesting that the level of risk and cost associated with activism can alter the relationship 
between orientations and participation.  Even if this were true, protest dispositions should 
still indirectly promote participation, connecting people to other protesters and people who 
support protest action.  This would be an important contribution given that so little is known 
about the formation of protest networks.  Overall, then, with the exception of the direct effect 
of orientations on participation, it seems that the processes observed for collective civic 
action should generalize to other, more disruptive forms of collective action. 
To conclude, this chapter has advanced our understanding of differential participation 
in three important ways.  First, by synthesizing a dispositional and a relational perspective of 
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collective action, it has broadened our knowledge of the dynamics of activism, specifying 
how the push of orientations connects to the pull of social networks to promote participation 
in collective action.  Second, this chapter has explicated the precise dimensions of social 
networks that are the most potent sources of social influence inducing participation, showing 
that behavioral types of social influence are more important for mobilizing collective action 
than attitudinal social influence.  Last, it has shown that the important network characteristic 
of density does not moderate the effect of any type of social influence on participation in 
collective action.  Because there are good reasons to believe that these contributions 
generalize beyond the case of collective civic action, this encourages future studies of 
differential participation to incorporate them in their models of collective action regardless of 
whether the form studied is of a low-risk/cost or high-risk/cost nature.
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis 
 
 
Mean S.D.
Collective civic action
Volunteered for a community project .327 .469
Prosocial orientation
Personally feeling responsible to help others in need 3.722 .884
Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice 3.435 1.020
Attitudinal social influence
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering 3.762 1.951
Passive behavioral social influence
# of strong ties who volunteer 1.325 1.476
Active behavioral social influence
# of strong ties who request volunteering .597 1.178
# of strong ties (network size) 4.620 1.068
Network density .207 .244
# of charitable organizations .346 .768
# of noncharitable organizations .186 .585
Demographic variables
White .760 .427
Black .111 .314
Other race .128 .334
College education .243 .429
Income 5.487 2.844
Female .519 .500
Age 45.013 17.713
Physical heath 3.855 .921
# of children under 19 living in household .617 1.021
Working full-time .493 .500
Served in the military .156 .363
Married .563 .495
South .386 .487
Rural .230 .421
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 Table 2.2 Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Dispositional and Relational Models of Collective Civic Action 
 
 
Explanatory variables Dispositional Model Relational Model
Prosocial orientation            .255***              ⎯
          (.046)
Attitudinal Social Influence
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering              ⎯           .086***
         (.018)
Passive Behavioral Social Influence              ⎯
# of strong ties who volunteer           .152***
         (.020)
Active Behavioral Social Influence              ⎯
# of strong ties who request volunteering           .116***
         (.021)
# of strong ties              ⎯           .002
         (.036)
Noncharitable organizations              ⎯           .238***
         (.038)
Charitable organizations              ⎯           .477***
         (.024)
R2            .194           .377
Model χ2          1479.100***            451.137***
Degrees of freedom              21             17
CFI            .751           .926
IFI            .755           .927
TLI            .755           .927
RMSEA            .155           .094
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for both models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not
Collective Civic Action
 
*** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
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 Table 2.3. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action 
 # of strong # of strong
ties who # of strong ties who
Nonchartiable Charitable # of strong approve of ties who request Collective 
Explanatory variables Organizations Organizations ties volunteering volunteer volunteering Civic Action
Prosocial Orientation     .037**     .101***     .058**      .288***     .224***     .156***     .163***
   (.013)    (.020)    (.019)     (.052)    (.041)    (.031)    (.038)
Nonchariable organizations        ⎯        ⎯     .024      .056     .178***     .054*     .235***
   (.003)     (.053)    (.038)    (.026)    (.040)
Charitable organizations        ⎯        ⎯     .061*      .141***     .421***     .318***     .465***
   (.026)     (.041)    (.030)    (.026)    (.024)
# of strong ties        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯     .007
   (.036)
Attitudinal Social Influence
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯     .062**
   (.020)
Passive Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who volunteer        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯     .140***
   (.023)
Active Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who request volunteering        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯      .095***
    (.028)
R2      .032      .071      .050      .109      .171      .098      .397
Model χ2     69.272***
Degrees of freedom       16
CFI     .991
IFI     .991
TLI     .991
RMSEA     .034
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are controls for
all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1 (see Appendix B for results for demographic variables).
* p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 2.4. Indirect and Total Effects of Prosocial Orientation on Strong Civic Activist Ties and Collective Civic Action 
 
 
# of strong ties # of strong ties
who approve of # of strong ties who request Collective 
volunteering who volunteer volunteering Civic Action
Prosocial Orientation        .014/.302        .049/.273         .034/.190        .131/.294
Note : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the p < .05 level (two-tail tests) or lower.
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 Table 2.5. Moderating Effect of Network Density 
 
 
Explanatory variables Collective Civic Action
Attitudinal Social Influence
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering                       .063**
                     (.021)
Passive Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who volunteer                       .136***
                     (.023)
Active Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who request volunteering                       .111***
                     (.028)
# of strong ties                       .001
                     (.037)
Network density                      -.037
                     (.142)
Network density × # of strong ties who approve of volunteering                      -.042
                     (.073)
Network density × # of strong ties who volunteer                      -.116
                     (.091)
Network density × # of strong ties who request volunteering                       .144
                     (.113)
R2                       .401
Model χ2                    242.197***
Degrees of freedom                         28
CFI                       .975
IFI                       .976
TLI                       .976
RMSEA                       .052
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for both models is 2,898 individuals.
Also included but not shown are controls for organizations and all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
 
** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 2.6. Sensitivity Tests for Hypothetical Values for Feedback Effect of Participation in Collective Civic Action on the 
Formation of Strong Civic Activist Ties 
 
0 25 50 75 100
Attitudinal Social Influence
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering      .062**      .055**      .049*      .042* .036+
Passive Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who volunteer      .140***      .117***      .094***      .071**      .048*
Active Behavioral Social Influence
# of strong ties who request volunteering      .095***      .075**      .057*      .037 ⎯
+ p < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
organizations, and all demographic variables listed in Table 2.1.
Notes : Number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are controls for network size, 
Percentage
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual Relational Model of Collective Civic Action 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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 Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model of Collective Civic Action: Homophily Effects 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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 Figure 2.4. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Spurious Network Effects 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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 Figure 2.5. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Dispositional Indirect Effects 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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 Figure 2.6. Conceptual Synthetic Model of Collective Civic Action: Dispositional Direct Effect 
 
Prosocial
Orientation
Organizational
Involvements
Collective Civic 
Action
Strong Civic
Activist Ties
Note: Strong ties to those who approve of civic action, to those who request civic action, and to 
those who participate in civic action are represented with the single box labeled “strong civic 
activist ties.”
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 Figure 2.7. Effects of Different Dimensions of Social Influence on Participation in Collective Civic Action 
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 CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATION ON U.S. CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT: EXPLICATING MECHANISMS OF MOBILIZATION AND 
CONSTRAINT 
Echoing the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville over a century and a half ago and 
contrary to secularization and privatization theorists, political scientists and sociologists have 
regularly observed the significance of today’s religious institutions for mobilizing a critical 
mass of U.S. citizens to participate in social and political action.25  A large body of 
scholarship has demonstrated that embeddedness in religious organizations promotes 
participation in various kinds of civic engagement, including volunteer efforts in 
communities, lobbying campaigns to elect candidates, and protests and demonstrations to 
support or oppose governmental policies (Becker and Dhingra 2001; Beyerlein and Hipp 
2006; Brown and Brown 2003; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell and Yonish 2003; Cassel 
1999; Cavendish 2001; Guth et al. 1998; Harris 1994, 1999; Jackson et al. 1995; Lam 2002; 
McVeigh and Smith 1999; Musick et al. 2000; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wilson and Janoski 1995; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1999; 
Wiltfang and McAdam 1991; Wuthnow 1999, 2004).  The increasing presence of religion in 
American public life has given rise to much scholarly and 
                                                 
25 This chapter focuses on the relationship between religious congregational embeddedness and civic 
engagement.  The impact of other dimensions of religion, such as beliefs or private devotional practices, on 
civic engagement is less clear.  Prior research has found that they sometimes mobilize, demobilize, or have no 
effect on getting involved in civic action (see, for example, Becker and Dhingra 2001; Lam 2002; Musick, 
Wilson, and Bynum 2000).  Given these contradictory findings, a profitable direction for future research would 
be to conduct a systematic analysis on the connection between other dimensions of religion and civic 
engagement as this chapter has done for the organizational dimension of religion. 
 
 pubic debate, with conservatives generally arguing for a greater role of religious 
organizations, and liberals generally arguing for a more restricted role. 
As far as a cultivating a robust civil society is concerned, one issue is the extent to 
which religious participation encourages inter-group community activism, that is, whether it 
promotes forms of social participation that are focused exclusively within religious groups 
or, rather, beyond their own bounds.  As a baseline, many scholars suggest that the simple 
existence of a multiplicity of non-state social groups, organizations, and institutions 
mediating between individuals and the state fosters a rich civil society crucial for sustaining 
healthy democracies (Berger and Neuhaus 1977).  Beyond that, some scholars also suggest 
that the cohesion of civil society is further strengthened when voluntary associations of civil 
society are able to mobilize support not only for involvement in their own activities, but also 
for outwardly-focused social relations and voluntary service to people beyond their own 
immediate groups (Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000).  When religious groups mainly encourage 
participants to devote time and energy to relating to and helping fellow members and to 
advancing their own religious activities and interests, religious institutions strengthen civil 
society in an elementary way through their simple existence.  On the other hand, when 
religious involvements motivate activities that go beyond merely serving in-group members 
to also serving those in the wider community, to engagement in forms of social participation 
that benefit citizens broadly regardless of their religious commitments, then we have reason 
to believe the influence of religious organizations in the public sphere in this way is likely to 
further enhance the cohesion and functioning of civil society.  Nearly one-hundred million 
Americans participate every week in religious congregations, spending more time in faith 
congregations than any other type of voluntary association.  Religious institutions thus 
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 significantly shape the nature of American civil society in various ways.  Therefore, 
understanding the mechanisms through which congregational embeddedness can mobilize or 
constrain activism that serves those in the broader community would seem to have important 
implications for our understanding of the character and vitality of civil society in the United 
States. 
But this is where extant scholarship on religion and civic engagement is of little help.  
For one, this scholarship has generally focused on describing rather than explaining the 
relationship between congregation participation and civic engagement.  Consequently, we do 
not know what exactly it is about congregation integration that mobilizes participation in 
civic activism in communities.  Connected to this, the scholarship on religion and civic 
engagement has not been careful to specify the dimensions of congregation embeddedness 
that are most important for mobilization.  Another important limitation of extant scholarship 
on religion and civic engagement is that it tends to assume that religious integration always 
facilitates participation in civic engagement in communities.  However, social movement 
scholarship has begun to emphasize that embeddedness in certain organizations and networks 
need not necessarily mobilize activist participation, and that it may actually demobilize 
activist participation (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and 
Paulsen 1993).  To grasp fully religious participation’s effect on civil society, it is crucial that 
we not only identify the processes that lead to mobilization of civic engagement, but also 
those that may lead to demobilization.  Finally, studies and debates about the relationship 
between religious organizations and civic action invoke language that grants causal power to 
these organizations’ mobilization efforts.  However, the relationship between religious 
embeddedness and civic engagement could just as easily be the result of selection, where 
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 religious people who were previously committed to activism purposively join activist 
congregations because they reflect their values.  Given that current studies have generally 
ignored selection, we cannot be confident that the observed positive effects of religious 
organizations on civic engagement in communities are in fact the function of their 
mobilization efforts. 
In what follows, I substantially advance our understanding of the relationship 
between religion and civic engagement by overcoming these important limitations of past 
research.  First, I develop and test a theoretical model that explicates the various mechanisms 
through which different dimensions of congregation embeddedness promotes volunteer 
efforts that help those in the broader community.  Second, in contrast to the current religion 
and civic engagement scholarship, I identify how congregation participation also constrains 
participation in civic activism in communities.  Last, I draw on a dispositional model to 
address the alternative explanation of selection, and thus help isolate the effect of 
congregations’ mobilization efforts on promoting civic engagement in communities. 
 
A Model of Congregation Mobilization 
Clergy Mobilization 
 The first way in which congregations can mobilize parishioners to participate in civic 
action in communities is through clergy mobilization efforts.  Because of the way in which 
religious institutions are organized, they have preexisting leadership structures, in the form of 
clergy, priests, pastors, ministers, rabbis, or imams.26  This is important because the social 
movement literature has demonstrated an important link between leadership and the 
emergence, growth, decline, success, and failure of various collective action struggles (for a 
                                                 
26 For brevity, I use the term clergy to refer to the leaders of various religious traditions and communities. 
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 recent review of social movement scholarship on leadership, see Morris 2000).  In social 
movements where religious organizations have played a key role, for example the U.S. civil 
rights movement, Central America peace struggle, Solidarity movement in Poland, and 
community-based organizing, studies often identify the significance of clergy, especially in 
terms of inducing people to participate and sacrifice for the cause (McAdam 1999; Morris 
1984; Nepstad 2004; Oberschall 1973; Osa 2003; Smith 1996; Warren 2001; Wood 2002).  
In his classic study of the civil rights movement, Morris (1984) demonstrated how many 
black pastors embraced and preached a militant version of Christianity, demanding that 
church members engage in the fight to end racial injustice (see also McAdam 1999; 
Oberschall 1973).  By doing so, black clergy were often able to raise the activist 
consciousness and broaden perceptions of church members and thus get them involved in the 
movement, which they may not have done otherwise. 
In addition to case studies of social movements, the religion and politics literature 
highlights that clergy often attempt to mobilize parishioners for external civic action.  In 
general, this literature stresses two main strategies that clergy use to promote civic 
engagement among members.  First, clergy try to get laity involved in civic action by 
providing information about opportunities to be active.  For example, clergy make 
announcements about civic activities during formal and informal religious gatherings 
(Brewer, Kersh, and Petersen 2003; Greenberg 2000; Guth et al. 1997; Olson 2000; Welch et 
al. 1993), and clergy organize events to let members know about civic activities in 
communities, including arranging representatives of community or social service 
organizations to speak at congregations (Chaves 2004).  Second, and more important, clergy 
attempt to promote lay participation in civic action by encouraging them to get involved to 
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 help and serve others in communities during sermons, teachings, homilies, prayers, or 
discussions.  These encouragements may be indirect or direct in nature.  Indirectly, for 
instance, clergy may emphasize the importance of helping the needy during sermons or 
religious teachings.  In their study of Protestant clergy, Guth and colleagues (1997) found 
that, on average, issues of hunger and poverty were discussed very often or often in 80 
percent of sermons that clergy delivered.  Similarly, Wuthnow (2004 :68) found that almost 
60 percent of members of congregations heard a sermon about “caring for the poor” in the 
last year.  Clergy may also directly encourage civic action through, for example, personal 
appeals to members to get involved in volunteer efforts in communities.  Verba and 
colleagues (1995) found that clergy attempted to recruit over a third of members of 
congregations to get involved in some civic action other than voting. 
Because the unit of analysis in the previously mentioned studies tends to be 
movements, clergy, or congregations, it is difficult to evaluate the success of clergy 
mobilization efforts in terms of getting members involved in civic activities in communities.  
The few studies that have collected data on both clergy mobilization efforts and congregation 
members’ activist participation suggest that these efforts are quite effective.  For example, in 
his case study of participation in parish-based civic action in the south side of Chicago, 
Cavendish (2001) found that parish members of a predominantly African American church 
who were exposed to preaching that stressed the value of activist commitments were more 
likely to participate in parish-based civic action.  To account for the effect of clergy 
mobilization on participation, Cavendish (2001) focused on how activist preaching may 
cultivate attitudes that are conducive to activism, such as religious justifications for action.  
This is similar to Morris’ (1984) account discussed above for how black clergy mobilized 
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 church members to participate in the civil rights movement.  However, Cavendish (2001) 
found that exposure to activist preaching was a robust predictor of participation in parish-
based civic action even after the inclusion of attitudinal factors of activism.  This suggests 
that there is another explanation for the link between clergy mobilization efforts and 
members’ participation in civic engagement beyond fostering attitudes useful for activism. 
 As leaders of religious congregations, clergy occupy a position of prestige, authority, 
and respect relative to other congregation members.  Congregation members look to clergy 
for advice not only on religious matters, but also on nonreligious matters, and members are 
likely to feel obligated to follow what clergy advise.  Although it is rarely viewed in this 
manner, the relationship between clergy and laity can be thought of as a vertical social 
network consisting of an asymmetric relation of power and dependence (Putnam 1994: 173).  
By conceiving of the clergy-laity link in this way, we can see that clergy exert a considerable 
degree of social influence over members.  Because congregation members tend to hold clergy 
in high esteem, they are likely to want to please and avoid disappointing them.   
This has important implications for our understanding of clergy mobilization efforts 
and the response of congregation members to these efforts.  The broader social network 
literature discusses how social influence is an important mechanism that motivates action and 
helps explain the robust effects of human connections (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers 
et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham et al. 
1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; 
Warr and Stafford 1991).  Although not using the exact language of social influence, rational 
choice as well as cultural theorists of collective action argue that the desire to gain approval 
and avoid disapproval from significant others is an important nonmaterial selection incentive 
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 motivating participation in various forms of activism (see, for example, Chong 1991; 
Goodwin et al. 2001; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 1993).  Following this line of thought, 
clergy’s exertion of social influence on congregation members to get involved in civic efforts 
in communities, whether informally or formally, serves as an important selective incentive 
inducing members to participate, given that they have much to gain by participating or much 
to lose by not.  Hence, I expect that when clergy call on members to get involved in civic 
action in communities, they will generally respond to this call and participate. 
Laity Mobilization 
The second way in which congregations can encourage members to participate in 
civic engagement in communities is through mobilization networks consisting of fellow 
congregation members.  A great deal of social movement scholarship on differential 
participation has demonstrated that embeddedness in activist personal networks is one of the 
main factors for explaining why certain people participate in collective action while others do 
not (see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; 
Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; 
Opp and Gern 1993; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Snow et al. 1980).  
Importantly, this scholarship has shown that it is strong activist ties that are most 
consequential, as they are powerful sources of social influence inducing participation in 
collective action (for a recent discussion of this point, see Kitts 2000).  People respond to the 
request of close friends to participate in activism because they desire their approval and wish 
to avoid their disapproval, but they have little or nothing to lose by turning down or little or 
nothing to gain by acting on the request of a stranger or a distant acquaintance.  Echoing this 
sentiment, Passy (2001) found that having friends who were activists had a positive effect of 
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 participation in the Swiss solidarity movement, while having acquaintances who were 
activists did not (see also McAdam 1986; Opp and Gern 1993).  Congregation peer networks 
should therefore mobilize participation in civic action if they are strong and activist in nature. 
In terms of closeness, congregations are among the most important social institutions 
for forging strong bonds among individuals.  Wuthnow (2004 :81), for example, found that 
80 percent of congregation members had three or more close friends who were also 
congregation members.  Congregations, then, clearly fulfill the strength component that is 
necessary for peer network mobilization, but do they also provide the activist component?  
Given the significance of congregations in various social movements as previously 
mentioned, the answer would seem to be yes.  Surprisingly, however, little attention has been 
given to the possible activist nature of congregation peer networks.  Campbell and Yonish’s 
(2003) analysis of the Giving and Volunteering Surveys did show that among people 
engaged in civic activities, 30 percent of recruitment efforts were through congregations, 
though sampling on the dependent variable obviously limits the usefulness of this study.  But 
it does demonstrate that congregation ties can be mobilizing in character. 
More often, research on the relationship between congregation networks and civic 
engagement simply models the effect of the number of congregation friends in general.  
Becker and Dhingra (2001), for instance, found among a sample of attenders in upstate New 
York that having congregation members in one’s close circle of friends predicted engaging in 
general volunteering, while being able to confide in fellow congregation members predicted 
engaging in congregation-based volunteering efforts.  However, the results of such studies do 
not have a clear interpretation since they do not account for the activist nature of 
congregation ties.  It is unclear why congregation peer networks in general would mobilize 
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 participation in civic action, especially civic action in the wider community.  The lack of 
empirical evidence notwithstanding, the theoretical reasons articulated above lead us to 
expect that when congregation peer networks are activist in nature, they will induce members 
to participate in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community. 
Cultivation of Transposable Skills 
The third way in which congregations can mobilize participation in civic engagement 
in communities is through cultivating relevant skills for activism.  Political scientists Verba 
and colleagues (1995) have demonstrated that people who possess organizing skills are 
considerably more likely to be involved in civic activities that demand significant time and 
energy relative to those who lack organizing skills (see also Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 
1982:85-87; Opp 1989:Chapter 8).  Importantly, Verba et al. (1995) documented that, along 
with other voluntary organizations and workplace institutions, congregations were important 
settings in which people acquired and sharpened organizing skills: writing letters, planning 
meetings, giving presentations, and attending meetings where decisions were made during 
the course of congregation involvement.  These skills can then be transferred to civic 
activities outside of congregations, as Verba et al. (1995) demonstrate. 
Like the Verba (1995) team, a central focus of recent scholarship on religion and 
civic engagement has been on how involvement in congregation activity beyond religious 
service attendance “spills over” to external civic engagement.  Numerous studies have found 
a positive connection between congregation activity and participation in a wide range of civic 
outcomes.  Brown and Brown (2003) found that the more African Americans participate in 
church committee work, the more likely they are to participate in voting and other types of 
civic activism (see also Harris 1994; Harris 1999).  Similarly, Park and Smith (2002) found 
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 among churchgoing Protestants that involvement in church activities beyond worship 
service—such as attending potlucks, Bible studies, choir practice, or small groups—was 
positively associated with both religious and nonreligious sponsored community 
volunteering.  Many other studies of more representative samples have found a similar 
connection between engagement in church activity beyond worship service and engagement 
in different kinds of civic activity outside of congregations (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Cassel 
1999; Lam 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004). 
The assumption of Verba et al (1995) and recent religion and civic engagement 
scholarship is that participation in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance 
of any sort will foster skills that lead to participation in other civic activities.  But this may be 
an incorrect assumption, as skills gained from, say, leading Bible studies in congregations 
would seem to be very different from those gained from, say, participating in volunteer 
efforts in congregations.  Because of the difference in skill acquisition, participation in 
different kinds of congregation activity is likely to have a differential effect on promoting 
involvement civic engagement in communities.   
This perspective about congregation activity and civic engagement has not received 
adequate attention.  Although it is hard to know why for sure, this neglect is presumably 
because of data limitations.  Since the majority of studies examining the effect of 
congregation activity on participation in civic activities have been restricted to one general 
measure of congregation activity, they have been unable to differentiate among different 
types of congregation activity and test for possible differential effects.  Wuthnow’s 
(2004:112-115) analysis represents one exception.  In his study of predictors of volunteering 
to help disadvantaged people in communities, Wuthow (2004:112-115) included three 
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 distinct measures of involvement in congregation activity beyond religious service 
attendance: attending Sunday school, serving on a church committee, and belonging to a 
small group.  For members of congregations, he found that while the measure for Sunday 
school attendance was an insignificant predictor of participation in volunteer efforts to assist 
disadvantaged people, the measures of church committee service and small group 
membership significantly positively predicted this participation.  One important drawback of 
Wuthnow’s (2004:112-115) model is that he was unable to distinguish between participation 
in religious activity and volunteering activity in congregations.  But this seems to be the 
crucial distinction in terms of identifying congregation activity that is most likely to promote 
participation in civic engagement in communities. 
Although not focusing exclusively on religious congregations, Lam (2002) found that 
doing volunteer work for religious organizations (some of which were congregations) had a 
significant positive effect on doing volunteer work for other voluntary organizations, net of 
other types of religious organization involvement.  By engaging in volunteer work in 
congregations, members acquire and hone skills that are directly applicable to volunteer work 
outside of congregations.  For instance, congregation members learn the skill of caring and 
providing for others as they engage in volunteer work in congregations.  Similar to Sewell’s 
(1992) notion of transposablity of schema or mental categories, the skills that members learn 
from volunteering in a congregation context are “transposable” to volunteering in other 
contexts, such as those in the larger community.  However, not all volunteer work in 
congregations may be equally “transposable” to civic engagement in communities.  
Congregation volunteer work that primarily focuses on the upkeep of the organization or 
serving members would seem less valuable in terms of cultivating a volunteering repertoire 
 77
 that is most useful for engaging in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader 
community relative to congregation volunteer work that is mainly aimed at helping 
nonmembers.  Because of data limitations, Lam (2002) was unable to test for the effect of the 
distinction between “inwardly-focused” and “outwardly-focused” volunteer work in religious 
organizations.  In my empirical models, I test for this finer-grained distinction, expecting that 
participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer work activity will be a particularly 
strong mobilizer of participation in other volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader 
community. 
 
Summary of Congregation Mobilization Model 
Based on the above theoretical arguments, I posit that participation in activist clergy-
led congregations, embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks, and involvement in 
congregation volunteer activity will directly promote involvement in civic engagement in 
communities.  In addition to the direct effect of participation in activist clergy-led 
congregations, it is likely that participation in these congregations will have indirect effects 
through encouraging the formation of activist ties among fellow members as well as 
participation in volunteer work in congregations, especially volunteer work that is outwardly-
focused.  In terms of forging congregation activist peer networks, a large body of research 
has shown that voluntary organizations are among the most important social settings in 
which similar people develop and form friendships (Feld 1982; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 
1987; McPherson et al. 2001).  Because of homophily, religious activists are likely to be 
attracted to and populate congregations with activist clergy.  Participation in these 
congregations therefore gives activist members the necessary opportunities to interact with 
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 each other and become friends.  In terms of promoting involvement in volunteer activity in 
congregations, Verba and colleagues (1995) found, as discussed above, that congregations 
were among the most important voluntary organizations for cultivating skills useful to 
activism.  But activist clergy-led congregations should be particularly prone to offering 
opportunities for members to get involved in volunteer efforts in congregations, especially 
those focused on helping nonmembers, given the knowledge that participation in these efforts 
increases the activist expertise of laity and thus makes them more likely to get involved in 
other types of civic engagement that benefit people in the larger community (Hart 2001; 
Warren 2001; Wood 2002).  Although there are good reasons to expect that participation in 
activist clergy-led congregations will be antecedent to both the formation of activist 
congregation ties and participation in volunteer efforts in congregations, the causal order 
between activist congregation peer networks and congregation volunteer activity is less clear.  
As Wuthnow (2004:83) states, “Those who participate more frequently are more likely to 
make friends in their congregations, and having friends probably encourages people to 
participate more often and to feel better about being part of their congregation.  For this 
reason, I do not assign causal order between activist congregation ties and volunteer activity 
within congregations, but rather assume that they are just positively related.  The above 
arguments motivate the conceptual model of congregation mobilization represented in Figure 
3.1. 
Congregation Mobilization or Selection of Religious Activists Into Mobilizing 
Congregations? 
Figure 3.1 specifies that participation in congregations with activist clergy, 
embeddedness in activist congregation networks, and engagement in volunteer activity in 
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 congregations will promote involvement in civic action in communities.  These congregation 
factors—not other factors—are thus assumed to explain members’ involvement in volunteer 
efforts that benefit people in the broader community.  But there is an alternative explanation 
that threatens the interpretation that congregation integration drives participation in civic 
action in communities.  Instead of members’ participation being the result of congregations’ 
mobilization efforts, it is possible that members who are already committed to activism 
purposely seek out and join activist clergy-led congregations as well as associate with other 
activist members and participate in volunteer efforts in congregations.  If this were the case, 
then congregations would not generally be responsible for mobilizing members to participate 
in civic engagement in communities.  Rather, the positive relationship between congregation 
integration and civic engagement would reflect the fact that people with prior activist 
commitments “select” into activist congregations and activist congregation networks because 
they reflect their values.  If we are to attribute congregation members’ civic engagement to 
the congregation factors specified in Figure 3.1, then it is important that we account for 
selection.  Current scholarship on religion and civic engagement is of little help in this regard 
since it has generally been silent on the issue of selection (but see Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). 
Drawing on insights from a dispositional perspective of civic engagement provides a 
way to address the important issue of selection.  This perspective stresses that what is often 
called a “prosocial orientation” motivates people directly to participate in civic action to help 
others.  Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526) define a prosocial orientation as “an enduring 
tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy 
for them, and to act in a way that benefits them” (see also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995).  
Importantly, a large body of research has found a significant positive connection between a 
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 prosocial orientation (or measures capturing it) and participation in a range of civic activities 
(Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and 
Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; 
Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991).  
Given the maxim that “birds of a feather flock together,” we would expect prosocially 
oriented people to join activist clergy-led congregations, embed themselves in activist 
congregation networks, and participate in volunteer activity within congregations.  
Consequently, a prosocial orientation is an important way to control for selection and thus 
help isolate the effects of congregation mobilization efforts on promoting participation in 
civic engagement in communities. 
 
Constraining Effects of Congregations 
 Figure 3.1 assumes that congregations are important vehicles of mobilization, 
exposing members to clergy recruitment efforts, integrating members into activist networks, 
and fostering transposable volunteering skills in members.  But it would be a mistake to 
assume that activist clergy always lead congregations, that congregation peer networks are 
always activist in nature, and that congregation activities always focus on volunteering.  This 
may be called the mobilizing myth of congregations and represents one of the most 
significant limitations in current scholarship on religion and civic engagement.27  This 
scholarship has generally been silent on any possible constraining effects of congregation 
integration on civic engagement in communities.  But when congregations are viewed as 
                                                 
27 In the late sixties, certain research examining the effect of religion on support for and participation in the civil 
rights movement among American Africans acknowledged that certain religious orientations may inhibit 
support for and participation in this movement (Marx 1967).  Besides this research, it is difficult to find any 
mention of the possible constraining effects of religion on civic engagement, especially in literature specifically 
focused on this topic. 
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 religious establishments—which they are first and foremost—it is not difficult to see how 
involvement and ties developed in them can hinder participation in volunteer efforts that 
serve those in the broader community.  
The primary purpose of congregations is, of course, to provide religious guidance and 
social fellowship (see, for example, Ammerman 2005), not to organize efforts for civic action 
in communities.  Given this, civic engagement is often not a vital or part at all of many 
congregations’ missions.  Nurturing the spiritual and social needs of members is the first 
priority, and mobilizing takes a back seat or is altogether avoided due to concerns that it will 
compromise this nurturing (Greenberg 2000).  For example, based on the 1998 National 
Congregations Study (NCS), Chaves (2004:182-183) found that while over 40 percent of 
congregations did not engage in social service activity of any sort in the last year, only 1 
percent of congregations did not engage in worship of some sort in the last week and only 10 
percent of congregations did not engage in religious education classes in the last week.  
Additionally, Chaves (2004:184) found that significantly more people were involved in 
worship and religious education activities in congregations relative to social service 
activities.  Even the mobilization efforts of the “black church”—generally regarded as the 
most activist of all U.S. religious institutions—are far from universal.  During the height of 
the civil rights movement, for instance, the theological conservatism of many African 
American congregations rendered their participation unlikely (Kurzman 1998; Payne 1995; 
Reed 1986:Chapter 4).  Current studies of the black church also identify the quiescence of 
many of its institutions, finding that one fourth or more of African American congregations 
today abstain from mobilization efforts altogether, such as organizing activist events or 
preaching activist sermons (Wuthnow 2002a, 2004).  This is not to say that all congregations 
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 do not engage in mobilization efforts, because some do as the above section described.  But 
these studies point out that many congregations are not vehicles of mobilization, a fact that is 
rarely, if ever, acknowledged in current scholarship on religion and civic engagement.  
Instead, this scholarship generally reads as though congregations always mobilize members 
for participation in civic engagement in communities (but see Wood 2002). 
In the past, social movement scholars were guilty of the same oversight in their 
discussion of the role of organizations and networks in the activist process.  But over the last 
decade or so social movement scholars have begun to acknowledge that organization and 
network embeddedness are not only a source of mobilization, but can also function as a 
barrier to activist participation (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000). As 
McAdam and Paulsen (1993:645, 641) articulate, “social ties may constrain as well as 
encourage activism…[People] are invariably embedded in many organizational or 
association networks or individual relationships that may expose the individual to conflicting 
behavioral pressures.”  The social movement literature, however, has yet to specify the exact 
kinds of organizations and networks that are most likely to hinder activism.  Given the focus 
on spiritual and social support of members, congregations and the networks that they foster 
may substantially hinder members from civic engagement in communities.  In what follows, 
I discuss three specific ways in which congregations can constrain participation in volunteer 
efforts that serve those in the broader community. 
First, when congregation networks are quiescent in nature, embeddedness in them 
should function as a disincentive for participation in civic action in communities.  
Congregation members who are not committed to activism are likely to see their primary role 
as serving the spiritual and social needs of fellow members.  There is no shortage of evidence 
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 for the “bonding” nature of congregation ties.  Congregation members are called to care for 
the spiritual needs of fellow members.  As Krause et al. (2001:638) state, “…fellow 
parishioners help each other in ways that are uniquely religious, such as providing spiritual 
support (i.e., mutual encouragement to adopt and practice various tenets of religion).”  These 
scholars found that embeddedness in congregation networks providing spiritual support was 
positively associated with religious coping, such as looking to God for strength or seeking 
help from God to let go of anger.  In terms of social support, Wuthnow (2004:84) found, for 
example, that 40 percent of people said that they could count on members of their 
congregation for help if they or family members became sick, whereas only 29 percent of 
people said they could count on co-workers and 9 percent of people said they could count on 
members of other nonprofit organization for this help.  Moreover, a large body of literature 
on religion and health echoes the finding that congregation ties serve as significant providers 
of social support for members (for a recent review, see George, Ellison, and Larson 2002). 
Because congregation members who are not activists are more likely to perceive that 
civic engagement may conflict with helping fellow members spiritually and socially 
(Greenberg 2000), which may be the first priority in their minds, they would be more likely 
to disapprove of activist participation than congregational members who are community 
activists.  In the same way that individuals desire not to disappoint activist peers by not 
participating in collective action, congregation members desire not to disappoint fellow 
members who are primarily committed to serving the spiritual and social needs of members 
by participating in this action.  If members who are embedded in religious congregations that 
tend toward exclusive “bonding” social relations engage in civic action in communities, they 
risk being sanctioned by fellow members for going against their wishes and what they think 
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 is most important.  Recall from above that congregation ties are generally strong in nature 
and thus their social influence on those who have them tends to be great.  Hence, integration 
into congregation networks that are not activist in nature should be a very powerful source of 
social influence deterring involvement in external civic activities.   
In his study of the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines, Goodwin (1997) 
suggested that because of safety concerns for loved ones, activists embedded in romantic and 
familial networks faced intense pressure to withdraw from the high-risk activities of the 
insurgency, which many did, leading to the eventual demise of the movement.  There may be 
a broad parallel here in American religious congregations, in which a primary concern for the 
spiritual and social needs of members might discourage participation in out-group volunteer 
efforts in communities.  Hence, integration in congregation networks that are not activist in 
nature may represent a significant barrier to participation in civic engagement which is seen 
as distracting from caring for congregation members spiritually and socially.  This 
observation has an important methodological implication that to date has not been 
incorporated.  Because many relationships forged among members in congregations are 
unlikely to be activist in nature, it is important to include not only a measure for the number 
of congregation ties, but also a measure for the number of congregation activist ties when 
modeling the effect of congregation network embeddedness on participation in civic 
engagement in communities.  But prior studies such as Becker and Dhingra (2001) have not 
done so , including only a measure of the number of congregation ties in general, and thus 
they have likely obscured the fact that integration into certain types of congregation 
networks—“bonding”—are likely to constrain rather than mobilize involvement in volunteer 
efforts that benefit people outside of congregations. 
 85
  Second, congregation activity that does not consist of volunteering activity also has 
the potential to hinder participation in civic engagement in communities.  Although Verba et 
al. (1995) and scholarship on religion and civic engagement (Brown and Brown 2003; Cassel 
1999; Harris 1994, 1999; Lam 2002; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004) 
have argued that congregation activity of any sort should foster skills that are transferable to 
external civic action, there are good reasons to question this argument.  Because of the nature 
of civic engagement in communities, volunteer activity in congregations, especially when 
outwardly-focused, is the most likely type of activity to generate skills that transpose to 
getting involved in volunteer efforts to help those in the wider community.  Following this 
logic, engaging in such exclusively religious activities in congregations as leading Bible 
studies or teaching Sunday school is less likely to generate skills that are applicable for 
participation in volunteer efforts in communities.  Rather, this activity is more likely to 
generate skills that are most useful for participation in other religious activities in 
congregations.  Consequently, members who engage in solely religious activity in 
congregations will be less prepared to participate in volunteer efforts focused on serving 
others in the broader community and thus may avoid them, preferring instead to devote their 
time to religious activities for which they are well versed.  In this way, participation in 
activity in congregations that does not involve volunteer work may hinder participation in 
civic engagement in communities. 
Third, like members of congregations who are not committed to activism, clergy who 
abstain from mobilizing parishioners for civic action in communities likely believe that their 
focus should be on the spiritual and social needs of members, and consequently that 
mobilization efforts undermine this focus (Greenberg 2000).  Beyond devotion to the 
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 spiritual and social needs of members, quiescent clergy likely object to mobilizing laity for 
community activism because they see this as an inappropriate solution to social ills.  As one 
“disengaged” pastor in Olson’s (2000:18) study of Protestant clergy stated, “I see the real 
solution to society’s problems as evangelism and personal holiness in the lives of individuals 
rather than social activism.”  Whether the result of commitment to spiritual and social needs 
of members or rejection of activism as an adequate response to social problems, quiescent 
clergy are likely to make implicitly and explicitly known their dislike for activism to 
parishioners.  Congregation members thus risk falling out of good graces with clergy, whom 
they are likely to hold in high regard given that they are spiritual leaders, if they go against 
their desires and get involved in civic engagement.  In light of this, I expect an inverse 
relationship between participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations and involvement in 
volunteer efforts in communities. 
 While the direct effect of attending quiescent clergy-led congregations on civic 
engagement in communities has a clear expectation, this is not the case for its indirect effect.  
On the one hand, we may reasonably posit that participation in quiescent clergy-led 
congregations will indirectly inhibit participation in civic engagement in communities 
through limiting involvement in volunteer activity in congregations and embeddedness in 
activist congregation networks as well as promoting participation in religious activity in 
congregations and integration into congregation non-activist networks.  The homophily 
principle predicts that congregations with quiescent clergy are more likely to be populated 
with members who are not activists, and thus participation in them is likely to give rise to 
embeddedness in congregation non-activist peer networks rather than embeddedness in 
congregation activist peer networks.  Furthermore, because of the emphasis on spiritual 
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 development and providing social fellowship, the focus of the internal activities of these 
congregations are likely to be spiritual matters and member support, such as Bible studies or 
self-group groups, rather than volunteer efforts, especially those aimed at helping people 
outside of congregations.   
On the other hand, it is possible that participation in quiescent clergy-led 
congregations may indirectly foster involvement in civic action in communities.  In support 
of this, research on other nonpolitical organizations has demonstrated that they often promote 
participation in external civic activities.  One important way that they do so is by getting 
members involved internally.  For instance, Leighley (1996) found that unintentional 
mobilization efforts—involvement in internal democratic practices—of nonpolitical 
organizations were important for promoting members’ engagement in civic activities outside 
of the group.  Importantly, Hoge et al. (1998) showed that religious service attendance in 
general was associated with doing volunteer work in congregations.  Because there are 
additional motivations for encouraging volunteer work in congregations other than 
cultivating skills relevant for external activism, perhaps quiescent clergy-led congregation 
may promote internal volunteer work.  Another possible way in which participation in non-
activist clergy-led congregations may indirectly promote volunteer efforts in communities is 
through fostering connections with members who are activists.  Given that there are other 
reasons besides those activist in nature for motivating people to join congregations, such as 
geographic proximity or theological fit, it is possible that even non-activist congregations 
provide opportunities for members to form relationships with other activists.  As Rosenstone 
and Hansen (1993:87) state, “organizations, by design, multiply contact.”  Regarding 
congregations, Wuthnow (2004:89-94) found that general congregation integration was 
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 linked to increased probability of forming friendships with influential people (e.g., elected 
officials or corporate executives) and individuals from diverse racial and class backgrounds.  
Consequently, members of congregations are likely to come in contact with various types of 
people in their congregation, which increases the odds that one or more of these people will 
be activists.  By promoting participation in volunteer efforts in congregations and fostering 
activist connections, involvement in quiescent clergy-led congregations may indirectly 
promote civic engagement in communities.  In what follows, I test these two competing 
perspectives regarding the indirect effect of attending quiescent clergy-led congregations on 
participation in volunteer efforts in communities. 
Given the above arguments, Figure 3.1 needs to be revised to incorporate the 
constraining effects of congregations.  Figure 3.2 thus combines the arguments about 
congregation mobilization presented in Figure 1 with the arguments made in this section 
about the inhibiting effects of congregations.  Depending on the nature of the clergy, ties 
developed, and internal activity practiced, congregations are posited to constrain as well as 
promote volunteer efforts that benefit people in the broader community.  Figure 3.2 captures 
both the mobilization and demobilization aspects of congregations, as well as the ambiguity 
of the indirect effects of participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations. 
 
Data, Variables, and Models  
Data 
To test my model of congregation mobilization and demobilization illustrated in 
Figure 3.2, I used the 2002 Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS).  Unlike other 
commonly employed surveys on religion and civic engagement, the 2002 RAPAS contained 
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 detailed information on clergy mobilization efforts, congregation ties’ activist involvements, 
and different types of congregation participation beyond religious service attendance, 
including making the crucial distinction between religious activity and volunteering activity 
(and between inwardly-focused and outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity).  As 
discussed above, this information allowed me to test not only the proposed mobilizing 
mechanisms of congregations, but also the proposed demobilizing mechanisms.  The 2002 
RAPAS was a telephone survey representing English-speaking Americans 18 years of age 
and older who resided in households in the United States, conducted by FGI Research Inc., a 
national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  The survey was 
conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-dial method, employing a sample of 
randomly generated telephone numbers representative of all telephones in the 50 United 
States.  The survey was conducted with English-speaking households only.  In order to 
randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure representativeness of age and 
gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the person in the household who 
had the most recent birthday.  All non-household numbers (business, government, nonprofit, 
etc.) were screened out of the sample through direct calling dispositions or ascription of 
contact and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes based on proportions of 
household numbers among working telephone numbers.  Survey respondents were offered an 
incentive of 10 dollars to complete the survey.  The final sample size for the 2002 RAPAS 
was 2,898 and the response rate based on AAPOR’s RR3 method was 47 percent (American 
Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).28,29
                                                 
28 The formula for AAPOR’s RR3 method is I /((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed 
Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is 
Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of 
unknown eligibility that are eligible.  For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they 
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Endogenous Variables 
The first endogenous variable in the model, which all other variables predict, was a 
binary measure for doing volunteer work through a nonreligious organization that benefits 
people in the community outside the group.  I coded this variable as one if respondents did 
this type of volunteer work during the last year, and I coded this variable as zero if they did 
not. My second endogenous variable measured participation in activist clergy-led 
congregations, which was operationalized with an eight-point ordinal variable that ranged 
from never attending congregations where clergy encourage participation in volunteer efforts 
to attending congregations where clergy encourage participation in volunteer efforts more 
than once a week.  To measure participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations, my third 
endogenous variable, I included an eight-point ordinal variable ranging from never attend 
congregations where clergy refrain from encouraging involvement in volunteer efforts to 
attend congregations where clergy refrain from encouraging involvement in volunteer efforts 
                                                 
were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC’s percentage of 
working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000).  For non-contacted numbers 
after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren’s 
(2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call 
attempts that are residential numbers. 
 
29 Because the 2002 RAPAS was unable to collect information on nonparticipants, there was no way to 
investigate whether those who responded to the survey were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who 
did not.  Given the focus of this chapter, if those who were more civically active were more likely to respond 
than those who refused, this could be an important source of bias.  While it is true that people who are more 
civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an 
incentive generally negates this difference (Groves et al. 2000).  Incentives generally produce greater survey 
representativeness without any deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; 
Singer et al. 2000).  Regarding demographic differences between the 2002 RAPAS and Census averages, older, 
more educated, and female respondents were overrepresented. The 2002 RAPAS constructed a weight based on 
these demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions 
matched those of the Census for American adults. 
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 more than once a week.30  Participation in religious leadership activity was my fourth 
endogenous variable.  I operationalized this variable with a binary measure that was coded as 
one if respondents held any religious leadership positions in their congregations, such as 
serving as an elder or deacon, and zero if otherwise.  My fifth endogenous variable was a 
measure for participation in inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity in 
congregations, such as helping with the upkeep of the organization or serving members.  I 
coded this variable as one if respondents participated in this type of volunteer activity in 
congregations, and zero if they did not.  My sixth endogenous variable measured 
participation in congregation volunteer activity that served nonmembers in some way.  I 
coded the outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity variable as one if respondents 
did this type of volunteer work in congregations, and zero if they did not.  My seventh 
endogenous variable was a measure for the number of strong ties out of five who were 
members of the respondents’ congregation.31  The eighth endogenous variable in my model 
was a measure for the number of strong ties out of five who were members of the 
respondents’ congregation and who participated in volunteer work.32  
                                                 
30 Although assuming that the absence of encouragement implies discouragement may not be reasonable for 
leaders of other organizations, because of their focus on the spiritual and social care of members and the fact 
that activism is generally perceived as conflicting with this care (see arguments above), I interpret 
congregations with quiescent clergy as providing significant disincentives to get involved in volunteer efforts in 
communities.  Greater attendance at these congregations should therefore reduce the likelihood of external civic 
engagement.  If this is an unreasonable assumption—that some quiescent clergy are truly neutral toward civic 
engagement in communities—then the effects would be stronger once attending congregations with neutral and 
disapproving clergy were separated into two different measures.  Unfortunately, the 2002 RAPAS or other 
extant surveys of which I am aware do not contain measures to make this separation and thus allow me to test 
this assumption. 
 
31 The 2002 RAPAS defined strong ties in terms of closeness, asking respondents to nominate up to five people 
to whom they felt the closest outside of their household.  Because this chapter focuses on congregation factors 
for explaining civic engagement, nominated strong ties must also be members of respondents’ congregations. 
 
32 The high correlation among the three measures of congregation tie activist social influence (the other two 
being the number of congregation tie who request volunteer work and the number of congregation ties who 
approve of volunteer work) caused estimation problems when they were all entered in the same model.  Since 
the focus on this chapter is not on specifying the effect of different types of congregation activist ties, but rather 
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  My final endogenous variable, a prosocial orientation, was included to control for 
selection.33  Following the conceptualization of a prosocial orientation as a concern for the 
welfare and rights of other people (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 
1995), I used two five-category ordinal variables that tap this conceptualization. The first 
variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to help other people who are 
in need.  The second variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to take 
action against wrongs and injustices in life.  Each variable ranges from one (not responsible 
at all) to five (extremely responsible). 
 
Exogenous Variables 
Because prior studies of civic engagement have identified that demographic 
characteristics are important factors for distinguishing individuals who are civically engaged 
from those who are not, I thus controlled for the following exogenous variables that might 
have otherwise confounded the effect of the congregation factors described above on civic 
engagement: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); race (0 = white; 1 = African 
American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college degree; 0 = less than a four-year 
college degree); region (1 = South; 0 = Non-South); community type (1 = rural; 0 = non-
                                                 
on differentiating congregation activist from non-activist ties, it was only necessary that I include one measure 
of congregation activist ties.  I chose to include the number of congregation ties that engage in volunteer work 
as the measure for congregation activist ties in the final model because it arguably captures the strongest source 
of congregation activist peer social influence (see Chapter 1). 
 
33 Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial 
orientation, such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others.  For these variables, it would be 
preferable to not have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation.  However, a 
programming limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus I also treated the other control variables as 
occurring casually prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive 
sense (e.g., working full-time).  But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control 
variables to underlying propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors 
with the measure for a prosocial orientation.  Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, 
seems to violate the least number of assumptions.  But since it is not without flaws, I do not interpret the effects 
of the control variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation.  
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 rural); working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status (1= 
married;  0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); 
physical health (five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood 
(number of children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and 
household income (eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than 
$100,000).  Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.34
 
Structural Equation  Models 
Figure 3.2 specified that congregation factors may directly and indirectly mobilize as 
well as constrain civic engagement in communities.  Structural equation models (SEMs) can 
simultaneously estimate numerous regression equations, and they facilitate the 
decomposition of indirect, direct, and total effects among these equations (Bollen 1989).  
This is the first reason that I chose to use this statistical procedure to test my conceptual 
model of congregation mobilization and demobilization presented in Figure 3.2.  The second 
reason that I used SEMs was because they allowed me to account for measurement error that 
might otherwise be present for a prosocial orientation, given that observed variables are 
unlikely to capture perfectly what is conceptually meant by this concept.  Furthermore, as 
described above, I have two measures for a prosocial orientation.  If we were to form scales 
for these measures and run a series of regression models, the results would be difficult to 
interpret since the measurement error in them would not be taken into account and thus the 
coefficients would be biased.  Given that accurately accounting for selection requires that I 
                                                 
34 Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number 
of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above. 
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 adequately measure the concept representing it, I modeled a prosocial orientation as an 
unobserved or latent variable that incorporates measurement error.35
Because some of my observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, I could 
not use traditional SEMs to estimate my congregation mobilization and demobilization 
model because they assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous.  I 
therefore used methods devised to correct the various problems that categorical observed 
endogenous variables pose for traditional SEMs.  Appendix A provides a more formal 
presentation of the SEM approach that I use.  In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal 
and dichotomous variables are crude representations of normally distributed continuous 
variables.  The covariance matrix of these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is 
the basis for the analysis.  In the case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous 
outcome variable with exogenous explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to 
probit regression.  However, the SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate 
multiple equations with a mixture of ordinal and dichotomous indicators (see Appendix A for 
complete details).  To facilitate interpretation of the effects of congregation factors on civic 
engagement in communities, I calculated predicted probabilities for them.  This also allowed 
me to obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of their effects. 
Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not 
have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; 
Schafer and Olsen 1998).36  MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed 
                                                 
35 I assume that the other measures have negligible measurement error.  This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption, as, for example, the measure of participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity 
measures “doing volunteer work for congregations that benefits nonmembers.”  I thus assume that any 
measurement error in the other measures would not introduce considerable bias for the results.  
 
36 For MI, I used the MICE program (van Buuren et al. 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 2005), 
which explicitly handles categorical variables.  
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 techniques for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy 
variable adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12).  Moreover, MI assumes only 
that the data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that 
they are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other 
commonly employed techniques.  I generated five imputations, each of which replaced cases 
with missing information with plausible values based on their predictive distributions.  I ran 
identical SEMs for each of the five imputed datasets, using complete data on all variables.  I 
then combined these results to produce overall estimates, standard errors, and significance 
levels that take into account uncertainty about missing data. 
My analyses proceed in the following steps.  I first estimate a model that replicates 
prior studies on religion and civic engagement to demonstrate its limitations.  I next estimate 
my model of congregation mobilization and demobilization illustrated in Figure 3.2.  In 
doing so, I calculate predicted probabilities for the significant congregation effects in order to 
gain a better understanding of the magnitude of their effects as well as to highlight and 
contrast the mobilizing and demobilizing nature of congregation effects. 
 
Results 
Previous Religion and Civic Engagement Model Replication 
 Table 3.2 replicates prior models of religion and civic engagement, entering a general 
measure of religious service attendance, a measure for participation in any sort of 
congregation activity beyond attendance, and a measure for the number of strong ties who 
are congregation members (demographic variables described above are controlled).  Looking 
down the last column in Table 3.2, we see that only congregation activity of any sort has a 
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 significant effect on participation in civic engagement in communities (β = .563; p < .001).37  
This is somewhat surprising given that this measure combines involvement in religious 
leadership activities and volunteer activities in congregations and thus the expected negative 
effect of the former should have offset the expected positive effect of the latter.  But the other 
two congregation factors behave as predicted, as both have no significant relationship to civic 
engagement in communities.  Given the heterogeneity of the congregation attendance and 
number of congregation tie measures, this is not surprising.  The general congregation 
attendance measure conflates attendance at activist clergy-led congregations and attendance 
at quiescent clergy-led congregations, while the general congregation tie measure conflates 
embeddedness in congregation networks that are activist and non-activist in nature.  These 
results reveal the drawback of not differentiating congregations’ mobilizing dimensions from 
their demobilizing ones, which is characteristic of prior scholarship on religion and civic 
engagement.  Furthermore, like this prior scholarship, the model in Table 3.2 does not 
address selection, nor does it consider that congregation attendance may precede 
participation in congregation activity and the formation of congregation ties.  In other words, 
it does not allow for indirect effects for congregation attendance on participation in volunteer 
efforts that benefit those in the larger community.  For these reasons, prior models of religion 
and civic engagement are unsatisfactory.  To address the drawbacks of prior models on 
religion and civic engagement, I estimate my congregation mobilization and demobilization 
model depicted in Figure 3.2. 
                                                 
37 For brevity, I refer to doing volunteer work through any nonreligious organization that benefits people in the 
community outside the group as civic engagement in communities, volunteer efforts that serve the needs of 
those in the broader community, or similar language.  
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Congregation Mobilization and Demobilization Effects 
 Table 3.3 reports the direct effects in the form of probit coefficients for my 
congregation mobilization and demobilization model illustrated in Figure 3.2.38  Each 
column represents a separate probit regression that corresponds to each path in Figure 3.2.  
All models control for a prosocial orientation as well as for the demographic variables 
described above (but because demographic variables are not the focus of this chapter and to 
conserve space, I display their results only in Appendix D in Table D1).  Turning to Table 
3.3, we can see the importance of differentiating factors of congregations that mobilize from 
those that demobilize in terms of explaining participation in civic engagement in 
communities.  The last column in Table 3.3 shows that, with the exception of congregation 
religious leadership participation and congregation inwardly-focused volunteer activity, each 
congregation factor has a significant direct effect on getting involved in volunteer efforts that 
serve those in the broader community.  Confirming expectation about congregations’ 
mobilizing potential, the greater the participation in activist clergy-led congregations, the 
greater the probability of participation in civic engagement in communities (β = .026; p < 
.10).  Involvement in congregation outwardly-focused volunteer activity also significantly 
positively predicts civic engagement in communities (β = .290; p < .05).  And replacing a 
congregation non-activist tie with a congregation activist tie increases the probability of 
doing volunteer work to benefit people in the wider community (β = .111; p < .001).39  
                                                 
38 All models from the SEM estimates are based on unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship 
and Radbill 1994). 
 
39 To hold constant the number of congregation ties, an increase in the number of congregation activist ties 
means that there must be an equivalent decrease in congregation non-activist ties.  So, for example, if a person 
has 3 total congregation ties and gains 2 congregation activist ties, then this person must also lose 2 
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 Shifting focus to congregations’ demobilizing capacity, the first column in Table 3.3 
indicates that the more people participate in quiescent clergy-led congregations, the less 
likely they are to get involved in volunteer efforts that help those in the wider community (β 
= -.077; p < .001).  Similarly, each additional congregation non-activist tie decreases the 
likelihood of this involvement as well (β = -.075; p < .05), holding the number of 
congregation activist ties and demographic variables constant.40  The effects for congregation 
religious leadership and inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity are also negative, 
but neither effect is significant.  This indicates that congregation activity beyond religious 
service attendance of any sort does not mobilize people to get involved in civic engagement 
in communities.  Only when congregation activity is volunteering in nature and outwardly-
focused does it “spill over” to participation in civic engagement in communities.  
It should be emphasized that, unlike prior models of religion and civic engagement, 
all these observed effects occur after accounting for selection since a prosocial orientation is 
included in all models.  As a dispositional model and the homophily principle predict, we see 
in the eighth column in Table 3.3 that a prosocial orientation has a significant positive direct 
effect on involvement in activist clergy-led congregations (β = .263; p < .01), involvement in 
congregation inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity (β = .083; p < .05) as well as 
outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity (β = .120; p < .01), and participation in 
civic engagement in communities (β = .088; p < .01).  Although it does not have a significant 
direct effect on promoting integration into congregation activist networks, a prosocial 
                                                 
congregation non-activist ties.  My substantive interpretation of the effect of congregation ties and congregation 
activist ties on civic engagement incorporates this interdependence, and thus the measure for general 
congregation ties captures the effect for congregation non-activist ties. 
 
40 In terms of substantive interpretation, the same logic applies here as for the measure of quiescent clergy-led 
congregation attendance (see note 30). 
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 orientation has a significant indirect effect of .026 on promoting this integration through its 
significant direct effect on participation in activist clergy-led congregations (.263 × .099 = 
.026).  Interestingly, a prosocial orientation has a significant negative direct effect on 
participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations (β = -.058; p < .10).  Finally, prosocially 
oriented people are more likely to be involved in congregation religious leadership activities 
(β = .093; p < .01). 
Looking at the overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 
3.3, we see that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model generally achieves a 
moderately good to good fit to the data.  Although the chi-square test statistic is significant, 
indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test 
statistic is not suited to evaluate model fit with large sample sizes like the one in 
congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model (N = 2,898).  This is because the ability of 
detecting even small differences between the model implied covariance and the observed 
covariance substantially increases with sample size.  All of the other fit statistics indicate a 
moderately good to good model fit.41  For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit 
Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a 
good model fit, while values less than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit.  For the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), values less than .05 generally indicate a 
very good model fit, values greater than .10 generally indicate a poor model fit, with values 
in between indicating a moderate fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993).  The values for the TLI, 
IFI, and CFI are all .968 indicating that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing model 
is a good fitting model, while the value for the RMSEA is .077, indicating that this model has 
                                                 
41 There is ambiguity about how to calculate fit statistics in SEM when using MI (Bollen and Curran 2006:68).  
The fit statistics reported in this chapter are based on averages across the five imputed datasets. 
 100
 a satisfactory overall fit.  Finally, looking at the R2 value for civic engagement communities 
in the last column in Table 3.3, we see that the congregation mobilizing and demobilizing 
model explains almost 30 percent of the variability in people’s propensity to get involved in 
volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community. 
To gain a better understanding of the mobilizing and demobilizing effects of 
congregation factors on civic engagement in communities, I calculated predicted 
probabilities for them while setting other variables to particular values.42  This allowed me to 
explicate the magnitudes of the direct effects for the different congregation factors.  As 
Figure 3.3 shows, the effects of participation in activist clergy-led congregations and 
quiescent clergy-led congregations on civic engagement in communities differ considerably, 
especially at high levels of congregation attendance.  For instance, the predicted probability 
of participation in civic engagement for attending congregations more than once a week 
where clergy encourage volunteer efforts is .465, while this predicted probability for 
attending congregations more than once a week where clergy do not encourage volunteer 
efforts is .181, a difference of .284.43  Turning to the predicted probabilities for the different 
types of congregation networks in Figure 3.4, we can clearly see that, depending on their 
nature, embeddedness in them promotes as well as constrains participation in volunteer 
                                                 
42 The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: Pr(yi =1| xi) = 1-Φ(τ1-βxi).  Unless 
otherwise noted, the predicted probabilities of civic engagement in communities are for white unmarried college 
educated males age 25 who have no children under 19 living at home, military experience, attend activist 
clergy-led congregations weekly, engage in outwardly-focused volunteer work in congregations, live outside the 
south, live in rural areas, have 3 congregation activist friends, average prosocial orientation, average physical 
health, and average income. 
 
43 Although the focus of this chapter in terms of congregation attendance is on differences in civic engagement 
in communities between quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance and activist clergy-led congregation 
attendance, Figure C1 in Appendix C shows the result of the probability of this engagement for never attend 
congregations for comparative purposes.  Looking at this figure, we see that while the probability of civic 
engagement in communities for never attending congregations is lower than that for attending activist clergy-led 
congregations more than weekly, this probability is higher for never attending congregations relative to 
attending quiescent clergy-led congregations more than weekly (although the differences are not as great, the 
same pattern holds for lower levels of congregation attendance). 
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 efforts that serve those in the broader community.  Each set of bars in Figure 3.4 displays the 
predicted probability of civic engagement for a different congregation non-activist/activist tie 
combination, with the left bar in the set representing the predicted probability of civic 
engagement for the congregation non-activist/activist tie combination and the right bar in the 
set representing the predicted probability of civic engagement for the congregation 
activist/non-activist tie combination.  Given that the maximum number of congregation ties 
was 5 and as an easy way to hold the number congregation ties constant, I used the following 
combinations when calculating the predicted probabilities: 3/2 (2/3), 4 /1 (1/4), and 5/0 (0/5).  
Since the first set of bars is for the 3/2 (2/3) combination, the left bar in the set is the 
predicted probability of civic engagement for 3 congregation non-activist ties/2 congregation 
activist ties, while the right bar in this set is the predicted probability of civic engagement for 
2 congregation non-activist ties/3 congregation activist ties.  Another way to approach Figure 
3.4 is to think of the sets of bars as representing differences in the predicted probability of 
civic engagement for different congregation non-activist/activist tie combinations, with the 
right bar favoring the congregation non-activist tie difference and the left bar favoring the 
congregation activist tie difference.  Returning to the first set of bars, we can think of them as 
displaying the predicted probability of civic engagement for a difference of 1 in the 
congregation non-activist/activist tie combination (the right bar is for 1 greater congregation 
non-activist tie as this is the 3/2 congregation non-activist/activist combination and the left 
bar is for 1 greater congregation activist tie as this is the 2/3 congregation activist/non-
activist combination). 
Whichever way we think about Figure 3.4, the results clearly reveal that the 
difference in the predicted probability of civic engagement is always greater for congregation 
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 activist/non-activist tie combination than the congregation non-activist/activist tie 
combination (thus the greater heights for the bars on the right in all cases).  Looking at 
various sets of bars, we can see that the difference in the predicted probability of civic 
engagement between the congregation non-activist/activist tie combinations grows as the 
difference in the combinations becomes greater.  The final set of bars shows that the 
predicted probability of civic engagement for individuals who have 5 congregation ties who 
do not engage in volunteer efforts and 0 congregations ties who do is .284, while this 
predicted probability is .494 for those who have 5 congregation ties who do engage in 
volunteer efforts and 0 congregation ties who do not, a difference of .210.  This demonstrates 
the mobilizing power of embeddedness in congregation activist networks on the one hand, 
and the constraining power of integration in congregation non-activist networks on the other.  
Shifting attention to the effect of congregation outwardly-focused congregation volunteer 
activity on civic engagement on communities, there is a .112 difference in the predicted 
probability of this engagement between engaging in this type of volunteer work in 
congregations (.465) and not engaging in this work in congregations (.353).  In sum, the 
predicted probabilities further emphasize that congregation factors mobilize as well as 
demobilize people to get involved in volunteer efforts that benefit those in the broader 
community. 
Besides direct effects of congregation factors, Figure 3.2 specified indirect effects for 
attending activist clergy-led and quiescent clergy-led congregations, for which my empirical 
models provide support.  Looking down the second row in Table 3.3, we see that the more 
people participate in congregations where clergy encourage volunteer efforts, the more likely 
they are to get involved in outwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations (β =.213; p 
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 < .001) and to be embedded in congregation activist networks (β =.099; p < .001), both of 
which increase the probability of civic engagement in communities and thus provide two 
positive indirect effects for activist clergy-led congregation attendance.  However, because 
attending activist clergy-led congregations has a positive direct effect on having congregation 
ties in general, this reduces its indirect effect since this measure has a significant negative 
direct effect on civic engagement in communities.44  But this negative indirect effect does not 
cancel out the other two positive effects of attending activist clergy-led congregations.   
Table 3.4 shows that activist clergy-led congregation attendance’s total indirect effect 
on participation in civic engagement in communities is .063.  When its positive direct effect 
of .026 is included, this gives attending an activist clergy-led congregation a total effect for 
engaging in volunteer efforts that serve those in the broader community of .089.  By contrast, 
as the first column in Table 3.4 indicates, attending a quiescent clergy-led congregation’s 
total effect on participation in civic engagement is negative.  This is the result of its negative 
total indirect effect and negative direct effect.  Returning to Table 3.3, we see that the greater 
the attendance at quiescent clergy-led congregations, the lower the probability of outwardly-
focused congregation volunteer activity (β = -.076; p < .001) and the fewer number of 
congregation activist friends (β = -.014; p < .10).  Both of these effects contribute to a 
quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance’s negative total indirect effect, given that 
participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity and having more 
congregation activist friends promote participation in volunteer efforts that benefit people in 
the broader community.  Further contributing to attending a quiescent clergy-led 
                                                 
44 Attending an activist clergy-led congregation also significantly affects congregation religious leadership and 
congregation inwardly-focused volunteer activity.  But since both measures do not have significant effects on 
civic engagement in communities, they are not included in the calculation of total indirect effect for activist 
clergy-led congregation attendance.  
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 congregation’s total indirect effect is its positive direct effect on having a greater number of 
general congregation friends (β = .064; p < .001), which is negatively associated with 
participation in civic engagement in communities.  Summing these negative indirect effects 
and negative direct effect gives attending a quiescent clergy-led congregation a total effect 
for participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the larger community of -.105 (see 
first column in Table 3.4).] 
 
Responses to Possible Objections 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, the source of information of 
the strong tie network characteristics, and the timing of the survey, several objections to the 
above statistical models and interpretations are possible.  This section reviews and responds 
to these objections. 
First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult 
activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist 
friendships promote a prosocial orientation.  But this possibility seems unlikely when judged 
against previous empirical studies.  Research has demonstrated that the forming of a 
prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization 
factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to 
exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and 
Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; 
Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; 
Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125).  Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation 
generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way 
around. 
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 Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from 
respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have 
inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties.  However, this is less of a 
concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness.  If people are 
unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not 
operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to 
explain.  For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of 
respondents learning of strong ties’ participation in collective action.  Hence, even if 
respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong 
ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are 
aware.  Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the 
objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong 
ties. 
Third, because the 2002 RAPAS was administered in the months after the September 
11 terrorist attacks and asked questions about activities during a portion of these months, this 
may bias the results regarding participation in collective civic action.  Even if 9/11 affected 
the extent to which people got involved in collective civic action, it is unlikely that this 
would have fundamentally altered the nature of the causal relationships that I observed.  In 
other words, even if September 11 had, for instance, increased the rates of peers who 
encouraged friends to do volunteer work or the rates of volunteering for community projects, 
it seems unlikely that these increases would have changed, for instance, the fact that having 
such peers is a powerful source of social influence inducing participation in collective civic 
action.  Although prior studies have not integrated a prosocial orientation and social networks 
 106
 as I have here, these studies have consistently shown the importance of these factors for 
explaining who participates in volunteer efforts and who does not outside of disaster 
contexts.  Consequently, any effects of September 11 on my survey data and results would 
appear to have been exogenous, possibly increasing levels of civic behaviors and 
commitments, but not altering the fundamental processes that I have observed. 
 
Conclusion and Contributions 
Recent decades have witnessed a boom in studies on religion and civic engagement, 
which no doubt has contributed to the emergence of religion as an important explanatory 
factor of activist participation in fields other than the sociology of religion.  Scholarship on 
social movements and philanthropy, for instance, has increasingly focused on how religion 
shapes involvement in various kinds of collective action.  As valuable as the large body of 
prior research on religion and civic engagement is, it has three important limitations that 
problematize our ability to evaluate the extent to which religious organizations foster a 
healthy civil society.  Because of the lack of attention to specifying the dimensions and 
mechanisms of congregation influence in prior scholarship, the conditions under and 
processes through which congregation participation is a force mobilizing citizens to 
participate in civic action were unknown.  Recall from my replication of previous religion 
and civic engagement models the general lack of significant findings for general 
congregation factors, such as religious service attendance or number of congregation ties.  If 
congregations do indeed induce activism, as prior research claims, then it is important that 
we understand exactly how they do so.  Second, given the tendency of prior religion and 
civic engagement scholarship to view congregations as exclusively mobilizing agents, it was 
unknown whether congregations also constrain activism in any respect.  If congregation 
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 involvement was to hinder participation in civic engagement in communities, then this would 
raise doubts about congregations’ ability to promote a strong civil society.  Finally, prior 
scholarship has ignored the possibility that selection explains the positive relationship 
between congregation participation and civic engagement.  As a result, we could not be 
confident that this relationship was the result of the mobilization efforts of congregations.  
Yet scholars contend that congregations are responsible for mobilizing citizens to get 
involved in civic action in communities, rather than prior committed religious activists 
intentionally choosing to join activist congregations because they reflect their values. 
 This chapter overcomes the important flaws of prior research on religion and civic 
engagement to advance substantially our understanding of how religious organizations shape 
the nature of American civil society.  As de Tocqueville described over a century and a half 
ago and as numerous modern observers point out today, the results in this chapter 
demonstrate that participation in congregations mobilizes members to participate in volunteer 
efforts that help citizens in the larger community.  In this way, religious organizations clearly 
strengthen civil society.  However, this is only part of the story.  My findings reveal that 
congregation involvement also constrains members from getting involved in such volunteer 
efforts, which calls into question religious organizations’ ability to cultivate a vibrant civil 
society.  This side of congregation participation has generally been ignored.  But the story 
about religion and civic engagement is incomplete and misleading without it.  By specifying 
the conditions under which congregation embeddedness mobilizes and demobilizes civic 
action in communities, I bring a new perspective to bear on the study of religion and civic 
engagement.  In what follows, I discuss the implications of this perspective as well as 
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 discussing the other main contributions of this chapter, connecting them to broader 
theoretical concerns in the social movement and social capital literatures. 
 Recently, social movement scholarship has called for greater specificity in 
understanding the dimensions and pathways that motivate activist participation (McAdam et 
al. 2001).  Responding to this call, I have moved beyond the descriptive nature that generally 
characterizes past studies of religion and civic engagement to identify the precise ways in 
which congregations mobilize members to get involved in civic engagement in communities.  
Specifically, my conceptual model in Figure 3.2 emphasized that congregations encourage 
members to participate in civic action by exposing them to clergy recruitment efforts, forging 
activist relationships, and cultivating transposable skills.  My empirical results confirmed the 
utility of this conceptual model, showing that each of these congregation factors had a 
significant positive direct effect on mobilizing members to participate in civic engagement in 
communities.  Because of their position as leaders of congregations, clergy have considerable 
social influence over their parishioners.  By going against the wishes of clergy, members risk 
receiving disapproval or losing support from religious leaders, whom they likely deeply 
respect and admire.  Consequently, when clergy encourage members to get involved in civic 
engagement, this represents a powerful selective incentive inducing lay participation in civic 
action.  But activist clergy are not the only source of social influence in congregations that 
encourage civic engagement.  As prior research has observed, congregations are among the 
most important voluntary organizations for fostering close relationships among members 
(Wuthnow 2004).  When congregation peer networks are activist in nature, embeddedness in 
them also becomes a powerful source of social influence promoting participation in civic 
engagement.  Members of congregations have much to lose if they do not respond or much to 
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 gain if they do to the social influence that fellow congregation activist members exert on 
them.  In the social movement literature on differential participation, both rationalists and 
culturalists alike emphasize that activist friendships constitute an important selective 
incentive that motivates participation in collective action (Chong 1991; Goodwin et al. 2001; 
Opp 1989). Given the robustness of the findings for attending congregations where clergy 
encourage volunteer efforts and embeddedness in congregation peer networks that do the 
same, this also seems to be the case for integration into activist vertical and horizontal 
relationships in congregations. 
 In addition to networks of social influence, congregations foster skills that are 
transposable to participation in volunteer efforts that help those in the broader community.  
Supporting this argument, my empirical models identified that involvement in outwardly-
focused congregation volunteer activity significantly encourages participation in civic 
engagement in communities.  However, participation in congregation religious leadership 
activity did not (though it did not decrease participation in civic engagement either), nor did 
participation in inwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity.  Counter to Verba et al. 
(1995) and religion and civic engagement scholarship (Brown and Brown 2003; Cassel 1999; 
Harris 1994, 1999; Lam 2002; Park and Smith 2002; Peterson 1992; Wuthnow 2004), then, 
participation in congregation activity beyond religious service attendance of any sort does not 
“spill over” to involvement in civic engagement in communities.  Rather, it is only 
involvement in volunteer activity in congregations that focuses on helping nonmembers that 
does.  Because prior research has not made these differentiations among congregation 
activity beyond religious service attendance, it has missed this important finding.  That 
participation in outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity, as opposed to religious 
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 activity or inwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations, transposes to external civic 
engagement is not surprising.  As members engage in volunteer work in congregations that 
serve nonmembers, they acquire and hone skills—such as caring for those who are 
different—that are directly applicable to other volunteer efforts that benefit people in the 
broader community.  In other words, members who participate in outwardly-focused 
congregation volunteer work develop a volunteering repertoire that is transposable to other 
types of civic engagement in communities that serve those outside their social group.  By 
contrast, it is unclear clear how participation in religious leadership activity or inwardly-
focused volunteer activity does, which likely explains why these activities in congregations 
were not significantly related to participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the 
broader community. 
Besides the important direct effect of attending congregations with activist clergy on 
participation in civic engagement in communities, attending these congregations also has two 
important indirect effects on participation in civic engagement.  First, my empirical models 
showed that the greater the attendance at activist clergy-led congregations, the greater the 
likelihood of embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks.  Given that religious 
activists are likely to be attracted to activist clergy-led congregations, participation in these 
congregations gives activist members the necessary opportunities to interact and form 
friendships.  Echoing this finding, social movement studies have found that involvement in 
political associations is particularly likely to foster activist connections among members.  For 
instance, Opp (1989:Chapter 5) demonstrated that political group membership had a 
significant positive on embeddedness in protest-encouraging networks (see also Opp and 
Gern 1993).  Second, I found that individuals who attend activist clergy-led congregations 
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 were more likely to be involved in outwardly-focused volunteer activity in congregations.  
Given activist clergy’s commitment to external civic engagement, they are likely to organize 
volunteering activities of this sort as a way to equip members with the needed skills to get 
involved in other volunteer efforts that serve individuals outside of congregations (Hart 2001; 
Warren 2001; Wood 2002).  By facilitating participation in internal volunteer activity and 
helping forge activist ties among members, congregations with activist clergy provide two 
important pathways to get people involved in volunteer efforts in communities. 
 Notwithstanding the above discussion, congregations also constrain involvement in 
civic engagement in communities.  This is an important corrective to prior scholarship on 
civic engagement, which has generally contended that congregations always mobilize—or at 
least never demobilize—members to participate in civic action in communities.  But as my 
empirical models demonstrate, this simply is not true.  Attendance at quiescent clergy-led 
congregations and embeddedness in the same kinds of horizontal congregation peer networks 
function as significant barriers to participation in volunteer efforts that serve those in the 
broader community.  For many clergy and laity, their first priority is caring for the spiritual 
and social needs of fellow members.  As past research has shown, activism is often seen, by 
clergy and laity alike, as a threat to this care (Greenberg 2000; Olson 2000).  Unless clergy 
and members are committed to activism, they are likely to avoid and frown upon activism.  
Hence, congregation members involved in non-activist clergy-led congregations and 
embedded in non-activist congregation peer networks risk being negatively sanctioned from 
people whom they hold in high esteem and fracturing important relationships if they were to 
get involved in community activism.  In this way, congregation networks constitute an 
important selective disincentive for participating in civic engagement in communities.  This 
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 observation has generally gone unnoticed in prior scholarship on religion and civic 
engagement. 
Case in point is Ruiter and De Graaf’s (2006) recent American Sociological Review 
article on religion and volunteering.  Drawing on prior scholarship on religion and civic 
engagement, they identified networks as the key variable for explaining the link between 
congregation participation and involvement in volunteer efforts.  As Ruiter and De Graaf 
(2006:193) state, “…church members are more likely to meet other volunteers and be 
recruited by them.”  Based on this premise, they theorized that individuals in more devout 
societies should have more extensive religious networks and thus more extensive volunteer 
networks relative to individuals in secular societies.  For this reason, Ruiter and De Graaf 
(2006) posited that people in devout nations should be more likely to volunteer than those in 
secular nations, and that levels of church attendance should matter more for volunteering in 
the latter context.  But empirical results from my chapter demonstrate that religious networks 
actually can constrain participation in civic engagement, directly challenging Ruiter and De 
Graaf’s (2006) theoretical explanation.  Besides correcting prior scholarship on religion and 
civic engagement’s assumption that religious networks imply activist networks, observing 
that congregation ties hinder volunteer efforts in communities makes a valuable contribution 
to the social movement on differential participation.  Although social movement scholarship 
has begun to recognize that organizations and networks can hinder participation in collective 
action (Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993), 
it has yet to specify the exact types of associational connections that are the most potent 
constrainers of this action.  My chapter demonstrates that, when they are quiescent in nature, 
religious leadership and religious networks significantly inhibit involvement in civic 
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 engagement in communities.  The broader point seems to be that when activism is perceived 
to jeopardize the primary goals of organizations, then it is likely to be discouraged, and thus 
group members will more likely abstain from activist participation in order to avoid negative 
reactions from leaders and other group members who prefer to focus on spiritual and in-
group activities. 
Participation in quiescent clergy-led congregations also indirectly discourages civic 
engagement in communities.  In contrast, other studies of other nonpolitical organizations 
have found that unintentional mobilization efforts of these organizations are important for 
facilitating participation in external activities (Leighley 1996).  In fact, Hoge et al (1998) 
found a positive relationship between general religious service attendance and doing 
volunteer work in congregations.  But I found that when distinguishing between the activist 
and non-activist nature of congregation leadership, attending quiescent clergy-led 
congregations inhibits participation in volunteer efforts in congregations, especially those 
that are outwardly-focused, which in turn reduces the probability of getting involved in 
volunteer efforts in communities.  Additionally, consistent with the homophily principle, 
attending congregations with quiescent clergy prevented the formation of congregation 
activist peer networks while promoting the formation of general congregation peer networks, 
both of which further indirectly hampered participation in civic engagement that benefit the 
broader community.  As a result, while attending quiescent clergy-led congregations may 
encourage congregation friendships that cross racial or class lines (Wuthnow 2004), it does 
not seem to encourage congregation friendships that cross activist lines. 
Identifying that congregations can actually demobilize civic engagement in broader 
communities also has important implications for the literature on social capital.  Although 
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 most attention to social capital has focused on its positive effects, scholars have also begun to 
focus on the potential so-called “dark side” of social capital (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; 
Fiorina 1999; Paxton 1999, 2002; Portes 1998).  These scholars have noted that social capital 
need not necessarily produce outcomes generally considered socially desirable, but that it 
may produce outcomes often considered undesirable.  Even Robert Putnam (2000:350-363), 
arguably the most outspoken advocate for social capital’s positive benefits, has also stressed 
that social capital can have harmful consequences. Much of the current discussion about 
social capital’s potential negative effects focuses on differences in who benefits from social 
capital.  Voluntary organizations clearly provide numerous benefits to members, and this 
contributes to civil society in an elementary but important way.  But when they also provide 
benefits to nonmembers—for example, through their out-group volunteering or activism—we 
have reason to think that they further strengthen the cohesion of civil society in contributing 
broadly to American community life.  Because of the emphasis on spiritual nurturance and 
social fellowship, participation in non-activist-clergy-led congregations and integration into 
non-activist congregation networks appears to inhibit participation in volunteer efforts that 
serve those in the larger community. We might think of these congregations as relatively 
“greedy institutions” (Coser 1974), monopolizing indigenous resources primarily for their 
own use.  By doing so, these congregations may successfully serve the needs of their 
members, but they weaken civil society’s provision of assistance to those in need outside of 
their communities and to fostering “bridging” social capital in the wider community. 
The final limitation of prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement that this 
chapter has taken a significant step to address and overcome is the omission of attention to 
potential selection effects.  Prior scholarship on religion and civic engagement has assumed 
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 that the positive relationship between congregation participation and civic action in 
communities is the result of congregations’ mobilization efforts.  But, as previously 
mentioned, this relationship may just as easily reflect selection processes over time, where 
prior committed religious activists purposively join activist congregations.  To address this 
selection concern, I drew in this analysis on a dispositional perspective of civic engagement 
that emphasizes the push of a “prosocial” orientation—which is believed to be formed 
through socialization very early in the life course—to explain involvement (Penner 2002; 
Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995).  Although this perspective had not been 
previously applied to research on religion and civic engagement, the homophily principle led 
me to expect that prosocially oriented people would be attracted to activist congregations, 
networks, and activity.  Consistent with this expectation, I found that a prosocial orientation 
had a significant positive effect on respondents attending congregations where clergy 
encourage volunteer efforts, indirectly forging friendships with activist members, and 
engaging in volunteer activity in congregations.  Interestingly, a prosocial orientation also 
had a significant negative effect on attendance at congregations without activist clergy, 
suggesting that prosocially-oriented people tend to avoid joining congregations where clergy 
do not attempt to mobilize members for activities that reflect their values.  As found in other 
studies, a prosocial orientation positively predicted participation in civic engagement in 
communities (Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; 
Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and 
Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; 
Wuthnow 1991).  Most importantly, though, the effect of attendance at congregations with 
activist clergy, embeddedness in activist congregation peer networks, and participation in 
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 outwardly-focused congregation volunteer activity was robust to the inclusion of a prosocial 
orientation.  This ought to significantly increase our confidence that the social influence of 
activist clergy and members as well as the cultivation of transposable skills are important 
factors for explaining the relationship between congregations and participation in civic 
engagement in communities, beyond the effects of selection. 
In sum, this chapter has made three important contributions to our understanding of 
the relationship between religion and civic engagement.  First, I have shown the dimensions 
and mechanisms through which congregations mobilize participation in civic engagement in 
communities.  Second, this chapter has demonstrated that certain kinds of congregations may 
actually deter participation in civic engagement.  Last, I have established that congregational 
factors promote participation in civic engagement even after the inclusion of a control for 
selection.  Given that many tens of millions of Americans participate in congregations every 
week and the fact that they mobilize as well as demobilize members to participate in civic 
engagement in communities, religious organizations should be seen as powerful but 
complicated and variable actors influencing the character of civil society in the Untied States.  
Based on the findings from this chapter, neither the call from conservatives for a greater 
blanket influence of religious organizations in public life, nor the call from liberals for a 
highly restricted influence would seem to be an adequate response to interests in 
strengthening the capability of civil society to strengthen and enrich American communities 
and democracy broadly.  Rather, according to the findings and arguments of this chapter, 
religion’s influence on civil society significantly varies, according to the more or less socially 
mobilizing nature of its leadership, internal activities, and member composition.  In this 
sense, future scholarship ought not to investigate the effects of “American religion” as if it 
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 were a monolithic entity, but should rather, as I have attempted to do here, disaggregate quite 
different types and tendencies within the broader field of American religion.  By doing so, we 
will bring to the surface more fine-grained yet key distinctions which will help to better 
understand the nature and function of community life, social capital, and civil society in the 
United States.
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 Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis  
Mean S.D.
Civic Engagement in Communities
Do volunteer work through a nonreligious organization that 
benefits people in the community outside the group .130 .337
Congregation Factors
Attend quiescent clergy-led congregation 2.458 2.334
Attend activist clergy-led congregation 3.205 2.755
# of congregation ties .976 1.457
# of congregation activist ties .422 .931
Congregation religious leadership position .144 .351
Congregation inward volunteer activity .212 .401
Congregation outward volunteer activity .189 .391
Prosocial orientation
Personally feel responsible to help others in need 3.719 .885
Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice 3.437 1.020
Demographic variables
White .761 .426
Black .110 .313
Other race .128 .334
College education .244 .429
Income 5.491 2.854
Female .519 .500
Age 45.016 .17.711
Physical heath 3.855 .921
# of children under 19 living in household .617 1.021
Working full-time .493 .500
Served in the military .156 .363
Married .564 .500
South .386 .487
Rural .230 .421
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 Table 3.2. Probit Coefficients for Effects of Prior Religion and Civic Engagement Replication Model 
Civic Engagement
Explanatory variables in Communities
Congregation attendance                    .002
                  (.015)
Any congregation activity beyond attendance                    .563***
                  (.079)
# of congregation ties                   -.021
                  (.024)
R2                     .123
Model χ2                         ⎯
Degrees of freedom                         ⎯
CFI                         ⎯
IFI                         ⎯
TLI                         ⎯
RMSEA                         ⎯
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but
not shown are controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 3.1.
*** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 3.3. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Congregation Mobilizing and Demobilizing Model  
Quiescent Activist Congregation Congregation Congregation Number of Civic
clergy-led clergy-led religious inward outward Number of congregation engagement
congregation congregation leadership volunteer volunteer congregation activist in
Explanatory variables attendance attendance position activity activity ties ties communities
Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance        ⎯        ⎯    -.016    -.053***    -.076***     .064***    -.014+    -.077***
   (.014)    (.013)    (.014)    (.011)    (.007)    (.017)
Activist clergy-led congregation attendance        ⎯        ⎯     .185**     .229***     .213***     .126***     .099***     .026+
   (.011)    (.013)    (.012)    (.009)    (.006)    (.014)
Congregation religious leadership position        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯    -.017
    (.087)
Congregation inward volunteer activity        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯    -.010
   (.153)
Congregation outward volunteer activity        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯     .290*
   (.127)
Number of congregation ties        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯    -.075*
   (.031)
Number of congregation activist ties        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯        ⎯     .111**
   (.042)
Prosocial Orientation     -.058+      .263**      .093*      .083*      .120**      .004      .016      .088**
    (.032)     (.094)     (.037)     (.033)     (.045)     (.016)     (.011)     (.037)
R2      .067      .086      .337      .380      .379      .106      .113      .277
Model χ2  312.012***
Degrees of freedom      17
CFI     .968
IFI     .968
TLI     .968
RMSEA     .077
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are controls for
all demographic variables listed in Table 3.1 (see Appendix D for results for demographic variables).
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests)
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 Table 3.4. Indirect and Total Effects of Quiescent and Activist Clergy-Led Congregation Attendance on Civic Engagement in 
Communities  
Civic
Engagement in
Explanatory variables Communities
Quiescent clergy-led congregation attendance                    -.028/-.105
Activist clergy-led congregation attendance                     .063./089
Note : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the p < .05 level (two-tail tests) or lower.
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 Figure 3.1 Conceptual Congregation Mobilization Model  
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 Figure 3.2. Conceptual Congregation Mobilization and Demobilization Model  
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 Figure 3.3. Effects of Activist and Quiescent Clergy-Led Attendance on Civic Engagement in Communities  
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 Figure 3.4. Effects of Activist and Non-Activist Congregation Networks on Civic Engagement in Communities  
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 CHAPTER 4: U.S. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AFTER 9/11: EXPLORING THE 
MOBILIZING SCOPE OF TRAGEDY, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND PROSOCIAL 
ORIENTATION 
The terrorist attacks occurring on the morning of September 11, 2001 left an indelible 
mark on the lives of New Yorkers and Americans.  Given the gravity of 9/11, it should come 
as no surprise that the tragedy and its aftermath have been the subject of a growing body of 
social scientific research.  Among the important issues receiving a great deal of scholarly 
attention is the extent to which the September 11 events revitalized Americans’ waning civic 
commitments and behaviors.  Drawing on his arguments about how World War II mobilized 
a generation of Americans to get involved in civic action and remain involved throughout 
their lives, Robert Putnam posited that 9/11 was just what America needed to reverse its 
downward trend in civic participation.45  In his book Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000:402) 
stated that the “[increase in civic disengagement] would be eased by a palpable national 
crisis, like war or depression or natural disaster, but for better and for worse, America at the 
dawn of the new century faces no such galvanizing crisis” (emphasis in original).  But then 
on the morning of September 11, Americans found themselves living through one of the 
greatest national crises in U.S. history.  But was Putnam (2000) correct?  Did 9/11 mobilize 
Americans to espouse stronger civic attitudes and participate in civic activities in greater 
numbers than before the attacks?
                                                 
45 There has been much scholarly debate in recent years about the decline in U.S. civic participation (see, for 
example, Paxton 1999; Sampson et al. 2006). 
 
 Based on available data, it seems that while 9/11 may have created greater civic 
mindedness in Americans, especially in the short-term, it did not promote any systematic 
increase in Americans’ civic participation.  Regarding civic attitudes, Traugott et al. (2002) 
found that Americans had more favorable attitudes toward such American ethnic groups as 
African Americans and Hispanics in their post-9/11 fall 2001 survey than in either the 1998 
or 2000 National Election Studies (NES).  Additionally, Ford and colleagues (2003) 
discovered among a large sample of adolescents that respondents interviewed within two 
months after 9/11 were more likely to agree that they could trust all levels of government 
(i.e., federal, state and local) than those interviewed in the two months before 9/11.  
Regarding national pride, Smith et al. (2001) showed that respondents to the National 
Tragedy Survey (NTS), conducted between September 12 and September 27, 2001, were 
much more likely to disagree with the statement “there are some things about America today 
that make me feel ashamed of America” relative to respondents from previous years of the 
General Social Survey (GSS).  Furthermore, based on a panel study of 500 individuals 
surveyed in the fall of 2000 and then reinterviewed in October and November of 2001, 
Putnam (2002) found that Americans’ interest in politics had increased, which is particularly 
impressive since the national Presidential campaign was going on in the fall of 2000. 
Civic behaviors, however, did not appear to have followed the same pattern as civic 
attitudes after the tragedy.  Available evidence suggests that more Americans did not 
participate in civic efforts after 9/11.  Returning to Traugott et al.’s (2002) study, they found 
that Americans were actually less likely to get involved in “any sort of volunteer or 
charitable activity in their community” after 9/11 than before.  On their post-9/11 fall survey, 
Traugott et al. (2002) found that 39 percent of respondents had engaged in volunteer or 
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 charitable activity in their community, while a comparable question on a survey conducted 
before 9/11 found that the percentage of Americans who had engaged in this activity was 43.  
Although Putnam (2002) tended not to find a decline between pre- and post-9/11 estimates of 
civic engagement on his survey, he documented only negligible or no differences in these 
estimates.  While increases in civic attitudes are notable, especially if they remain elevated, it 
is civic involvement that is most crucial for reviving American civic life.  As Putnam 
(2002:22) states, “Changes in attitudes alone, no matter how promising, do not constitute 
civic renewal.”  Because the attacks of 9/11 do not seem to have mobilized Americans to 
participate in civic engagement in greater numbers than before, this calls into question 
Putnam’s (2000) hypothesis that an event such as 9/11 would rally the country to engage 
broadly in civic action throughout communities and help restore U.S. civic life. 
Before dismissing the possibility that 9/11 motivated more Americans to participate 
in civic engagement than before the attacks, we need to consider more closely how the 
previously presented studies operationalized post-9/11 civic engagement.  Because these 
studies focused on comparing rates of civic behaviors that occurred before and after the 9/11 
attacks, they did not include volunteer efforts that directly focused on helping victims, 
families of victims, or rescue workers, as these efforts obviously could not have occurred 
prior to the attacks.  However, we know that, at least in the short-term, participation in 
volunteer efforts to help those directly harmed by the tragedy was an important part of the 
post-9/11 civic response (Beyerlein and Sikkink 2005).  Consequently, when prior studies 
like Traugott et al. (2002) measured civic engagement in terms of doing volunteer or 
charitable activity in communities, they did not capture volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts.  If 
participation in volunteer efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of victims, or rescue workers 
 129
 was part of the post-9/11 civic engagement estimates, it is likely that we would have 
observed a significant increase in civic engagement similar to what Putnam (2000) predicted. 
But even if we had, it still would be debatable whether this constitutes a broad 
renewal of U.S. civic engagement like the one Putnam (2000) had in mind.  Examining the 
studies on 9/11 relief efforts, we learn that, not surprisingly, the most important factors for 
differentiating Americans who participated in some sort of 9/11 relief effort from those who 
did not were products of the 9/11 tragedy itself, such as proximity to the attack sites, personal 
relationships to victims or potential victims, and public displays of patriotism (Beyerlein and 
Sikkink 2005).  For instance, Smith et al. (2001) found that there was an eleven-point 
percentage difference in giving blood to help victims in the immediate days and weeks 
following the 9/11 attacks between New Yorkers and those living in other parts of the United 
States.  That 9/11 factors mobilized Americans to help victims certainly indicates an 
important civic response and shows solidarity with those injured or killed.  However, if these 
factors motivated participation exclusively in 9/11 relief efforts, then this casts doubt on the 
interpretation that 9/11 mobilized Americans to contribute broadly to civic life and helped 
start the process of civic renewal.  On the other hand, if 9/11-generated factors also 
encouraged Americans to participate in other forms of civic engagement, such as volunteer 
efforts in communities, then this would suggest a greater impact of 9/11 on U.S. civic life 
than has to date been acknowledged.  Because prior studies did not distinguish between post-
9/11 volunteer efforts that focused on helping those harmed by the tragedy and post-9/11 
volunteer efforts that focused on helping others in communities besides victims, we have no 
way to know whether the mobilizing effect of 9/11-generated factors was narrow or broad in 
scope.  Given that the same data limitation exists for scholarship on participation in relief 
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 efforts during natural disasters and the 1995 domestic terrorist bombing of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Haines, Hurlbert, and Beggs 1996; Kaniasty 
and Norris 1995; Nelson 1973; O'Brien and Mileti 1992; St. John and Fuchs 2002), it is also 
unknown in these cases whether disaster-generated factors only promoted helping behavior 
focused on victims of tragedies, or whether they also encouraged other types of helping 
behavior.  Beyond the case of 9/11, then, identifying whether 9/11-generated factors 
mobilized participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts as well as 9/11 relief efforts 
has important implications for our understanding of the nature of civic response in the 
aftermath of tragedy. 
Besides 9/11-generated factors, this chapter focuses on the significance of what 
scholars have recently called “social capital”—network and organizational embeddedness—
as well as psychological orientations for explaining variation in helping behavior after a 
crisis.  Concerning social capital, the sociology of disaster literature has demonstrated that 
social connections and voluntary organization membership significantly predict who 
volunteers to help with recovery efforts and who does not.  Likewise, a large amount of 
literature on civic engagement emphasizes the importance of social networks and 
organizations for understanding differential participation in volunteerism outside of disaster 
contexts.  However, an important limitation of both of these literatures is that they have not 
specified the exact types of personal ties and associational memberships that are most 
important for facilitating participation in helping behavior.  As a result, the civic engagement 
literature and the disaster literature have not developed a compelling theoretical account to 
explain why certain social networks and organizations are more likely than others to mobilize 
people to volunteer in routine and nonroutine situations.  To overcome these limitations, I 
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 draw on the broader scholarship on social networks and social movements to explain the 
differential effects of different types of social networks and organizations on helping 
behavior focused on victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as those focused 
on others in communities after 9/11.  
 A prosocial orientation is the final factor on which this chapter focuses to account for 
differences in participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 volunteer efforts in 
communities.  A large body of literature on the psychology of volunteering emphasizes the 
importance of the “push” of this orientation for differentiating volunteers from nonvolunteers 
(Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; Penner 2002; Penner and 
Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Piliavin and Charng 1990; 
Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 1999; Wuthnow 1991).46  
Surprisingly, however, a dispositional perspective has generally not been incorporated in the 
disaster scholarship to understand variation in involvement in efforts to help victims and 
rescue workers after tragedies.  Given the robustness of a prosocial orientation’s effect on 
participation in volunteer efforts outside of disaster contexts, its omission from models of 
helping with relief efforts is notable.  Furthermore, as discussed below, incorporating a 
prosocial orientation in models of helping behavior after tragedies provides a way to address 
the selection problem that may otherwise undermine the interpretation that social networks 
and organizations were sources of mobilizing for this behavior.  By bringing a dispositional 
perspective to bear on participation in volunteers efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of 
                                                 
46 The dispositional psychological perspective is one of many psychological perspectives relevant for 
understanding helping behavior.  For instance, psychological scholarship on helping behavior has focused on 
perceived diffusion of responsibility for assisting others in distress (Latane and Darley 1970).  For a review of 
the many psychological processes that can affect helping behavior see (Schroeder et al. 1995). 
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 victims, or rescue workers, I broaden our understanding of the dynamics that encourage civic 
engagement to help those harmed by tragedies.  
 
Tragedy-Generated Factors and Helping Behavior 
 Scholarship on the sociology of disaster demonstrates the importance of tragedy-
generated factors for explaining why some individuals volunteer to help those harmed by 
catastrophes while others do not.  One important factor in this regard is being a victim of 
some sort.  Although disaster studies have established the importance of this variable, there is 
some debate about whether experiencing loss from traumatic events positively or negatively 
affects getting involved in volunteer efforts to help other victims.  On the one hand, some 
argue that experiencing loss, especially severe loss, may limit individuals’ ability to help 
other victims since they have to care for themselves and focus on rebuilding their own 
damaged lives.  Supporting this view, Haines et al. (1996) found that the greater the house 
damage from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the lower the likelihood of engaging in recovery 
efforts to help other victims of the hurricane. 
But there seems to be greater support for the alternative view that being a victim 
gives rise to identification and solidarity with other victims and thus promotes participation 
in volunteer efforts to help others harmed.  As Dynes and Drabek (1994:12) state, “Disaster 
victims do not exhibit irrational and self destructive behavior nor do they become helpless 
and dependent…They become resources.  Most early emergency tasks, such as search and 
rescue, are done by disaster victims themselves…Such victims seldom exhibit traumatic 
indication of stress but do exhibit types of altruistic behavior uncommon prior to the 
disaster.”  In their study of the predictors of helping behavior after Hurricane Hugo in 1989, 
Kaniasty and Norris (1995) found that individuals who experienced greater property and 
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 belonging loss were more likely to provide tangible and informational help to other hurricane 
victims.  They found a similar effect for experiencing greater disaster-related injuries and 
perceiving greater life threats during the hurricane.  For residents of Santa Cruz and San 
Francisco, California, O’Brien and Mileti (1992) showed that greater household and 
neighborhood damage from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was positively associated with 
greater participation in emergency response efforts in the aftermath of the quake.  
Concerning the catastrophic tornado that hit Lubbock, Texas, in 1971, Nelson (1973) found 
that among residents living within the disaster area, those who suffered personal loss or 
injury were much more likely to donate funds than those who did not.  Prior disaster studies 
have also documented that experiencing loss from tragedies in the form of the death of 
friends, colleagues, or other associates also significantly motivates participation in relief 
efforts.  For the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, St. John and Fuchs (2002) found that people 
who knew more victims of the bombing (other than relatives) were considerably more likely 
to participate in a range of relief effort activities compared to those who knew no victims.  
Regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) also found that 
knowing more victims or potential victims was positively related to volunteering for 
organizations or groups to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers.  They argued 
conceptually that knowing victims or potential victims reflected a strong emotional 
attachment to those harmed and thus created a personal stake in getting involved in relief 
efforts as a way to honor the injured or the memory of a departed loved one. 
Extending the arguments of disaster scholarship and drawing on social movement as 
well as collective behavior scholarship, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) posited that other 
tragedy-generated factors should also be important for explaining variation in 9/11 relief 
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 efforts.  They focused especially on the role of emotions, geographic propinquity, collective 
and regional identity, and commemorative gatherings to explain this variation.  In terms of 
emotions, they theorized that sorrow and grief would be central since these emotions arise 
from suffering and loss and create identification with and empathy for victims.  Because 
living close to the terrorist attack sites likely increased the chance of knowing victims or 
potential victims, knowledge about helping opportunities, and awareness of needs, Beyerlein 
and Sikkink (2005) argued that proximity should also be an important factor facilitating 
participation in relief efforts.  They hypothesized that patriotism—understood as a symbolic 
bond with America and commitment to its history, ideals, traditions, and way of life—as well 
should mobilize Americans to participate in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or 
rescue workers of the attacks.  Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) claimed that the spike in 
patriotism after 9/11, as evident by the large number of public displays of the American flag 
and other patriotic symbols (Collins 2004), was likely an important expression of 
identification with the nation perceived to be the object of the attacks.  For many Americans, 
then, these authors argued that patriotism represented a salient collective identity that united 
citizens in a common struggle and thus should have increased the likelihood of volunteering 
for 9/11 relief efforts.  According to Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005), the attacks of 9/11 may 
have also activated a regional collective identity (see also Abrams, Albright, and Panofsky 
2004).  These authors argued that those living in the New York area likely interpreted 9/11 as 
an assault on the self, their distinctive way of life, and fellow New Yorkers.  Given this, New 
Yorkers should have participated in relief efforts at greater rates than individuals living in 
other parts of the United States to defend their identity and to show their solidarity with other 
New Yorkers.  Finally, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) emphasized that participation in 
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 commemorative events to honor victims—such as community candlelight or prayer vigils—
should have spurred people to get involved in 9/11 relief efforts, as participation in these 
events likely heightened the significance of tragedy, intensified values conducive to helping 
behavior, including sympathy and compassion, and increased information about 
opportunities to help victims.  Based on analyses of a nationally representative survey of 
Americans after 9/11, Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) generally found empirical support for 
their arguments about the positive relationship between 9/11-generated factors and getting 
involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 
tragedy. 
 Returning to one of the central questions of this chapter, did the 9/11-generated 
factors on which Beyerlein and Sikkink (2005) focused also motivate Americans to get 
involved in post-9/11 volunteer efforts in communities?  Like previous disaster scholarship 
on relief efforts, Beyerlein and Sikkink’s (2005) analysis was limited to participation in 
volunteer efforts to help 9/11 victims, families of victims, or rescue workers.  Without a 
comparative analysis, we cannot answer the important question of whether these factors also 
mobilized other types of helping behavior after 9/11 and thus evaluate the extent to which the 
tragedy may have helped contribute to reviving U.S. civic life.  On the one hand, it is 
possible theoretically that, for instance, because patriotism evoked feelings of solidarity, 
greater levels of patriotism would have encouraged Americans to help not only those harmed 
by the 9/11 attacks, but also citizens broadly as a way to strengthen, heal, and unify the 
nation.  On the other hand, however, perhaps greater patriotism limited Americans from 
getting involved in volunteer efforts in communities after 9/11, as they may have been 
consumed with helping victims, families of victims, or rescue workers since these were the 
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 people who directly suffered loss or died and thus most represented the fallen nation in need 
of care.  In what follows, I test whether 9/11-generated factors—knowing victims or potential 
victims, proximity to the attack sites, sorrow in response to the attacks, patriotism, New York 
residence, and participation in commemorative gatherings—predicted getting involved in 
post-9/11 volunteer efforts in communities in addition to 9/11 relief efforts, or whether the 
effects of these factors were limited to getting involved to help victims, families, or rescue 
workers of the 9/11 attacks.  By doing so, I identify for the first time whether tragedy-
generated factors mobilize a civic response that is narrow or broad in scope. 
 
Social Capital and Helping Behavior 
 Besides the previously identified 9/11-generated factors, variables scholars have 
generally labeled as “social capital”—networks and organizations—should be important for 
explaining involvement in 9/11 relief efforts as well as involvement in post-9/11 community 
volunteer efforts.  Literature on the sociology of disaster has demonstrated the significance of 
personal connections for explaining who provides help after catastrophes.  In their study of 
the determinants of providing help to prepare for and involvement in recovery efforts after 
Hurricane Andrew, Haines et al. (2005) found that people who had larger and denser social 
networks were more likely to engage in a greater number of recovery efforts.  Regarding the 
preparation phase, however, only network density was associated with a greater number of 
helping behaviors.  Kanisty and Norris (1995) also found that the greater the network size, 
the greater the likelihood of proving tangible help, informational help, and emotional help to 
victims of Hurricane Hugo.  Echoing these findings are those from the scholarship on civic 
engagement.  This scholarship has also demonstrated the importance of social ties for 
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 distinguishing volunteers from nonvolunteers outside of disaster contexts.  For example, 
Wilson and Musick (1999) found that the greater number of friends and the greater 
interaction with them (either in person or by telephone), the greater the participation in 
volunteer activity in a variety of contexts and the greater the number of hours volunteered.  
Similarly, Amato (1990) showed that people who had more people in their social network 
and greater contact with them, the more likely they were to engage in planned volunteer 
efforts.  
 Overall, then, the scholarship on disaster relief efforts and civic engagement 
demonstrates that individuals who are embedded in larger social networks and interact more 
often with their social ties are more likely to participate in helping behavior during normal 
times and times of crisis.  As valuable as this scholarship is for directing our attention to the 
role of social connections for understanding who volunteers for relief and other efforts, it is 
less helpful for understanding why social networks mobilize volunteerism.  This is because 
prior research has only focused on general network characteristics, namely size, instead of 
specific network characteristics.  However, there is nothing about network size per se that 
should induce people to participate in relief efforts or other types of volunteer efforts.  In 
support of this view, social movement scholarship on differential participation has shown 
that having more friends is not what is important for explaining activist participation, but 
rather having more friends who are activists or committed to activism.  For example, when 
Passy (2001) controlled for the number of ties who supported the Swiss solidarity movement, 
she found that there was no positive effect of network size on participation in activism on 
behalf of this movement.  Applying this logic to participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-
9/11 community volunteer efforts, the characteristic of social networks that should matter 
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 most for promoting this participation is a commitment to volunteering, expressed either 
verbally, behaviorally, or both.  The majority of studies on helping behavior in and outside 
disaster situations have ignored the volunteering characteristic of social networks.  When 
studies have acknowledged this characteristic, they have done so only in passing to justify 
their measure of network size, arguing that the larger the social network, the greater the 
opportunity of coming in contact with a volunteer (Pearce 1993; Wilson and Musick 1999).  
But as just noted above, Passey (2001) demonstrated it is not the size of friendship networks 
that is important, but whether they are activist in nature.  Furthermore, the “opportunity 
thesis” tells us nothing about why having friends who volunteer would be important for 
mobilizing people to participate in volunteer efforts to help victims and others in 
communities after tragedies.  To explain why embeddedness in volunteering networks should 
motivate participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue 
workers of tragedies as well as others in communities, we must turn to the theoretical insights 
of the broader scholarship on social networks and social movements. 
 The broader network literature emphasizes that social influence is the crucial 
mechanism for understanding the importance of social networks for shaping the behavior of 
those embedded in them (see, for example, Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 
1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; Graham et al. 1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; 
Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991).  
Because people desire to gain approval and avoid disapproval from friends, they are likely to 
act in a way that conforms to the commitments and expectations of those in their social 
circle.  While a network perspective has been a prominent part of a myriad of different 
sociological literatures, the most relevant literature for the purposes of this chapter is the 
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 social movement literature on personal ties and protest participation.  A large body of social 
movement research has demonstrated the importance of embeddedness in activist friendship 
networks for explaining why certain people participate in protest activism while others do not 
(see, for example, Chong 1991; della Porta 1988; Diani 1995; Kitts 1999, 2000; Klandermans 
and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 1989; Opp and Gern 
1993; Passy 2001, 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Snow et al. 1980).  For instance, McAdam 
(1986) showed that applicants to the Mississippi Freedom Summer project who had 
preexisting close relationships with other applicants and activists were considerably more 
likely to participate in this project than those who did not.  Although not using the exact 
language of social influence, social movement scholars as diverse as rationalists and 
culturalists have employed a similar logic to explain the robust effects of activist networks on 
participation.  These scholars have argued that because people integrated into activist 
networks are subject to positive and negative sanctions from peers, they have powerful 
“selective incentives” to get involved in protest activity (Olson 1965).  By participating in 
protest activism, members of activist networks likely receive praise and avoid criticism from 
friends and thus remain in their good graces (Chong 1991; Kitts 2000; Opp 1989).  Consider, 
for instance, the work of della Porta (1988).  She found that individuals joined Italian left-
wing terrorist groups because they sought approval of friends who were in the process of 
joining or who had already joined.  Extending these arguments to the topic of this chapter, we 
would expect individuals embedded in volunteering networks to be more likely to help 9/11 
victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as to help others in communities 
besides those directly harmed by the tragedy after 9/11. 
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  However, volunteer friends may exert different types of social influence on peers, 
which may affect how likely they are to respond to this influence and get involved in helping 
behavior.  Broader scholarship on peer networks differentiates among attitudinal, passive 
behavioral, and active behavioral social influence (Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Graham et 
al. 1991; Matsueda and Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991).  Given the focus on this 
chapter, I explain these types of social influence in terms of helping behavior. First, 
attitudinal social influence consists of approval from peers to participate in helping behavior, 
such as friends’ verbal support to volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts or community efforts.  
Second, active behavioral social influence consists of explicit offers or encouragements from 
peers to engage in helping behavior.47  This type of behavioral social influence calls for an 
immediate response to accept or reject the offer or encouragement to volunteer.  Third, 
passive behavioral social influence consists of the observation or knowledge of peers’ 
involvement in helping behavior.  Unlike active behavioral social influence, this type of 
behavioral social influence does not call for an immediate response of acceptance or rejection 
to volunteer, though one may occur.  More often, there is a delay in the response to passive 
behavioral social influence.  Empirical studies on behaviors other than volunteering have 
generally shown that behavioral social influence has stronger effects than attitudinal social 
influence (Graham et al. 1991; Warr and Stafford 1991), though the difference between 
active behavioral social influence and passive behavioral influence has not been rigorously 
investigated.  It is thus expected that behavioral volunteer social influence will have stronger 
effects on 9/11 volunteering and post-9/11 community volunteering than attitudinal social 
influence. 
                                                 
47 Graham et al.’s (1991) discussion of active and passive behavioral social influence for deviant behavior was 
particularly drawn on in developing the argument for how these two types of social influence operate for 
helping behavior. 
 141
  Just as embeddedness in volunteering networks should be important for explaining 
variation in helping behavior for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer 
efforts, so should integration into voluntary organizations.  Both the sociology of disaster and 
civic engagement literatures support this observation.  Returning to Haines et al.’s (1996) 
study of the determinants of helping to prepare for and participation in recovery efforts after 
Hurricane Andrew, they found that while none of the measures for organization membership 
were significant predictors of helping in the preparation phrase, the measures for fraternal, 
service, and other group membership were significant predictors of helping in the recovery 
phrase.  Additionally, Nelson (1973) found that relative to individuals who held no 
memberships in voluntary organizations, those who held at least one voluntary organization 
membership were more likely to engage in emergency helping behavior following the 
Lubbock tornado.  Furthermore, St. John and Fuchs (2002) found that people who were 
members of more voluntary organizations prior to the Oklahoma City bombing were more 
likely to donate professional and nonprofessional services to victims and rescue workers as 
well to volunteer for organizations helping with and participating in the search and rescue 
efforts.  Consistent with the findings from the disaster literature, the civic engagement 
literature has identified a robust relationship between voluntary organization participation 
and participation in various types of volunteer efforts in routine situations.  For example, 
Wilson and Musick (1999) found that the more people attended meetings or programs of any 
voluntary organization, the more likely they were to engage in volunteer efforts and remain 
engaged. 
The importance of establishing the institutional foundation of volunteer efforts in 
times of crisis and normal times notwithstanding, the way in which the disaster and civic 
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 engagement literatures have tended to conceptualize voluntary organization membership is 
subject to a similar critique that was raised above for social networks.  These literatures have 
generally viewed participation in voluntary organizations of any sort as equally likely to 
mobilize people to participate in helping behavior in and outside of disaster situations (but 
see Paxton 2002; Perrin 2006; Stolle and Rochon 1998).  Supporting this view is disaster and 
civic engagement scholarship’s combining of different types of voluntary organization 
memberships into a single measure and modeling the effect of the overall number of 
organizations on helping behavior (Nelson 1973; St. John and Fuchs 2002; Wilson and 
Musick 1999).  Even when disaster and civic engagement scholarship has included measures 
for different types of voluntary organizations, it has treated them as conceptually equivalent, 
positing a general “organizational” membership effect for explaining involvement in 
volunteer efforts in routine and nonroutine situations (Haines et al. 1996).  But similar to 
what was previously discussed for social networks, there are good reasons to think that 
different types of organizations will encourage participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-
9/11 community volunteer efforts at different rates.  Although there are several dimensions 
along which organizations could be distinguished when studying their effects on helping 
behavior, this chapter focuses on the important distinction between charitable organizations 
or those that are committed to helping nonmembers and non-charitable organizations or those 
that are not committed to helping nonmembers.  
Based on previous research in social movements and political science, there seems to 
be four main ways through which participation in voluntary organizations could promote 
volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts: (1) cultivation of useful 
skills; (2) dissemination of information about opportunities to help; (2) exposure to leader 
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 social influence to be active; and (4) integration into volunteering peer networks that are also 
sources of social influence to help.  As discussed in what follows, each should be more 
prevalent among charitable organizations.  First, Verba and colleagues (1995) have argued 
that, along with workplace institutions, voluntary organizations are among the most 
important social settings in which people acquire and hone skills that are transferable to 
numerous external activities.  Verba et al. (1995) focused on skills that were derived from 
writing letters, planning meetings, giving presentations, and attending meeting where 
decisions were made.  Although these “organizing” skills are certainly relevant for promoting 
involvement in civic engagement—such as time-based political activity as Verba et al. 
(1995:357-364) demonstrated—other skills may be more important for encouraging 
participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  For instance, 
learning to take care of others would seem to be a more valuable skill for engaging in helping 
behavior than learning how to lead meetings.  Given charitable organizations’ commitment to 
helping nonmembers, they should be especially likely to organize and to encourage 
participation in activities that cultivate skills that can be used to help victims of disasters and 
others in need in communities.  Second, voluntary organizations can facilitate participation in 
helping behavior by publicizing opportunities to get involved during meetings, informal 
gatherings, and in written materials.  Like acquisition of useful skills, charitable 
organizations are probably more likely to provide a greater amount of information about 
volunteer efforts in communities than are non-charitable organizations, because of their 
greater commitment to and linkages with the broader community. 
Leader social influence to help is the third way through which voluntary 
organizations likely promote participation in volunteer efforts.  Because members likely look 
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 up to and respect group leaders, they are likely to want to gain their approval and avoid their 
disapproval.  As a result, when leaders of voluntary organizations encourage members to get 
involved in volunteer efforts, they are likely to respond and get involved to retain their good 
standing with group leaders.  But this assumes that all leaders of voluntary organizations 
encourage members to get involved in helping behavior.  However, Verba et al. (1995) have 
shown that leaders of voluntary organizations vary substantially in the extent to which they 
exert social influence on members to be politically active.  The same should be true for 
voluntary organization leadership encouragements to get involved in helping behavior.  
Again, given that helping nonmembers is central to the mission of charitable organizations, it 
is reasonable to assume that leaders of these organizations would be very committed to 
getting members involved in volunteer efforts and thus would be particularly likely to 
encourage them to get involved in helping efforts.   
Last, because voluntary organizations provide the necessary opportunities for 
volunteers to interact with each other and become friends, they promote embeddedness in 
peer social networks that are important sources of social influence inducing helping behavior.  
A large body of scholarship has established that voluntary organizations are among the most 
important social settings in which similar people develop and form friendships (Feld 1982; 
McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001).  Given the homophily principle, 
people who are committed to helping others are likely to be attracted to and populate 
charitable organizations because they reflect their values.  Consequently, participation in 
these organizations should be very likely to foster integration into volunteering peer 
networks.  Supporting this argument, social movement scholarship has found a positive 
relationship between involvement in political organizations and embeddedness in activist 
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 networks.  For instance, Opp (1989:Chapter 5) demonstrated that political group membership 
had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of being located in protest-encouraging 
networks (see also Opp and Gern 1993). 
In light of these arguments, we would expect people integrated into charitable 
organizations to be extremely susceptible to participating in post-9/11 community volunteer 
efforts.  However, the effect of charitable and non-charitable organizations on volunteering 
for 9/11 relief efforts is less clear.  Since volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts requires skills 
that charitable organizations are more likely to foster, members of these organizations may 
have enjoyed a greater skill advantage over members of non-charitable organizations, which 
would increase the likelihood of having been involved in 9/11 relief efforts.  But information 
as well as leadership and peer encouragement advantages may have been more minimal in 
the case of 9/11 relief efforts.  On the one hand, given the impact of the 9/11 attacks, non-
charitable organizations may have been just as likely to acquire relevant information about 
how to help victims.  Additionally, leaders and members of non-charitable organizations may 
have been just as likely to encourage people to get involved in relief efforts to help victims 
given the gravity of the attacks.  On the other hand, because of charitable organizations’ 
strong commitment to helping nonmembers, their leaders and members may have been even 
more likely to encourage others to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 
9/11 tragedy, and given their more extensive embeddedness in the broader community, 
charitable organizations may have been even more likely to gain information about 
opportunities to get involved in 9/11 relief efforts.  The empirical models that follow test 
whether there were differences in the extent to which integration into charitable organizations 
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 and integration into non-charitable organizations promoted participation in both types of 
helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
Prosocial Orientation and Helping Behavior 
The final factor on which this chapter focuses to explain why some people 
participated in 9/11 relief efforts and community volunteer efforts after 9/11 while others did 
not is dispositional in nature.  According to this perspective of helping behavior, certain 
orientations or dispositions should account for variation in helping behavior after the 9/11 
tragedy.  Among the most important orientations linked to helping behavior is a prosocial 
orientation.  Penner and Finkelstein (1998:526) define a prosocial orientation as “an enduring 
tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other people, to feel concern and empathy 
for them, and to act in a way that benefits them” (see also Penner 2002; Penner et al. 1995).  
A large body of research has found a significant positive relationship between a prosocial 
orientation (or measures reflecting it) and participation in a variety of volunteer efforts 
outside of disaster contexts(Carlo et al. 2005; Clary et al. 1996; Elshaug and Metzer 2001; 
Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995; Piliavin and Callero 1991; 
Piliavin and Charng 1990; Rossi 2001b; Sokolowski 1996; Wilson and Musick 1997, 1998, 
1999; Wuthnow 1991).  Based on this evidence, we would expect that people who were more 
prosocially oriented would have been more likely to engage in post-9/11 community 
volunteer efforts than those who were less prosocially oriented. 
Surprisingly, however, scant attention has been paid to the role of a prosocial 
orientation for explaining who gets involved to help with recovery efforts and who does not.  
None of the previously reviewed studies on disaster relief considered a prosocial orientation, 
 147
 or other orientations for that matter, to understand differences in helping behavior after 
tragedies.  Although not focusing on disasters, Oliner and Oliner (1988) identified that what 
Penner and colleagues (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995) would 
call a prosocial orientation was an important factor for differentiating people who helped 
rescue Jews from the Nazis from those who did not.  As they state, “What distinguished 
rescuers [from nonrescuers] was…their stronger sense of attachment to others and their 
feelings of responsibility for the welfare of others, including those outside their immediate 
familial or communal circles” (Oliner and Oliner 1988. p. 249).  This indicates that a 
prosocial orientation can be an important determinant of helping behavior in times of crisis 
and threat.  Combined with a prosocial orientation’s robust effects on helping behavior in 
routine situations, we would expect more prosocially oriented people to have been more 
likely to get involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue 
workers of the 9/11 tragedy than less prosocially oriented people. 
The above arguments suggest that a prosocial orientation should have directly 
mobilized Americans to participate in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer 
efforts.  However, a prosocial orientation may have also indirectly affected helping behavior 
after the tragedy through fostering integration into volunteering networks, promoting 
involvement in charitable organizations, heightening sorrow and patriotic response, and 
increasing attendance at commemorative events for victims.  Since “birds of a feather flock 
together,” people who are committed to helping others should be likely to embed themselves 
in volunteering networks.  Given that a prosocial orientation consists of concerns for the 
wellbeing of others, we would expect this orientation to be an important basis on which 
friendships among fellow volunteers form and remain intact.  For the same reasons, we 
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 would expect prosocially oriented people to be attracted to and participate in charitable 
organizations.  In addition to its indirect effects on helping behavior through social networks 
and organizations, a prosocial orientation may have indirectly affected this behavior through 
increasing feelings of sorrow about the attacks, participation in gatherings to honor victims, 
and expressions of patriotism.  Because the 9/11 attacks caused much human suffering and 
death, prosocially oriented people may have been especially likely to feel sorrow for and 
participate in events to commemorate the victims given their proclivity to be concerned about 
and care for the welfare of others.  To the extent that the nation was identified with human 
loss, prosocially oriented people may have also been more likely to display patriotic symbols 
as a way to show their solidarity with those who had died or were suffering. 
 Beyond specifying the pathways through which a prosocial orientation may have 
mobilized helping behavior after the 9/11 tragedy, incorporating this orientation into models 
of post-9/11 helping behavior helps address the issue of selection.  Although disaster and 
civic engagement scholarship on the relationship between relational factors and helping 
behavior has conceptually and empirically ignored this issue, selection, if left unaccounted, 
casts doubt on the previous arguments that charitable organizations and volunteering 
networks induce volunteering through social influence.  Because prosocially orientated 
people value helping others, the homophily principle predicts that they will be attracted to 
charitable organizations and people who engage in volunteer efforts.  Consequently, any 
observed charitable organization or volunteering network effects may be the result of 
selection rather than social influence.  If the addition of a prosocial social orientation renders 
the effects of charitable organizations and volunteering networks insignificant, then this 
would suggest that their effects are spurious due to homophily.  But if the effects of 
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 charitable organizations and volunteering networks are robust to the inclusion of a prosocial 
orientation, this would suggest that their effects are due to social influence (for a detailed 
discussion of selection and influence see Chapter 1). 
 
Summary of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model 
 Figure 4.1 summarizes my model of post-9/11 helping behavior.  While NY/NJ 
residence, WTC distance, knowing victims or potential victims, patriotism, sorrow in 
response to the attacks, and attendance at commemorative events (the latter three are 
presented by box “Other 9/11-Generated Factors” box) should have had significant effects on 
getting involved in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 9/11 
tragedy, it is an open question whether they also had significant effects on getting involved in 
efforts to help others in communities after the 9/11 attacks.  It is also expected that there was 
a positive relationship between knowing more victims or potential victims and the other 
9/11-generated factors as well as a positive relationship between both NY/NJ residence and 
WTC distance and knowing more victims or potential victims and the other 9/11-generated 
factors.  Because NY/NJ residence and distance from WTC were very likely antecedent to 
the social capital variables, they should have had effects on them, though the direction of 
their effects is not clear.  Net of homophily, there are good reasons to think that the social 
capital variables—especially charitable organizational involvement and embeddedness in 
volunteering networks—would have predicted getting involved in efforts to help not only 
victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy, but also others in communities 
after 9/11.  Finally, it is expected that a prosocial orientation directly affected both types of 
helping behaviors after 9/11 and indirectly affected these behaviors through its direct effects 
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 on sorrow in response to the attacks, patriotism, and attendance at commemorative events as 
well as its direct effects on the social capital variables.  In addition to specifying the 
mechanisms through which a prosocial orientation affected participation in 9/11 relief efforts 
and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, controlling for this orientation provides a way to 
determine whether the effects of organizational involvements and social networks were 
mainly due to social influence or selection. 
 
Data, Variables, and Models  
Data 
To test the model of post-9/11 helping behavior illustrated in Figure 4.1, the 2002 
Religion and Public Activism Survey (RAPAS) was used.  This survey was ideal for testing 
the model of post-9/11 helping behavior, as it contained detailed information on the types of 
volunteer efforts in which individuals were involved after the attacks, including making the 
crucial distinction between helping victims, families of victims, or rescue worker and others 
in communities.  Additionally, the 2002 RAPAS collected measures on various 9/11 
responses, such as sorrow and patriotism.  Finally, this survey included modules of voluntary 
organizations and social networks as well as a series of questions that tap psychological 
orientations toward activism.  The 2002 RAPAS is a telephone survey representing English-
speaking Americans 18 years of age and older who resided in households in the United 
States, conducted by FGI Research Inc., a national survey research firm based in Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina.  The survey was conducted from April to July 2002 using a random-digit-
dial method, employing a sample of randomly generated telephone numbers representative of 
all telephones in the 50 United States.  The survey was conducted with English-speaking 
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 households only.  In order to randomize responses within households, and so as to ensure 
representativeness of age and gender, interviewers asked to conduct the interview with the 
person in the household who had the most recent birthday.  All non-household numbers 
(business, government, nonprofit, etc.) were screened out of the sample through direct calling 
dispositions or ascription of contact and non-contact telephone numbers for non-completes 
based on proportions of household numbers among working telephone numbers.  Survey 
respondents were offered an incentive of 10 dollars to complete the survey.  The final sample 
size for the 2002 RAPAS was 2,898 and the response rate based on AAPOR’s RR3 method 
was 47 percent (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).48,49
 
Endogenous Variables 
The first and second endogenous variables in the model, which all other variables 
predict, were binary measures for doing volunteer work for any group or organization 
providing direct relief to the September 11 terrorist attack victims, their families, or workers, 
                                                 
48 The formula for AAPOR’s RR3 method is I/((I +P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)), where I is Completed 
Interviews, P is Partial Interviews, R is Refusals or Break-offs, NC is Non-contacts, O is Other, UH is 
Unknown household eligibility, UO is unknown other eligibility, and e is the estimated proportion of cases of 
unknown eligibility that are eligible.  For contacted numbers where it could not be determined whether they 
were household numbers or not, 38.83 percent was used for e, which represents the FCC’s percentage of 
working telephone numbers that were household numbers in 2002 (FCC 2000).  For non-contacted numbers 
after multiple attempts, 24.2 percent was used for e, which represents Brick, Montaquilla, and Scheuren’s 
(2002) estimate of the percentage of undermined numbers (no answer or answering machine) after multiple call 
attempts that are residential numbers. 
 
49 Because the 2002 RAPAS was unable to collect information on nonparticipants, there was no way to 
investigate whether those who responded to the survey were distinctive in any meaningful way from those who 
did not.  Given the focus of this chapter, if those who were more civically active were more likely to respond 
than those who refused, this could be an important source of bias.  While it is true that people who are more 
civically engaged tend to be more likely to participate in surveys than the less civically engaged, offering an 
incentive generally negates this difference (Groves et al. 2000).  Incentives generally produce greater survey 
representativeness without any deleterious consequences, such as jeopardizing data quality (Singer et al. 1999; 
Singer et al. 2000).  Regarding demographic differences between the 2002 RAPAS and Census averages, older, 
more educated, and female respondents were overrepresented. The 2002 RAPAS constructed a weight based on 
these demographic variables (the weight also adjusted for household size), so that its demographic distributions 
matched those of the Census for American adults. 
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 and for volunteering for a community project after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  
Respondents who had done volunteer work for 9/11 relief efforts were coded one and those 
who had not were coded as zero.  The same coding scheme was used for post-9/11 
community volunteering.  The third, fourth, and fifth endogenous variables measured 
attitudinal, passive behavioral, and active behavioral social influence that strong ties exert for 
volunteering.  The RAPAS asked respondents to nominate up to the five people to whom 
they felt closest who were not members of their household, and then asked numerous 
questions about the characteristics of these people. Attitudinal social influence was measured 
as the number of strong ties who would respond positively if respondents did volunteer work 
for a social, political, or community issue.  Passive behavioral social influence was measured 
as the number of strong ties who regularly do volunteer work, while active behavioral social 
influence was measured as the number of strong ties who asked or encouraged respondents to 
do volunteer work in the past year.  The sixth endogenous variable was a measure of network 
size, representing the total number of strong ties whom respondents nominated. 
The seventh and eighth endogenous variables measured participation in charitable and 
non-charitable organizations.  The RAPAS asked respondents the number of groups or 
organizations in which they were involved during the past 12 months.  Respondents who 
reported being involved in any organization were then asked to report the number of 
organizations in which they were involved.  For each organization reported, respondents 
were then asked whether the organization sponsored efforts that serve the needs of people in 
the community outside the group.  This information was used to construct a variable for the 
number of organizations in which respondents were activity involved that provided help to 
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 nonmembers (charitable organizations) and a variable for the number of organizations in 
which respondents were activity involved that did not (non-charitable organizations). 
The next set of endogenous variables measured the 9/11-generated factors (see the 
section on exogenous variables for the description of the New York and distance from the 
WTC measures).  The tenth endogenous variable was a measure for the number of people 
respondents knew who died or were in danger during the terrorist attacks.50  The eleventh 
endogenous variable was a dichotomous variable for whether respondents felt sad, blue, or 
depressed for a week or more because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, which was 
coded as one if respondents felt sad, blue, or depressed because of the attacks and zero if they 
did not.  The twelfth endogenous variable was a measure for the number of American flags 
or other patriotic symbols publicly displayed after September 11.51  The thirteenth 
endogenous variable was a dichotomous measure for whether respondents had participated in 
a prayer or community candlelight vigil about the September 11 terrorist attacks, with those 
who had coded as one and those who had not coded as zero. 
A prosocial orientation was the final endogenous variable.52  Following the 
conceptualization of a prosocial orientation as a concern for the welfare and rights of other 
people (Penner 2002; Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Penner et al. 1995), two five-category 
                                                 
50 Response categories “six or more” were collapsed to form the upper category. 
 
51 Response categories seven or more were coded as the top category. 
 
52 Although it is clear that some of the control variables discussed below causally precede a prosocial 
orientation, such as gender, race, or age, this is not the case for others.  For these variables, it would be 
preferable to not have to assume causal order, but rather covary them with a prosocial orientation.  However, a 
programming limitation in Mplus precludes this option and thus the other control variables were treated as 
occurring casually prior to a prosocial orientation, even though in some cases this does not make substantive 
sense (e.g., working full-time).  But this is preferable to other alternatives, such as transforming the control 
variables to underlying propensities (see Appendix A for a discussion of this point) and covarying their errors 
with the measure for a prosocial orientation.  Treating a prosocial orientation as an endogenous variable, then, 
seems to violate the least number of assumptions.  But since this strategy is not without flaws, the effects of the 
control variables on the measure for a prosocial orientation were not interpreted. 
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 ordinal variables were used that tap this conceptualization. The first variable measured how 
responsible respondents personally feel to help other people who are in need.  The second 
variable measured how responsible respondents personally feel to take action against wrongs 
and injustices in life.  Each variable ranges from one (not responsible at all) to five 
(extremely responsible). 
 
Exogenous Variable 
 The two main exogenous variables were New York residence and distance from the 
World Trade Center.  The first was operationalized with a dichotomous variable that was 
coded as one if respondents lived in either the “New York, Northern New Jersey, Long 
Island” CMSA identified by the U.S. Census or other parts of New York or New Jersey, and 
zero if otherwise.53,54  To measure proximity to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a 
dichotomous variable was used that was coded as one if respondents lived 10 miles or less 
from where the World Trade Center stood, and zero if otherwise.55  This distance seems a 
reasonable estimate of increased opportunities and reduction of logistic barriers that would 
have made helping with relief efforts more probable. 
Because prior studies of helping behavior have identified that demographic 
characteristics are important factors for distinguishing individuals who help from those who 
do not, the following exogenous variables that might have otherwise confounded the effect of 
                                                 
53 Besides counties in New York and New Jersey, this CMSA includes four counties in Connecticut (Fairfield, 
Litchfield, Middlesex, and New Haven) and one county in Pennsylvania (Pike). 
 
54 Auxiliary analyses tested for differences in volunteering between those living in “New York, Northern New 
Jersey, Long Island” CMSA and those living in other parts of New York or New Jersey.  Because no such 
differences were found, these two categories were combined. 
 
55 The distance from where the World Trade Center was located was calculated from latitude and longitude 
measurements of survey respondents’ home addresses. 
 
 155
 the main explanatory variables were included: age (in years); gender (1 = female ; 0 = male); 
race (0 = white; 1 = African American; 1 = other race); education (1 = four-year college 
degree; 0 = less than a four-year college degree); community type (1 = rural; 0 = non-rural); 
working status (1 = working full-time; 0 = not working full-time); marital status (1= married;  
0 = unmarried); military service (1 = respondent served; 0 = did not serve); physical health 
(five-point ordinal variable, ranging from excellent to very poor); parenthood (number of 
children living in the household who are under nineteen years old); and household income 
(eight-point ordinal variable ranging from $10,000 or less to greater than $100,000).  Table 
4.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis.56
 
Structural Equation Models 
Figure 4.1 specified that there should be mediating relationships among many of the 
factors posited to be important for explaining participation in helping behavior after 9/11.  
Structural equation models (SEMs) can simultaneously estimate numerous regression 
equations, and they facilitate the decomposition of indirect, direct, and total effects among 
these equations (Bollen 1989b).  This was the first reason that this statistical procedure was 
chosen to test the conceptual model of post-9/11 helping behavior presented in Figure 4.1.  
The second reason for using SEMs was because they allowed measurement error to be taken 
into account that might have otherwise been present for a prosocial orientation, given that 
observed variables are unlikely to capture perfectly what is conceptually meant by this 
concept.  Furthermore, as described above, there were two measures for a prosocial 
orientation.  If scales for these measures were to be formed and a series of regression models 
                                                 
56 Descriptive statistics use weighted data to account for differential probabilities of selection based on number 
of eligible adults in the household and to adjust for the known demographic discrepancies as mentioned above. 
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 were to be run, the results would be difficult to interpret since the measurement error in them 
would not have been taken into account and thus the coefficients would be biased.  Given 
that accurately accounting for selection requires adequately measuring the concept 
representing it, a prosocial orientation was modeled as an unobserved or latent variable that 
incorporated measurement error.57
Because some of the observed endogenous variables were binary or ordinal, 
traditional SEMs could not be used to estimate the post-9/11 helping behavior model, as they 
assume that all observed endogenous variables are continuous.  Methods devised to correct 
the various problems that categorical observed endogenous variables pose for traditional 
SEMs were thus used.  Appendix A provides a more formal presentation of the SEM 
approach used.  In brief, the techniques assume that the ordinal and dichotomous variables 
are crude representations of normally distributed continuous variables.  The covariance 
matrix of these underlying continuous variables is estimated and is the basis for the analysis.  
In the case of a single equation with an ordinal or dichotomous outcome variable with 
exogenous explanatory variables, these techniques are equivalent to probit regression.  
However, the SEM procedures are more general in that they can estimate multiple equations 
with a mixture of ordinal and dichotomous indicators (see Appendix A for complete details).  
To facilitate interpretation of the effects of the main explanatory variables on 9/11 relief 
efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts and to gain a better understanding of the 
magnitude of their effects, predicted probabilities were calculated. 
                                                 
57 The other variables are assumed to have negligible measurement error.  This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption, as, for example, the variable for sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks measured “whether 
respondents felt sad, blue, or depressed for a week or more because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.”  It is thus assumed that any measurement error in the other measures would not introduce bias that would 
considerably alter the substantive interpretation of the findings. 
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 Multiple imputation (MI) was used to handle variables in the analysis that did not 
have complete information (Rubin 1991; Schafer 1997, 1999; Schafer and Graham 2002; 
Schafer and Olsen 1998).58  MI avoids shortcomings of other commonly employed 
techniques for dealing with missing data, such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy 
variable adjustment, or mean imputation (Allison 2002:5-12).  Moreover, MI assumes only 
that the data are missing at random (MAR) rather than the more restrictive assumption that 
they are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a requirement of the other 
commonly employed techniques, such as listwise or pairwise deletion.  Five imputations 
were generated, each of which replaced cases with missing information with plausible values 
based on their predictive distributions.  Identical SEMs were run for each of the five imputed 
datasets, using complete data on all variables.  The results were then combined to produce 
overall estimates, standard errors, and significance levels that take into account uncertainty 
about missing data. 
My analyses proceed in the following steps.  First, my model of post-9/11 helping 
was estimated and calculated predicted probabilities were calculated for the effects of the 
main explanatory variables.  Based on the results from this model, it was next tested whether 
there were significant differences in the magnitude of effects for the different explanatory 
variables on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  
Then, the analysis shifts to understanding the pathways through which certain explanatory 
variables mobilized involvement in the two types of helping behavior after 9/11.  Finally, 
auxiliary analyses were conducted to address the issue of the extent to which 9/11 
contributed to revitalizing U.S. civic life.  
                                                 
58 For MI, the MICE program (van Buuren et al. 1999) designed for STATA (Royston 2004, 2005) was used, 
which explicitly handles categorical variables.  
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Results 
 Table 4.2 reports the direct effects in the form of probit coefficients for the post-9/11 
helping behavior model illustrated in Figure 4.1.59  Each column represents a separate probit 
regression that corresponds to each path in this figure.  All models control for the 
demographic variables described above, but because demographic variables are not the focus 
of this chapter and to conserve space, their results are only displayed in Appendix E in Table 
E1.  Considering first the overall fit statistics listed at the bottom of the first column in Table 
4.2, we see that the post-9/11 helping behavior model achieves a good fit to the data.  
Although the chi-square test statistic was not significant, indicating rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the model fits the data perfectly, this test statistic is not suited to evaluate 
model fit with large sample sizes like the one in the post-9/11 helping behavior model (N = 
2,898).  This is because the ability of detecting even small differences between the 
population model implied covariance and the population observed variable covariance 
substantially increases with sample size.  All of the other fit statistics indicate a good model 
fit.60  For the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI), values greater than .95 generally indicate a good model fit, while values less 
than .90 generally indicate a poor model fit (Bollen 1989a; Bollen and Curran 2006:44-47).  
For the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), values less than .05 generally 
indicate a very good model fit, while values greater than .10 generally indicate a poor model 
fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993).  The values for the TLI, IFI, and CFI are .994 and the value 
                                                 
59 All models from the SEM estimates are based on unweighted data (DuMouchel and Duncan 1983; Winship 
and Radbill 1994). 
 
60 There is ambiguity about how to calculate fit statistics in SEM when using MI (Bollen and Curran 2006:68).  
The fit statistics reported in this chapter are based on averages across the five imputed datasets. 
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 for the RMSEA is .028, indicating that the post-9/11 helping behavior model is good fitting 
model.  Finally, looking at the R2 values for 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community 
volunteer efforts at the bottom of the last two columns in Table 4.2, we see that the post-9/11 
helping behavior model explains over 25 percent of the variability in people’s propensity to 
get involved in 9/11 relief efforts and almost 40 percent of the variability in people’s 
propensity to get involved in post-9/11 community efforts. 
Turning to the second to the last column in Table 4.2, we see that with the exception 
of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, all the 9/11-generated factors directly mobilized 
Americans to get involved in relief efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue 
workers of the tragedy.  For instance, the more patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11, the 
more likely they were to volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts (β = .080; p < .001).  That 9/11-
generated factors promoted helping with 9/11 relief efforts is not surprising, but did these 
factors also promote participation in post-9/11 volunteer efforts that were focused on others 
in communities after the tragedy?  The last column in Table 4.3 indicates that, yes, they 
generally did.  Other than NY/NJ residence, all of the 9/11-generated factors also had 
positive significant direct effects on getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer 
efforts.  As with 9/11 relief efforts, the more patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11, the 
greater the probability of participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts (β = .030; p 
< .05).  Interestingly, while sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks was not a significant 
predictor of volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts, it was a significant predictor of volunteering 
for post-9/11 community efforts (β = .075; p < .05).   
Although the 9/11-generated factors generally had significant positive direct effects 
on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-91l community efforts, the size of their 
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 effects was greater for the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy than the latter 
type (with the exception of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, which had a stronger 
effect on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts).  Comparing the difference in the predicted 
probability of 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated factors to 
the difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community efforts for the presence or 
absence of the 9/11-generated factors clearly shows this size difference.61  Figure 4.2 
graphically displays these differences in predicted probabilities.  The top bar in the set 
represents the predicted probability difference in 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or 
absence of the 9/11-generated factors, while the bottom bar in the set represents the predicted 
probability difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the presence or absence 
of the 9/11-generated factors.  As Figure 4.2 shows, the top bar is always longer with the 
exception of sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks, indicating that the difference in the 
predicted probability of 9/11 relief efforts for the presence or absence of the 9/11-generated 
factors is greater than the difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community 
volunteer efforts for the presence or absence of these factors.  Looking at the third set of bars 
from the top, for instance, we see that the difference in the predicted probability of getting 
involved in 9/11 relief efforts for displaying four patriotic symbols after 9/11 and displaying 
no patriotic symbols after 9/11 is .111, while the difference in the predicted probability of 
getting involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for displaying four patriotic 
symbols after 9/11 and displaying no patriotic symbols after 9/11 is .036.  This demonstrates 
                                                 
61 The following formula was used to calculate the predicted probabilities: Pr(yi =1| xi) = 1-Φ(τ1-βxi).  Unless 
otherwise noted, the predicted probabilities are for white married college educated females age 25 who have 
children under 19 living at home, military experience, live in New York or New Jersey, live in non-rural areas, 
have three strong volunteering friends, participate in 1 charitable and 1 non-charitable organization, have 
average prosocial orientation, average physical health, and average income. 
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 that 9/11-generated factors seem to have been more important for mobilizing Americans to 
participate in 9/11 relief efforts than post-9/11 volunteer efforts to help others in 
communities besides victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy. 
Shifting our attention to the social capital variables in the latter rows of Table 4.2, we 
see that while neither having more non-volunteering strong ties nor replacing a non-
volunteering strong tie with an approving volunteer strong tie significantly encouraged 
getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts, replacing a non-volunteering strong tie with an 
encouraging volunteer strong tie (β = .044; p < .05) or a volunteering strong tie (β = .072; p < 
.05) as well as participating in more charitable voluntary organizations (β = .241; p < .001) or 
non-charitable voluntary organizations (β = .093; p < .05) did.62  As the last column in Table 
4.3 indicates, all of the social capital variables that had significant positive direct effects on 
getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts also had significant positive direct effects on getting 
involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  Moreover, unlike 9/11 relief efforts, 
replacing a non-volunteering strong tie with an approving volunteer strong tie significantly 
encouraged helping others in communities besides those directly harmed by 9/11 (β = .031; p 
< .10).  While the social capital variables generally had significant positive direct effects on 
both types of post-9/11 helping behavior, the size of their effects was greater for post-9/11 
community volunteer efforts than for 9/11 relief efforts.  Recall from above that the reverse 
was true for the 9/11-generated factors.  The difference in the effects of the social capital 
variables on the different helping behaviors after 9/11 is apparent when viewing Figure 4.3.  
                                                 
62 To hold constant the number of strong ties, an increase in the number of volunteering strong ties of any type 
means that there must be an equivalent decrease in non-volunteering strong ties.  So, for example, if a person 
has 3 total strong ties and gains 2 volunteering strong ties, then this person must also lose 2 non-volunteering 
ties.  My substantive interpretation of the effect of strong ties and volunteering strong ties on participation in 
9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts incorporates the interdependence of these 
measures, and thus the measure for the number of strong ties (network size) captures the effect for non-
volunteering strong ties. 
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 This figure compares the difference in the predicted probability of participation in 9/11 relief 
efforts for the presence or absence of each social capital variable to the difference in the 
predicted probability of participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the 
presence or absence of each social capital variable.  Contrary to Figure 4.2, the bottom bars 
(the predicted probability difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for the 
presence and absence of the social capital variables) are longer in all cases than the top bars 
(the predicted probability difference in 9/11 relief efforts for the presence and absence of the 
social capital variables).  For example, the last set of bars in Figure 4.3 indicates that the 
difference in the predicted probability of 9/11 relief efforts for individuals who have five 
volunteering strong ties and those who have no volunteering strong ties is .096, while the 
difference in the predicted probability of post-9/11 community efforts for this contrast in 
volunteering strong ties is .240. 
 Figure 4.3 also addresses the important issue of whether different types of 
organizations and networks had differing effects on participation in helping behavior after the 
9/11 attacks.  Comparing the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in 
post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for belonging to one non-charitable organization and 
belonging to none to the difference in this predicted probability for belonging to one 
charitable organization and belonging to none, we see that the difference is much greater for 
charitable organizations (the same pattern exits for 9/11 relief efforts).  This suggests that 
involvement in charitable organizations was a greater mobilizing force of participation in 
helping behavior after the 9/11 attacks than involvement in non-charitable organizations.  
Looking at the difference in the predicted probability of getting involved in the helping 
behaviors after 9/11 for having five friends who approve of volunteer work and having none 
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 who do and the difference in this predicted probability for having five friends who either 
encourage volunteer work or engage in volunteer work and having none who do not, we note 
that the difference for the latter is much greater.  This means that both types of behavioral 
social influence were more likely to induce Americans to participate in helping behavior after 
9/11 than was attitudinal social influence.  With that said, it appears that passive behavioral 
social influence had an even greater effect on helping behavior than active behavioral social 
influence, especially for post-9/11 community volunteer efforts. 
 Finally, considering the effect of a prosocial orientation on helping behavior after 
9/11, we see that this orientation had a significant direct effect on participation in 9/11 relief 
efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts (β = .069; p < .10 and β = .124; p < .001 
respectively).  But as with the social capital variables, a prosocial orientation had a stronger 
effect on helping others in communities after 9/11 than helping victims, families of victims, 
or rescue workers.  Figure 4.4 compares the difference in the predicted probability of 
participation in 9/11 relief efforts for a standard deviation shift (both below and above the 
mean) in a prosocial orientation to the difference in the predicted probability of participation 
in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for a standard deviation shift (both below and 
above the mean) in a prosocial orientation.  The bottom bars (the predicted probability 
difference in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts for a standard deviation shift in a 
prosocial orientation) are longer in both cases than the top bars (the predicted probability 
difference in 9/11 relief efforts for a standard deviation shift in a prosocial orientation).  This 
suggests that a prosocial orientation was a greater motivating force for getting involved in 
post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than 9/11 relief efforts. 
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  Thus far we have observed that 9/11-generated factors, social capital variables, and a 
prosocial orientation generally mobilized participation in both 9/11 relief efforts and post-
9/11 community volunteer efforts, but that the effects of the 9/11 generated factors were 
stronger for the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy while the effects of the 
social capital variables and a prosocial orientation were stronger for the latter type of helping 
behavior.  But were these differences significant?  Because specific hypotheses were not 
formulated, the first step was to conduct a chi-square different test between a restricted 
model in which the coefficients for the effects of all the explanatory variables—9/11-
generated factors, social capital, and prosocial orientation—on 9/11 relief efforts and post-
9/11 community volunteer efforts were jointly constrained to be equal and a unrestricted 
model in which the coefficients for these effects were freely estimated (this is possible 
because the restricted model is nested in the unrestricted model).63  If the chi-square 
difference test is significant, we would conclude that the model that freely estimates the 
effects of all the explanatory variables (H1) has a better fit than the model that jointly 
constrains all of these effects to be equal (H0).  If we fail to reject that the freely estimated 
model (H1) improves the fit compared to the constrained model (H0), then we would 
conclude that the freely estimated model fits no better than the model that jointly constrains 
all the effects to be equal.  If the former is the case, it would be reasonable to conduct a chi-
square different test for the effect of each explanatory variable separately in order to identify 
if there was a significant difference for any individual explanatory variable.  But if the latter 
is the case, conducting a chi-square difference test for the effect of each explanatory variable 
would not be justified.  Looking at the first column in Table 4.3, we see that the chi-square 
                                                 
63 No further constraints were imposed on the restricted or unrestricted model and thus the unrestricted model is 
equivalent to the model presented in Table 4.3 in all cases. 
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 difference test is significant, indicating that the unrestricted model in which the coefficients 
for all the explanatory variables are freely estimated has a better model than the restricted 
model in which the coefficients for all the explanatory variables are constrained to be 
equal.64
 Before turning to the results of the chi-square difference test for each explanatory 
variable, it is important to understand the implications of this test for each explanatory 
variable.  Consider, for example, the chi-square difference test and what a significant or 
insignificant result would mean for patriotism.  In this case, the chi-square difference test 
compares the restricted model in which the coefficients for the effects of patriotism on 9/11 
relief efforts and post-9/11 volunteer efforts are constrained to be equal to the unrestricted 
model in which the coefficients for the effects of patriotism are freely estimated.  If the chi-
square difference test is significant, we would conclude that the model that freely estimates 
the effects of patriotism (H1) has a better fit than the model that constrains these effects to be 
equal (H0).  Substantively, this result would mean that the coefficients from the freely 
estimated model are the appropriate estimates and thus the difference in the size of the effects 
of patriotism on 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer is significant.  Given 
that the freely estimated model shows that the coefficient for the effect of patriotism on 
participation in 9/11 relief efforts is over double the size of the coefficient for the effect of 
patriotism on participation in post-9/11 community efforts (see column 4 in Table 4.2), we 
would reasonably conclude that patriotism more strongly mobilized Americans to participate 
in the former type of helping behavior after the tragedy relative to the latter type of helping 
behavior.  If we fail to reject that the freely estimated model (H1) improves the fit compared 
                                                 
64 All nested tests were done using the DIFFTEST option in Mplus (Muthen and Asparouhov 2006).  Because 
the nested tests were conducted on five datasets from multiple imputation, Allison’s SAS marco (COMBCHI) 
was used to produce the final values for these tests. 
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 to the constrained model (H0), then we would conclude that the freely estimated model fits no 
better than the constrained model and thus there was not a significant differences in the size 
of the effects of patriotism on the two helping behaviors after 9/11. 
Table 4.3 displays the results of the chi-square difference test for the various nested 
models described above.  Looking at this table, we see in five cases the unrestricted model 
(no equality constraints) lead to a better fit compared to the restricted model (equality 
constraints).  The five cases were NY/NJ residence, patriotism, commemorative event 
participation, charitable organization participation, and non-charitable organization 
participation.  Since the coefficients for the effects of the first, second, and third variables 
were greater for 9/11 relief efforts than for post-9/11 community volunteer efforts (see rows 
1, 3, and 6 in Table 4.2), and since the reverse was true for the coefficients for the effects of 
the fourth and fifth variables (see rows 11 and 12 in Table 4.2), we find evidence that certain 
9/11-generated factors more strongly encouraged participation in volunteer efforts to help 
victims, families of victims, or rescue workers, and that certain social capital variables more 
strongly encouraged participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities in the 
months following the 9/11 attacks. 
In addition to the observed direct effects of 9/11-generated and social capital 
variables, Table 4.4 shows some important indirect effects for these variables.  Looking at 
the third row in Table 4.3, we see that the more victims or potential victims known, the more 
patriotic symbols displayed after 9/11 (β = .121; p < .001) and the greater likelihood of 
feeling sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks (β = .078; p < .001) as well as participating in 
events to honor the victims of the 9/11 attacks (β = .107; p < .001).  Because greater levels of 
patriotism and attendance at commemorative services had significant positive direct effects 
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 on participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, and because 
sorrow in response to the 9/11 attacks had a significant positive direct effect on participation 
in post-9/11 community efforts, the significant positive direct effect of knowing victims or 
potential victims on these variables gave it an indirect effect of .033 for getting involved in 
the former type of helping behavior and an indirect effect of .109 for the getting involved in 
the latter type of helping behavior (see Table 4.4).  When knowing victims or potential 
victims’ direct effects for these helping behaviors are included, its total effect for 
volunteering for 9/11 relief efforts is .109 and its total effect for volunteering for post-9/11 
community efforts is .061 (see Table 4.4).  Given that both NY/NJ residence and WTC 
distance significantly positively affected the number of victims or potential victims known (β 
= .835; p < .001 and β = .940; p < .001 respectively) and the fact that knowing more victims 
or potential victims had the effects just mentioned, this indirectly increased these variables’ 
likelihood of involvement in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community efforts.  With the 
exception of NY/NJ residence’s significant positive direct effect on participation in non-
charitable voluntary organizations, however, this 9/11-generated factor and WTC distance 
had either nonsignificant direct effects or significant negative direct effects on the social 
capital variables.  In addition, distance from the WTC significantly negatively affected the 
number of patriotic symbols displayed (β = -1.007; p < .01), suggesting that those living 
close to the attack site were uncomfortable with overt displays of patriotism, which is 
consistent with the ethnographic work of Abrams et al. (2004).  These significant negative 
direct effects reduced the total indirect effect of NY/NJ residence and WTC distance on 9/11 
relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  But they were not enough to offset 
the positive indirect effects that NY/NJ residence and WTC distance gained from their 
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 significant positive direct effects on knowing victims or potential victims.  Hence, as Table 
4.4 shows, the total indirect effects for NY/NJ residence and WTC distance on 9/11 relief 
efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts were .072 and .021 and .022 and .005 
respectively.  When adding the direct effect of WTC distance on helping behavior after 9/11, 
this gave this 9/11-generated factor a .520 total effect on 9/11 relief efforts and a .483 total 
effect on post-9/11 community efforts.  NY/NJ residence’s total effect of .406 on 9/11 relief 
efforts was a combination of its indirect effects and direct effect, but its total effect of .021 on 
post-9/11 community efforts was entirely a function of its indirect effects.  
 Turning to the social capital variables, we see that participation in charitable 
organizations significantly positively predicted embeddedness in all types of volunteering 
networks, which in turn promoted getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 
community volunteer efforts (charitable organizations also significantly predicted network 
size, but this variable did not have a significant effect on either type of helping behavior after 
the tragedy).  Charitable organization’s total indirect effect on participation in 9/11 relief 
efforts was .043 and its total indirect effect on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts was 
.083.  Adding its direct effects gave charitable organization involvement a total effect of .284 
on the former type of helping behavior and a total effect of .412 on the latter type of helping 
behavior.  Non-charitable organization participation had a total indirect effect of .015 on 9/11 
relief efforts and a total indirect effect of .027 on post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, 
both of which were due to its significant positive indirect effect on having more friends who 
encourage volunteer work (β = .067 < .05) and having more friends who engage in volunteer 
work (β = .164; p < .001).  When non-charitable organization’s direct effects were taken into 
account, its total effect on 9/11 relief efforts was .108 and its total effect on post-9/11 
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 community volunteer effort was .249.  Finally, in addition to its direct effect on both types of 
helping behavior after 9/11, a prosocial orientation had important indirect effects.  As the last 
column in Table 4.2 indicates, a prosocial orientation had significant positive direct effects 
on publicly displaying patriotic symbols after 9/11 (β = .206; p < .001), feeling sorrow in 
response to the attacks (β = .060; p < .05), and attending commemorative events for victims 
(β = .169; p < .001).  A prosocial orientation also had significant positive direct effects on all 
of the social capital variables.  Because these 9/11-generated factors and the social capital 
variables generally had significant positive direct effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief 
efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, a prosocial orientation significantly 
indirectly encouraged participation in these two types of helping behavior after the 9/11 
attacks.  Table 4.4 shows that a prosocial orientation’s total indirect effect on getting 
involved in 9/11 relief efforts was .255 and its total indirect effect on getting involved in 
post-9/11 community effort was .233.  Adding a prosocial orientation’s direct effect on 9/11 
relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts gave it a total effect of .324 on the 
former type of helping behavior after 9/11 and a total effect of .357 on the latter type of 
helping behavior after 9/11. 
 
Responses to Possible Objections 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed, source of information of the 
strong tie network characteristics, and respondents’ pre-9/11 volunteering commitments, 
several objections to the above statistical models and interpretations are possible.  This 
section reviews and responds to these objections. 
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 First, instead of a prosocial orientation or disposition driving the selection of adult 
activist friendships, the causal direction could also go the other way, where activist 
friendships promote a prosocial orientation.  But this possibility seems unlikely when judged 
against previous empirical studies.  Research has demonstrated that the forming of a 
prosocial orientation largely occurs from a combination of genetic and early socialization 
factors, such as parental emphasis on or modeling helping, and that this orientation tends to 
exhibit continuity over the life course (see, for example, Bar-Tal 1976:11-37; Davis and 
Franzoi 1991; Eisenberg et al. 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Eisenberg and Mussen 1989; 
Grusec 1981; Hoffman 1981; Koestner et al. 1990; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Rossi 2001a; 
Schroeder et al. 1995:91-125).  Given this evidence, it appears that a prosocial orientation 
generally develops prior to and shapes current activist friendships rather than the other way 
around. 
Second, because the survey obtained information on strong tie characteristics from 
respondents instead of strong ties themselves, it is possible that respondents may have 
inaccurately reported on the characteristics of their strong ties.  However, this is less of a 
concern in my case, given that social influence theory presumes awareness.  If people are 
unaware of the social influence that strong ties exert on them, then social influence is not 
operating, at least from the perspective of respondents whose behaviors we are trying to 
explain.  For instance, recall from above that passive behavioral social influence consists of 
respondents learning of strong ties’ participation in collective action.  Hence, even if 
respondents do not always know about and report all of the civic activities of all their strong 
ties, the important point is that they report social influence from strong ties of which they are 
aware.  Because social influence requires by definition awareness by those who are the 
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 objects of social influence, reports from respondents seem preferable to those from strong 
ties. 
Third, there is the issue of the mobilizing scope of 9/11 and its role in revitalizing 
U.S. life.  Supporting the view that 9/11 encouraged a broad civic response, the empirical 
models in this chapter generally demonstrated that 9/11-generated factors mobilized 
Americans to get involved in volunteer efforts to help others in communities in addition to 
efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the tragedy.  This is an 
important finding that contributes to our understanding of the mobilizing capacity of tragedy, 
but it is only a necessary condition for establishing Putnam’s (2000) claim that 9/11 helped 
revive U.S. civic life.  Because it is possible that the knowing victims or potential victims, 
NY/NJ residence, WTC distance, displaying patriotic symbols, sorrow about the attacks, and 
participation in commemorative events could have been related to pre-9/11 community 
volunteering, to establish sufficiently Putnam’s (2000) claim requires demonstrating that the 
effects of the 9/11-generated variables on participation in post-9/11 helping behavior were 
robust to the inclusion of pre-9/11 community volunteering.  If the effects of the 9/11-
generated factors on post-9/11 volunteering were to fall to nonsignificance with the addition 
of pre-9/11 community volunteering, this would suggest that these factors did not mobilize 
more Americans to get involved in volunteer efforts than before the attacks.  If this turned 
out to be the case, then this would call into question Putnam’s claim that 9/11 helped broadly 
renew U.S. civic engagement.  However, if the effects of the 9/11-generated factors were to 
remain robust with the addition of pre-9/11 volunteering , this would suggest that 9/11 
mobilized Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in greater numbers than before the 
attacks, which would lend support to Putnam’s (2000) claim.  Including pre-9/11 community 
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 volunteering has the additional benefit of checking whether the effects of the social capital 
variables and a prosocial orientation on post-9/11 helping behavior change in any meaningful 
way. 
The 2002 RAPAS asked respondents retrospectively whether they had participated in 
community volunteer efforts before as well as after the 9/11 attacks and thus a test of the 
above scenarios was possible.65  Table 4.5 displays the results of the models in Table 4.2 
while controlling for pre-9/11 community volunteering.  Looking at this table, we see that, 
with the one exception, the effects of the 9/11-genererated factors on post-9/11 relief efforts 
and post-9/11 community efforts remain significant with the inclusion of pre-9/11 
volunteering.  It thus seems that the 9/11 attacks mobilized more people to help others in 
communities than before the tragedy.  The one exception to this was people who knew 
victims or potential victims.  While the third row in Table 4.5 shows that knowing victims or 
potential victims was still a significant predictor of participation in 9/11 relief efforts when 
pre-9/11 community volunteering was added, this 9/11 generated factor was no longer a 
significant predictor of participation in post-9/11 community volunteering efforts.  This casts 
doubt on the interpretation that knowing more victims or potential victims mobilized 
Americans to get involved in community volunteer efforts in greater numbers than before the 
attacks, the possible reasons for which are discussed in the conclusion of this chapter.  
Although the effect of knowing victims or potential victims on post-9/11 community 
volunteering fell to nonsignificance with the inclusion of the measure for pre-9/11 
community volunteering, this did not happen for the other 9/11-generated factors.  Overall, 
then, the effect of the 9/11-generated factors was to mobilize Americans to participate in 
                                                 
65 Pre-9/11 community volunteering was entered as an endogenous variable, with a prosocial orientation and 
covariates predicting it.  For the other endogenous variables, it was assumed only that there was an association 
between a prosocial orientation and these variables. 
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 volunteer efforts in communities in greater numbers than before the terrorist attacks, which 
lends support to Putnam’s (2000) expectation that 9/11 would help revitalize U.S. civic life.   
It is also interesting to note that the social capital variable and prosocial orientation 
effects generally remain unchanged with the addition of pre-9/11 community volunteering 
variable.  This orientation had a significant direct effect on pre-9/11 community volunteering 
(see row 14 in Table 4.5).  This identifies yet another mechanism through which a prosocial 
orientation affected post-9/11 helping behavior.  But this effect did render the direct effect of 
a prosocial orientation on 9/11 relief efforts insignificant.  Also, with the addition of pre-9/11 
community volunteering, the weakest volunteering strong tie measure—approval from 
friends to do volunteer work—became insignificant.  All of the other explanatory effects 
remain substantively unchanged with the inclusion of pre-9/11 community volunteering.  In 
general, though, controlling for pre-9/11 community volunteering did not change the effects 
of the social capital variables and a prosocial orientation. 
Finally, besides strong volunteering ties being powerful sources of social influence 
inducing participation in volunteer efforts, it is possible that participation in these efforts 
could also affect the formation of these ties.  The main argument for this possibility would 
seem to be that involvement in volunteer efforts provides opportunities to interact with other 
volunteers and form friendships.  However, in his ethnography of various advocacy groups, 
Lichterman (2005:82-83) found that participation in community efforts did not give rise to 
close, personal relationships with other activists or people whom these efforts served.  When 
connections did develop from this participation, they were brief and impersonal.  
Lichterman’s (2005) evidence suggests that participation in volunteer efforts does not 
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 substantially affect the formation of volunteering ties and thus the exclusion of this effect 
should not undermine my results for the effect of volunteering ties. 
Furthermore, even if there was an effect of participation in volunteer efforts on the 
formation of volunteering ties, this would have almost certainly occurred from participation 
in volunteer efforts prior to 9/11 given the nature of the volunteering ties.  Recall that the 
measures of volunteering ties were the five closest people to respondents, not acquaintances 
or other weak ties.  Since my models control for pre-9/11 community volunteering, this 
would mean that people who did not develop strong volunteering ties from participation in 
pre-9/11 volunteer efforts got involved in volunteer efforts after 9/11, and, as a result of this 
involvement, formed close personal relationships with other volunteers whom they did not 
know or with whom they were not close prior to 9/11, including those whom they may have 
previously meet during pre-9/11 volunteer efforts.  Combining the remoteness of this 
possibility with Lichterman’s (2005) finding, it seems reasonable to assume that involvement 
in post-9/11 volunteer efforts did not substantially affect the formation of strong volunteering 
ties while holding constant pre-9/11 volunteering. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Synthesizing and extending insights from the disaster, civic engagement, and 
dispositional literatures on helping behavior and drawing on insights from the social network 
and social movement literatures on the relational dynamics of human action, this chapter 
theoretically developed and empirically tested a model that significantly advanced our 
knowledge about why certain Americans participated in helping efforts after 9/11 while 
others did not.  This model focused specifically on the role of tragedy-generated factors, 
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 social capital, and prosocial orientation to explain participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-
9/11 community volunteer efforts.  In what follows, I discuss the contributions of each of 
these variables for understanding variation in helping behavior in the months following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Confirming expectation and supporting prior research on participation in disaster 
relief efforts (Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Nelson 1973; O'Brien and Mileti 
1992; St. John and Fuchs 2002), 9/11-generated factors generally encouraged Americans to 
get involved in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers of the 
tragedy.  But unlike other studies of involvement in helping behavior after disasters, this 
chapter analyzed whether tragedy-generated factors also mobilized Americans to get 
involved in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  The empirical models showed that, with 
the exception of NY/NJ residence, all of the 9/11-generated factors significantly predicted 
participation in volunteer efforts to help others in communities besides those directly harmed 
by the 9/11 tragedy.  It seems thus that, for example, patriotism’s cultivation of greater 
feelings of solidarity spurred Americans to help not only 9/11 victims, but citizens broadly as 
way to strengthen, heal, and unify the attacked nation.  Interestingly, three of the 9/11-
generated factors—New York area residence, patriotism, and participation in 
commemorative events—had stronger effects on getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts than in 
post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  This indicates that although these tragedy-generated 
factors motivated Americans to participate in both types of helping behavior after the 9/11 
attacks, they more strongly motivated Americans to participate in 9/11 relief efforts. 
 Importantly, sensitivity analyses showed that, with one exception, the introduction of 
pre-9/11 community volunteering did not render the effects of the 9/11-genererated factors 
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 on post-9/11 helping behavior insignificant.  This suggests, then, that the 9/11 tragedy 
mobilized Americans to get involved in community volunteer efforts in greater numbers than 
before.  Based on this and other evidence presented in this chapter, there appears to be 
support for Putnam’s (2000) claim that 9/11 helped revitalize U.S. civic life.  But how long 
did this revitalization last?  Would the 9/11-generated factors that significantly differentiated 
Americans who participated in community volunteer efforts from those who did not in the 
months following the terrorist attacks still do so?  Without data over time, there is no way to 
know whether the 9/11-generated factors would promote civic engagement today.  Future 
longitudinal research is needed to determine how long the tragedy-produced factors were a 
significant source mobilizing Americans to participate in volunteer efforts in their 
community.  Whatever the outcome of this research, it should not distract from the fact that, 
net of pre-9/11 community volunteering, the people most affected by 9/11 were more likely 
to volunteer not only for relief efforts to help those directly harmed by the attacks but also for 
efforts to help others in their communities in the months after the 9/11 attacks. 
 As discussed above, the general pattern was that the 9/11-generated factors 
encouraged people to get involved in efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescues 
workers as well as in efforts to help others in communities.  However, there were two 9/11-
generated factors that did not follow this pattern:  New York area residence only directly 
mobilized participation in 9/11 relief efforts and sorrow in response to the attacks only 
directly mobilized participation in post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  The first priority 
for those living in the New York area was probably to care for fellow New Yorkers who 
were injured or killed in the attacks and families who lost loved ones.  This would have left 
little time and energy to engage in other volunteer efforts.  Second, it seems that people who 
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 felt sorrow about the attacks were only directly motivated to volunteer for efforts to help 
others in communities when other 9/11-tragedy and other variables were controlled. 
Concerning the robustness of the effects of 9/11-generated factors on participation in 
post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, only the effect of knowing victims or potential 
victims fell to nonsignificance.  What may explain why knowing victims or potential victims 
was the only 9/11-generated variable not to encourage more Americans to participate in 
volunteer efforts in communities than before the attacks?  Like the other 9/11-genereated 
factors, knowing victims or potential victims was a sufficient motivator for getting involved 
in 9/11 relief efforts, creating a personal stake to get involved to honor the memory of a 
departed family member, friend, or colleague.  But unlike the other 9/11 generated factors, 
there may have been other reasons beyond those related to the tragedy for why people who 
knew victims or potential victims volunteered in communities.  Given that the majority of 
terrorist attack victims were of higher status backgrounds, knowing more victims or potential 
victims likely reflects greater network centrality and prestige.66  This may be the key to 
understanding the effect of this 9/11-generated factor on community volunteer efforts, as 
prior studies have found a positive relationship between greater network centrality and 
prestige and civic engagement (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).  Perhaps because of their 
greater centrality and prestige, people who knew more victims or potential victims did not 
need the extra motivation that the 9/11 tragedy provided for getting involved in community 
volunteer efforts. 
                                                 
66 Based on data about the World Trade Center victims available online at CNN 
(http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/victims/main.html), the occupations of victims were coded 
into three broad categories: professionals, blue-collar workers, and firefighters, police officers, and paramedics.  
Sixty-nine percent of WTC victims were professionals. 
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 Beyond specifying the mobilizing scope of tragedy-generated factors, this chapter 
significantly advanced our understanding of the relationship between social capital and 
involvement in helping behavior after tragedies.  Previous scholarship on volunteer efforts in 
and outside of disaster contexts has tended to focus on integration into voluntary 
organizations of any sort to explain variation in helping behavior.  However, results from this 
chapter demonstrated that involvement in charitable organizations—those committed to 
helping nonmembers—was more effective than involvement in non-charitable 
organizations—those not committed to helping nonmembers—for mobilizing Americans to 
participate in efforts to help victims, families, or rescue workers as well as others in 
communities after 9/11.  The empirical models identified that people who were integrated 
into charitable organizations had a higher probability of getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts 
and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts than those who were integrated into non-
charitable organizations.  This was partly due to the fact that involvement in charitable 
organizations was more likely to foster embeddedness in volunteering networks.  But the 
direct effect of charitable organization integration on participating in both types of helping 
behavior was also stronger than that of non-charitable organization integration.  Because of 
their commitment to helping nonmembers, charitable organizations were probably more 
likely to cultivate more relevant helping skills among members, provide members with more 
information about helping opportunities, and expose members to group leader social 
influence to help than non-charitable organizations.  Given these likely differences in 
mobilization efforts and the robust empirical findings for the differing effects of charitable 
and non-charitable organizations, the distinction between organizations that help 
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 nonmembers and those that do not is crucial for understanding variation in helping behavior 
after tragedies. 
This chapter explicated the exact types of social networks that were most important 
for mobilizing people to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers and others in 
communities after the 9/11 attacks.  Unlike disaster and civic engagement scholarship that 
has tended to focus simply on greater network size to explain the effect of social ties on 
helping behavior, this chapter focused on the number of volunteering strong ties, arguing that 
they should have been crucial sources of social influence inducing participating in both types 
of helping behavior after the tragedy.  Supporting this expectation, the empirical models 
showed that the greater number of strong ties who were committed to volunteering, the 
greater the probability of getting involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community 
volunteer efforts.  However, the overall number of strong ties was not a significant predictor 
of participation in either type of helping behavior after the attacks when the number of 
volunteering strong ties was controlled.  This calls into question the findings from prior 
disaster and civic engagement studies showing the importance of network size for promoting 
involvement in volunteer efforts in and outside disaster contexts.  In light of this evidence, it 
seems that it is not having a greater number of close ties that matters for inducing helping 
behavior, but rather having a greater number of close ties who are committed to volunteering 
(c.f. Passy and Giugni 2001).  This should come as no surprise, as it is volunteers who should 
be most likely to care about helping others and thus exert social influence over their peers to 
get involved to help.  Drawing on the broader social network literature (see, for example, 
Akers 1985; Akers et al. 1979; Berelson et al. 1954; Friedkin 1998; Friedkin and Cook 1990; 
Graham et al. 1991; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Matsueda and 
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 Anderson 1998; Warr and Stafford 1991), this chapter also distinguished among attitudinal, 
active behavioral, and passive behavioral types of social influence and explored whether 
these distinctions mattered for explaining helping behavior after 9/11.  By doing so, it offered 
even a finer-grained understanding of the effect of volunteering ties on helping behavior after 
tragedies.  For both 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts, the effect 
of having more friends who exerted behavioral social influence was stronger than the effect 
of having more friends who exerted attitudinal social influence.  This suggests that verbal 
support from friends to help was less important than explicit encouragements from friends to 
help or observing friends participation in helping behavior for inducing involvement in 9/11 
relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  Because these social networks 
effects were robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation, this gives us confidence that 
they mainly reflect social influence rather than selection.  
 Bringing a dispositional perspective to bear on helping behavior after tragedies was 
the final contribution that this chapter made.  Although the civic engagement literature on 
helping behavior outside of disaster contexts has paid attention to the role of a prosocial 
orientation for explaining variation in volunteer efforts, the disaster literature on helping 
behavior has not.  The empirical findings in this chapter demonstrate that this is a significant 
omission.  A prosocial orientation significantly encouraged participation in 9/11 relief efforts 
as well as post-9/11 community volunteer efforts.  In addition to its direct effect on helping 
behavior after 9/11, a prosocial orientation had important indirect effects.  Consistent with 
the homophily principle, prosocially oriented people were more likely to be involved in 
charitable and non-charitable organizations as well as to embed themselves in volunteering 
networks, both of which promoted participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 
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 community volunteer efforts.  Additionally, a prosocial orientation promoted involvement in 
the two types of helping behavior after 9/11 through its significant positive effect on certain 
9/11-generated factors.  Because the 9/11 attacks were a significant source of human 
suffering and because the nation was identified with that suffering, it follows that prosocially 
oriented people would have been more likely to feel sorrow about the attacks, participate in 
events to commemorate victims, and display patriotic symbols given their penchant to be 
concerned about the welfare of others.  Finally, a prosocial orientation affected getting 
involved in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts through increasing 
pre-9/11 community volunteering.  The findings in this chapter encourage future research on 
participation in disaster relief efforts to incorporate a prosocial orientation and to explore the 
various ways through which this orientation acts as a conduit for encouraging helping 
behavior after tragedies. 
 To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of tragedy-generated 
factors, social capital, and a prosocial orientation for explaining differential participation in 
volunteer efforts to help victims, families of victims, or rescue workers as well as others in 
communities after the 9/11attacks.  These variables did not act in isolation, but often worked 
together to mobilize Americans to participate in helping behavior in the aftermath of the 9/11 
tragedy.  Because prior studies on disaster have not simultaneously incorporated tragedy-
generated factors, social capital, and psychological disposition into models of volunteering 
for relief efforts, our understanding of the dynamics of helping behavior after tragedies has 
been limited.  A natural question to ask is the extent to which the findings presented here 
generalize to helping behavior after other disasters.  It is difficult to imagine why the 
observed relational and dispositional foundations of 9/11 helping behavior would differ 
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 dramatically for helping behavior after other disasters.  These seem to be general 
mechanisms, broadly applicable to helping behavior in and outside of disaster contexts.  
However, while certain 9/11-generated factors, such as knowing victims or propinquity to the 
disaster sites, may have similar effects on participation in relief efforts for other disasters, 
other 9/11-generated factors may not.  Given that 9/11 was constructed as an attack on 
America and its citizens, the effects of patriotism would seem to matter less for natural 
disasters.  For instance, it is doubtful that patriotism differentiated people who traveled to the 
Gulf region to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina from those who did not.  For this reason, 
scholars need to pay particular attention to how victims and bystanders interpret the nature of 
the disaster.  Doing so will likely produce theoretically richer descriptions of how people are 
mobilized to help victims and others in communities after tragedies.
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 Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Mean S.D.
Post-9/11 Helping Efforts
Volunteer for 9/11 relief efforts .104 .305
Volunteered for a community project .268 0.443
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence .088 .284
Distance from WTC .012 .108
# of victims or potential victims known .644 1.393
# of patriotic symbols displayed 2.711 2.195
Sorrow in response to the attacks .238 .426
Commemorative gathering attendance .322 .467
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering .595 1.175
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering 1.330 1.477
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering 3.737 1.970
# of strong ties nominated (network size) 4.601 1.103
# of charitable organizations .346 .768
# of non-charitable organizations .186 .583
Prosocial orientation
Personally feeling responsible to help others in need 3.720 .884
Personally feel responsible to take action against injustice 3.435 1.020
Demographic variables
White .760 .427
Black .111 .315
Other race .128 .335
College education .244 .430
Income 5.504 2.838
Female .519 .500
Age 45.028 17.721
Physical heath 3.856 .921
# of children under 19 living in household .618 1.020
Working full-time .493 .500
Served in the military .156 .363
Married .564 .496
Rural .230 .421
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 Table 4.2. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior 
 
# of victims # of commem- # of strong # of strong
or potential patriotic Sorrow in orative ties who ties who
victims symbols response to gathering encourage engage in
Explanatory variables known displayed the attacks attendance volunteering volunteering
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence     .835***     .026     .166     .094     -.193+    -.278*
   (.074)    (.159)    (.103)    (.097)     (.109)    (.120)
Distance from WTC     .940***   -1.007**     .319     .061      .050    -.416
   (.166)    (.381)    (.218)    (.248)     (.233)    (.344)
# of victims or potential victims known ⎯     .121***     .078***     .107*** ⎯ ⎯
    (.026)     (.018)     (.017)
# of patriotic symbols displayed ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Sorrow in response to the attacks ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Commemorative gathering attendance ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties nominated (network size) ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of charitable organizations ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .295***      .417***
    (.025)     (.033)
# of non-charitable organizations ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .067*      .164***
    (.028)     (.037)
Prosocial orientation ⎯      .206***      .060*      .169***      .154***      .220***
    (.048)     (.028)     (.034)     (.031)     (.039)
R2     .077     .060     .117     .122      .100     .177
Model χ2   69.346***
Degrees of freedom       21
CFI     .994
IFI     .994
TLI     .994
RMSEA     .028
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are
controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix E for results for these variables).
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 4.2 Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11  
Helping Behavior Model (Continued)  
 
# of strong Volunteer Volunteer 
ties who # of strong # of # of non- for 9/11 for post-9/11
approve of ties charitable charitable relief community
Explanatory variables volunteering nominated organizations organizations efforts efforts
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence    -.162    -.008    -.051     .089*      .334**    -.065
   (.152)    (.085)    (.069)    (.040)     (.118)    (.117)
Distance from WTC    -.728*    -.614***     .033    -.238      .498*     .478*
   (.338)    (.128)    (.159)    (.241)     (.254)    (.240)
# of victims or potential victims known ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .076***     .039*
    (.021)     (.018)
# of patriotic symbols displayed ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .080***     .030*
    (.016)    (.013)
Sorrow in response to the attacks ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .039     .075*
    (.025)    (.037)
Commemorative gathering attendance ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .216***     .118**
    (.048)    (.040)
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .044*     .092***
    (.021)     (.023)
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .072*      .124***
    (.028)     (.021)
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .001      .031+
    (.028)     (.018)
# of strong ties nominated (network size) ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯     -.063      .024
    (.044)     (.041)
# of charitable organizations      .140**      .061* ⎯ ⎯      .241***      .412***
    (.041)     (.027)     (.032)     (.025)
# of non-charitable organizations      .051      .017 ⎯ ⎯      .093*      .222***
    (.053)     (.029)     (.045)     (.037)
Prosocial orientation      .274***      .055**      .096***      .035**      .069+      .124***
    (.050)     (.020)     (.020)     (.013)     (.041)     (.036)
R2     .112     .058     .070     .034      .269     .392
Model χ2
Degrees of freedom
CFI
IFI
TLI
RMSEA
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are
controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix E for results for these variables).
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 4.3. Difference Tests for 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 Community Volunteer 
Efforts
χ2 value Degrees of freedom p -value
Joint test 82.3 11 .000
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence 6.909 1 .010
Distance from WTC 0.005 1 .941
# of victims or potential victims known 1.97 1 .161
# of patriotic symbols displayed 7.003 1 .010
Sorrow in response to the attacks 0.344 1 .558
Commemorative gathering attendance 2.801 1 .094
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering 1.042 1 .313
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering 2.547 1 .111
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering 1.005 1 .317
# of strong ties nominated (network size) 1.56 1 .343
# of charitable organizations 19.31 1 .000
# of non-charitable organizations 5.136 1 .024
Prosocial orientation 1.47 1 .228
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 Table 4.4. Indirect and Total Effects for Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model  
Volunteer Volunteer 
for 9/11 for post-9/11
relief community
Explanatory variables efforts efforts
NY/NJ residence .072/.406 .021/.021
Distance from WTC .022/.520 .005/.483
# of victims or potential victims known .033/.109 .022/.061
# of charitable organizations .043/.284 .083/.412
# of non-charitable organizations .015/.108 .027/.249
Prosocial orientation .255/.324 .233/.357
Note : Indirect effect/total effect; all effects significant at the p  < .05 level (two-tail tests) or lower.
 188
 Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, 
Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering 
 
# of victims # of commem- # of strong # of strong
or potential patriotic Sorrow in orative ties who ties who
victims symbols response to gathering encourage engage in
Explanatory variables known displayed the attacks attendance volunteering volunteering
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence     .835***     .026     .166     .094     -.193+    -.279*
   (.074)    (.159)    (.103)    (.097)     (.109)    (.120)
Distance from WTC     .939***   -1.009**     .320     .062      .051    -.419
   (.166)    (.381)    (.218)    (.248)     (.233)    (.343)
# of victims or potential victims known ⎯     .121***     .078***     .107*** ⎯ ⎯
    (.026)     (.018)     (.017)
# of patriotic symbols displayed ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Sorrow in response to the attacks ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Commemorative gathering attendance ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties nominated (network size) ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of charitable organizations ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .295***      .417***
    (.025)     (.033)
# of non-charitable organizations ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯      .067*      .164***
    (.028)     (.037)
Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Prosocial orientation ⎯      .200***      .058*      .164***      .149***      .214***
    (.047)     (.027)     (.033)     (.030)     (.039)
R2     .077     .060     .117     .122      .100     .177
Model χ2   75.539***
Degrees of freedom       22
CFI     .993
IFI     .994
TLI     .994
RMSEA     .028
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are
controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
 
 
 
 189
 Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, 
Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering (Continued) 
 
# of strong
ties who # of strong # of # of non-
approve of ties charitable charitable
Explanatory variables volunteering nominated organizations organizations
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence    -.163    -.008     -.051     .089*
   (.152)    (.085)     (.069)    (.040)
Distance from WTC    -.728*    -.614***      .033    -.239
   (.338)    (.128)     (.159)    (.241)
# of victims or potential victims known ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of patriotic symbols displayed ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Sorrow in response to the attacks ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Commemorative gathering attendance ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of strong ties nominated (network size) ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
# of charitable organizations      .140**      .061* ⎯ ⎯
    (.041)     (.027)
# of non-charitable organizations      .051      .017 ⎯ ⎯
    (.053)     (.029)
Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ ⎯
Prosocial orientation      .265***      .034**      .096***      .035**
    (.049)     (.012)     (.020)     (.013)
R2     .112     .058      .070     .034
Model χ2
Degrees of freedom
CFI
IFI
TLI
RMSEA
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are
controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Table 4.5. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, 
Controlling for Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering (Continued) 
Voluntter Volunteer Volunteer 
for pre-9/11 for 9/11 for post-9/11
community relief community
Explanatory variables efforts efforts efforts
9/11-Generated Variables
NY/NJ residence    -.102      .348**    -.022
   (.119)     (.121)    (.131)
Distance from WTC    -.044      .500+     .564+
   (.288)     (.260)    (.322)
# of victims or potential victims known ⎯      .074***     .032
    (.021)     (.021)
# of patriotic symbols displayed ⎯      .081***     .038*
    (.016)    (.016)
Sorrow in response to the attacks ⎯      .042     .107*
    (.031)    (.050)
Commemorative gathering attendance ⎯      .213***     .117*
    (.048)    (.050)
Social Capital Variables
# of strong ties who encourage volunteering ⎯      .039+     .089**
    (.023)     (.028)
# of strong ties who engage in volunteering ⎯      .060*      .083**
    (.029)     (.026)
# of strong ties who approve of volunteering ⎯     -.006      .002
    (.028)     (.025)
# of strong ties nominated (network size) ⎯     -.063      .032
    (.044)     (.052)
# of charitable organizations ⎯      .207***      .308***
    (.033)     (.032)
# of non-charitable organizations ⎯      .081+      .204***
    (.045)     (.048)
Pre-9/11 Community Volunteering ⎯      .140**      .728***
    (.054)     (.060)
Prosocial orientation      .185**      .052      .065+
    (.039)     (.040)     (.039)
R2      .131      .281      .590
Model χ2
Degrees of freedom
CFI
IFI
TLI
RMSEA
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.  Also included but not shown are
controls for all demographic variables listed in Table 4.1.
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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 Figure 4.1. Conceptual Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model 
 
Note: Solid arrows represent paths where the theoretical expectation is clear; dashed arrows represent paths where the theoretical 
expectation is unclear.  For clarity, the double-headed arrows (representing correlations) are omitted between knowing victims and a 
prosocial orientation; knowing victims and organizational involvements; knowing victims and volunteering strong ties; organizational 
involvements and 9/11-generated variable; volunteering strong ties and 9/11-generated variables; and 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 
community efforts.
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 Figure 4.2. Differences in the Effects of 9/11-Generated Factors on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 
Community Efforts 
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 Figure 4.3. Differences in the Effects of Social Capital Variables on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 
Community Efforts 
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 Figure 4.4. Differences in the Effect of Prosocial Orientation on Participation in 9/11 Relief Efforts and Post-9/11 
Community Efforts 
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 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
My dissertation has advanced our understanding of the enduring question of why 
certain people participate in activism while others do not in a number of significant ways.  
Contrary to prior theoretical and empirical models of differential participation, I specified 
and tested a synthetic model of activism, integrating dispositional and relational perspectives.  
Because these perspectives have generally been pursued in isolation, our knowledge of the 
processes that explain activist participation has been limited.  Combining dispositional and 
relational perspectives offers a more comprehensive view of activism by showing how these 
perspectives work in concert to mobilize people to participate in volunteer efforts in 
communities.   
Regarding a dispositional perspective, my synthetic model established an important 
pathway through which a prosocial orientation affects community activism.  Given the 
homophily principle, prosocially oriented people form friendships with others who share 
their activist commitments and join organizations that are committed to helping others in 
communities.  In doing so, prosocially oriented people embed themselves in structures that 
are powerful sources of social influence inducing participation.  My empirical models 
showed that the greater the prosocial orientation, the greater the probability of having more 
activist friends of various types and joining more activist voluntary organizations.  Since 
prior dispositional models of activism have not incorporated relational factors, they have 
missed how a prosocial orientation acts as a conduit for activism, driving people to embed 
themselves in activist networks and organizations that in turn mobilize participation.
 
 Notably, including this important mechanism did not wash out the direct effect of a prosocial 
orientation on community activism.  Consistent with a dispositional perspective, a prosocial 
orientation directly motivated involvement in activism to help others in communities.  But 
only when a prosocial orientation’s effects on relational factors are included do we fully 
grasp how this orientation promotes activist participation. 
 Despite the fact that network and organizational effects on activism have become 
widely accepted, I argued that they should be viewed critically since relational models of 
activism have generally not controlled for selection.  Because my empirical models 
demonstrated that there is selection into activist networks and organizations based on a 
prosocial orientation, including this orientation when modeling the effect of relational factors 
on activism provides a way to account for selection.  Importantly, net of a prosocial 
orientation, integration into activist networks and organizations mobilized people to get 
involved in community activism.  This is not surprising, as activist networks and 
organizations are potent sources of social influence.  In this way, embeddedness in activist 
friendship networks and voluntary organizations solves Olson’s (1965) classic collective 
action dilemma.  Although free riders reap the public benefits of activist efforts—such as 
living in clean and safe communities—they cannot receive rewards or avoid punishments 
from activist peers without personally participating in activism.  Because we care about what 
our friends think about us, people who are integrated into activist social relationships are 
very likely to participate in activism so they can remain in the good graces of their activist 
friends.  Social influence is thus a powerful motivator of activist behavior. 
 Drawing on the broader scholarship on social networks, I distinguished three different 
types of social influence that activist friends can exert on peers: attitudinal social influence, 
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 passive behavioral social influence, and active behavioral social influence.  My empirical 
models revealed that these analytic distinctions had important explanatory consequences, as 
both types of behavioral social influence had stronger effects on participation in activism 
than attitudinal social influence.  Given the differences in positive and negative sanctions that 
likely follow from these different types of social influence, this is what we would 
theoretically expect.  Individuals who actually participate or directly request participation are 
likely to reward friends more who get involved relative to friends who merely support 
activism.  This is due to the fact that people who are activists are presumably more 
committed to activism than people who merely support activism and thus they place a higher 
value on their friends’ participation.  When peers directly request friends to participate in 
activism they are likely to receive praises for doing so since they have responded positively 
to what friends want.  When there is no direct request made, as is the case of mere attitudinal 
support of activism, this scenario is not possible.  Because mere attitudinal supporters of 
activism do not participate themselves, they are unlikely to react negatively when peers do 
not participate.  In contrast, people who are engaged in activism are more likely to 
disapprove of nonparticipating friends given their strong commitment to activism.  And 
turning down the direct requests of friends to participate in activism carries with it a great 
deal of risk of falling from good graces of friends since they are likely to feel slighted.  
We should not forget, however, that certain networks and organizations actually 
constrain activism.  My empirical models showed that integration into quiescent clergy-led 
congregations and “bonding” religious networks substantially hindered getting involved in 
volunteer efforts to help others in communities.  But given the emphasis on taking care of 
fellow members socially and spiritually and the fact that activism is often seen as 
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 undermining this care, it is not surprising that when religious organizations and ties are non-
activist in nature, they would be significant sources of constraint for community activism.  
The broader point seems to be that when activism is perceived to jeopardize the primary 
goals of organizations, religious or otherwise, then it is likely to be discouraged, and thus 
group members are likely to abstain from activist participation in order to avoid negative 
reactions from leaders and other group members who prefer to focus on helping group 
members and participating in-group activities. 
My synthetic model of activism and network and organizational distinctions were 
also helpful for explaining why certain Americans participated in helping efforts after 9/11 
while others did not.  Contrary to disaster scholarship on participation in other relief efforts, I 
showed that activist social ties and organizations were more important than non-activist ties 
and organizations for mobilizing participation in volunteer efforts to help victims, families of 
victims, or rescue workers as well as others in communities after 9/11.  While non-activist 
organizations had significant effects on these helping behaviors after 9/11, their effects were 
much weaker than those of activist organizations.  Importantly, simply having more friends 
was not a significant predictor of either type of helping effort after 9/11.  This calls into 
question arguments that there is a “general” integration effect on participation in disaster 
relief efforts (Haines et al. 1996; Nelson 1973; St. John and Fuchs 2002).  As with general 
community activism, the effects activist networks and organizations had on 9/11 relief efforts 
were robust to the inclusion of a prosocial orientation, giving us confidence that they are not 
spurious and thus entirely due to homophily.  A prosocial orientation indirectly affected 
participation in 9/11 relief efforts and post-9/11 community volunteer efforts by boosting 
certain 9/11 responses (i.e., patriotism, sorrow, and commemorative gatherings).  The 
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 findings are especially important for 9/11 relief efforts, as disaster scholarship has generally 
ignored the role of dispositions when explaining variation in volunteer efforts to help those 
harmed by tragedies.  Finally, it appears that 9/11 mobilized more Americans to participate in 
volunteer efforts in communities than before the attacks.  With the exception of knowing 
victims, the effects of the 9/11-generated variables were impervious to the inclusion of pre-
9/11 community volunteering.  This means that prior community activism does not explain 
why, for instance, feeling sorrow about the 9/11 attacks mobilized Americans to volunteer in 
their communities after 9/11.  In light of this evidence, there appears to be support for 
Putnam’s claim that 9/11 mobilized a civic response that was broad in scope, though I could 
not ascertain for how long this effect lasted. 
 No research project is perfect.  Given the various and complex social process 
involved in my synthetic model of activism, I would have ideally analyzed longitudinal data 
on activist networks and organizations, prosocial dispositions, and participation in volunteer 
efforts in communities.  But because these data do not exist, I analyzed cross-sectional data 
and drew on prior established research findings and conducted important sensitivity tests 
when possible to bolster support for my causal arguments about the relationships among 
activist networks and organizations, a prosocial orientation, and community activism.  
Nevertheless, future studies should collect data over time to evaluate how these causal 
processes unfold over time.  Preferably, these studies would begin in childhood and follow 
people throughout the life course, observing their entries into and exits from activist 
networks and activist behaviors as well as how orientations shape these actions. 
 To conclude, my dissertation has broadened our knowledge of the dynamics of 
activism in a number of ways.  But there is more research to be done.  In particular, I plan to 
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 explore the relevancy of my synthetic model of activism for cases of high-risk/cost activity.  
A prosocial orientation may not be the orientation that is most important for explaining 
participation in protest activism and other acts of rebellion (but see Keniston 1968; Loveman 
1998; Smith 1996:169-208).  Nonetheless, we would expect the insights of my synthetic 
model of activism still to be applicable.  Once the disposition that is most likely to promote 
insurgency is identified, we would expect it to be an important basis on which protest 
friendships form and thus including it in network models of high-risk/cost activism would 
help account for selection.  However, it is an open question whether a protest disposition 
would directly motivate participation in disruptive activity since this activity often involves 
considerable risk and cost.  This is where the significance of integration into activist 
networks comes in (della Porta 1988; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Opp 
1989; Opp and Gern 1993).  To establish this claim, however, requires accounting for the 
process of selection, which is why identifying, measuring, and modeling a disposition toward 
protest activity is so crucial.  By integrating dispositional and relational perspectives of 
activism, I will continue to advance our understanding of why people sacrifice time, energy, 
and even their livelihood for causes while others who do not. 
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 APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS 
Specifications and Assumptions of Traditional SEMs 
SEMs traditionally comprise two main components.  The first component is the 
structural model that describes the effects of the latent variables on each other.  The second 
component is the measurement model that specifies the link between the unobserved latent 
variables and their observed indicators.  The latent variable model’s general equation is η = 
Βη + Γξ + ζ, where η is an m × 1 vector of latent endogenous variables (m is the number of 
latent endogenous variables), ξ is an n × 1 vector of latent exogenous variables (n is the 
number of latent exogenous variables), Β is an m × m coefficient matrix for the regressions 
among the η’s, Γ is an m × n coefficient matrix for the regressions of the η’s on the ξ’s, and 
ζ is an m × 1 vector of disturbances or the unexplained component of the η’s.  There are also 
two covariance matrices that are part of the latent variable model.  The covariance matrix of 
the ξ’s is an n × n matrix, Φ, and the covariance matrix of the ζ’s is an m × m matrix, ψ.  The 
latent variable models assume that ζ’s have expected values of zero, covariances between ζ’s 
and ξ’s are zero, ζ’s are homoscedastic and nonautocorrelated, and (Ι − Β) is nonsingular.   
The general equation for the exogenous or independent variable measurement model 
is x = Λxξ + δ, where x is a q × 1 vector of observed indicators of the ξ’s (q is the number of 
observed indicators of ξ), Λx is a q × n matrix of coefficients or loadings for the regressions 
of the x’s on the ξ’s, and δ is a q × 1 vector of measurement errors.  The covariance matrix of 
the δ’s is a q × q matrix, Θδ.  And the endogenous or dependent variable measurement 
model’s general equation is y = Λyη + ε, where y is a p × 1 vector of the observed indicators 
of the η’s (p is the number of observed indicators of η), Λy is a p × m matrix of coefficients 
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 or loadings for the regressions of the y’s on the η’s, and ε is a p × 1 vector of measurement 
errors.  The covariance matrix of the ε’s is a p × p matrix, Θε.  These measurement models 
assume that δ’s and ε’s have expected values of zero, δ’s are uncorrelated with ε’s, η’s, ξ’s, 
and ζ’s, ε’s are uncorrelated with δ’s, η’s, ξ’s, and ζ’s, and δ’s and ε’s are homosecdastic 
and nonautocorrelated. 
 
Correction of Categorical Endogenous Variables for Traditional SEMs 
I first added an auxiliary measurement model to the traditional one since the 
traditional measurement model does not hold when the observed endogenous variables are 
not continuous.  The auxiliary measurement model assumes that underlying each categorical 
observed variable, yi, is a latent continuous one, yi*.  This measurement model’s general 
equation is yi = c, if τic-1 < yi* ≤ τic, where c is the number of categories for yi, τic (i = 1, 2, …, 
c −1) is the category threshold, and yi* is the latent continuous variable that determines the 
values of yi as it reaches or exceeds different thresholds (τi0 and τic, the two extreme 
thresholds, are respectively equal to – ∞ and + ∞).  For instance, the auxiliary measurement 
model equation for a binary observed endogenous variable, y1, is:  
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If y1* is less than τ, then y1 = 0.  If y1* reaches or exceeds τ, then y1 = 1.  All underlying latent 
continuous variables are assumed to be multinormally distributed, and the threshold values 
for the categorical observed endogenous variables are estimated from the univariate marginal 
distributions.  Because in the auxiliary measurement model categorical observed variables 
are nonlinearly and deterministically linked to their latent continuous counterparts through 
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 threshold models, error terms are not attached to the categorical observed variables as in 
traditional measurement models.  Error terms are instead attached to the latent continuous 
variables that underlie the categorical observed variables. 
Because each categorical observed endogenous variable is connected to a latent 
continuous variable through a threshold model, all estimated regressions are those of either 
binary or ordered probits.  The general equation for an ordered probit regression model is 
P(yi = c | xi) = Φ(τic − Βxi) − Φ(τic-1 − Βxi), where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution 
function (CDF), c is the number of categories for yi, τic (i = 1, 2, …, c −1) is the category 
threshold, xi is a matrix of explanatory variables, and Β is a vector of regression coefficients 
that link the explanatory variables to the outcome variable.  For the binary probit regression 
model, the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is omitted. 
Categorical observed endogenous variables also problematize the covariance structure 
hypothesis of traditional SEMs.  This fundamental hypothesis of traditional SEMs evaluates 
the extent to which the covariance matrix of the observed variables is a function of the 
specified model parameters.  Its general equation is H0: Σ = Σ(θ), where Σ is the population 
covariance matrix of observed variables, θ is a vector of the model parameters, and Σ(θ) is 
the model implied covariance matrix.  Rejection of H0 suggests that the constraints on Σ 
implied by the proposed model appear to be invalid and thus indicate that the proposed 
model has a poor fit to the data.  On the other hand, failure to reject H0 means that the 
proposed model seems to have an adequate fit to the data. 
The covariance structure hypothesis of traditional SEMs, however, does not generally 
hold when the observed variables of the population covariance matrix are noncontinuous. 
This is corrected by testing the population covariance matrix of the latent continuous 
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 variables that underlie the categorical observed variables, Σ*, instead of the population 
covariance matrix of the categorical observed variables, Σ (Bollen 1989b:441-442).  To 
estimate Σ*, a matrix of polychoric correlations—associations between the latent continuous 
variables that underlie the categorical observed variables—were generated from the bivariate 
marginal distributions conditional upon the given threshold values.  In order to obtain a 
suitable weight matrix, I also estimated the asymptotic covariance matrix of the polychoric 
correlation matrix.  With these matrices as input, I then estimated the models using 
diagonally weighted least squares with robust standard errors (Muthen and Muthen 1998-
2004). 
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 APPENDIX B 
Table B1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Synthetic Model of Collective Civic 
Action, Control Variables 
 
 
# of strong # of strong
ties who # of strong ties who
Nonchartiable Charitable # of strong approve of ties who request Collective 
Demographic variables Organizations Organizations ties volunteering volunteer volunteering Civic Action
Black     -.021     -.053    -.115+    -.178     .065      .222**     -.109
    (.042)     (.059)    (.066)    (.113)    (.100)     (.075)     (.094)
Other race     -.051     -.010    -.143**    -.393***    -.220*      .059      .050
    (.040)     (.051)    (.046)    (.113)    (.089)     (.078)     (.088)
College education      .124***      .229***    -.036     .236**     .315***      .089+      .246***
    (.026)     (.035)    (.046)    (.089)    (.062)     (.051)     (.061)
Income      .008      .034***     .023*     .029+     .034**     -.005      .038**
    (.005)     (.007)    (.010)    (.017)    (.012)     (.010)     (.012)
Female      .032      .117**     .116*     .356***    -.077     -.019      .151*
    (.032)     (.039)    (.048)    (.089)    (.074)     (.058)     (.064)
Age      .001     -.002    -.007***    -.018***     .008***     -.003+     -.003+
    (.001)     (.001)    (.001)    (.002)    (.002)     (.002)     (.002)
Physical heath      .035*     -.012     .001     .058     .053+      .008      .104**
    (.015)     (.017)    (.020)    (.039)    (.032)     (.025)     (.030)
# of children under 19      .053***      .055***    -.026    -.001     .037      .028      .007
living in household     (.012)     (.016)    (.024)    (.042)    (.029)     (.024)     (.029)
Working full-time     -.006     -.036     .170***     .191*    -.081     -.051     -.138*
    (.027)     (.036)    (.046)    (.089)    (.061)     (.052)     (.061)
Served in military      .012      .149**    -.011    -.005    -.251*     -.189*      .145
    (.044)     (.047)    (.056)    (.110)    (.086)     (.078)     (.089)
Married     -.035     -.107**     .049     .140+     .188*      .067      .101
    (.030)     (.036)    (.042)    (.081)    (.006)     (.053)     (.061)
South     -.019     -.052    -.016     .078     .079      .055      .005
    (.026)     (.033)    (.039)    (.074)    (.057)     (.049)     (.056)
Rural     -.002      .079     .051     .155+     .166*      .111*      .100
    (.030)     (.038)    (.051)    (.087)    (.070)     (.056)     (.066)
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
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 APPENDIX C 
Figure C1. Effects of Activist Clergy-Led Congregation Attendance, Quiescent Clergy-
Led Congregation Attendance, and No Congregation Attendance on Civic Engagement 
in Communities 
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 APPENDIX D 
Table D1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Congregation Mobilizing and 
Demobilizing Model, Control Variables  
 
 
Quiescent Activist Congregation Congregation Congregation Number of Civic
clergy-led clergy-led religious inward outward Number of congregation engagement
congregation congregation leadership volunteer volunteer congregation activist in
Explanatory variables attendance attendance position activity activity ties ties communities
Black      .692***     .405*     .368***     .413***     .590***      .026      .210*    -.031
    (.130)    (.167)    (.109)    (.101)    (.101)     (.068)     (.088)    (.115)
Other race      .061     .002    -.017    -.077    -.103      .001      .084    -.092
    (.147)    (.166)    (.106)    (.095)    (.102)     (.055)     (.086)    (.107)
College education     -.199*     .283*     .199**     .097     .043      .007     -.073     .271***
    (.101)    (.119)    (.073)    (.068)    (.007)     (.042)     (.065)    (.074)
Income     -.078***     .001    -.014    -.021     .015     -.019*     -.053***     .038*
    (.020)    (.022)    (.014)    (.014)    (.013)     (.009)     (.012)    (.014)
Female      .284**     .118     .061     .060     .103     -.041     -.038     .080
    (.107)    (.122)    (.076)    (.070)    (.074)     (.041)     (.065)    (.076)
Age      .019***     .003     .009***     .004+     .001      .004***      .006**    -.003
    (.003)    (.003)    (.002)    (.002)    (.002)     (.001)     (.002)    (.002)
Physical heath     -.048     .266***     .090*     .051     .034      .019      .050+     .001
    (.048)    (.029)    (.037)    (.035)    (.035)     (.020)     (.023)    (.039)
# of children under 19     -.048     .169**     .005     .105***     .075*      .024      .050+     .061+
living in household     (.049)    (.054)    (.032)    (.031)    (.032)     (.018)     (.003)    (.034)
Working full-time      .014    -.091     .007    -.115+    -.135+     -.047     -.072    -.097
    (.095)    (.112)    (.070)    (.066)    (.070)     (.060)     (.062)    (.071)
Served in military      .027    -.332+     .046    -.047    -.169     -.047     -.186*     .260*
    (.136)    (.169)    (.101)    (.097)    (.107)     (.041)     (.094)    (.105)
Married      .076     .539***     .170*     .181**    -.029      .014      .028    -.161+
    (.096)    (.119)    (.074)    (.068)    (.070)     (.041)     (.062)    (.034)
South      .307***     .405***     .290***     .096     .049      .001      .072    -.043
    (.086)    (.106)    (.066)    (.061)    (.064)     (.036)     (.056)    (.071)
Rural      .235*     .052     .326***     .223**     .266***      .137***      .177**     .177*
    (.098)    (.122)    (.075)    (.070)    (.074)     (.039)     (.064)    (.082)
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests)
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 APPENDIX E 
Table E1. Probit Coefficients for Direct Effects of Post-9/11 Helping Behavior Model, 
Control Variables 
 
# of victims # of commem- # of strong # of strong
or potential patriotic Sorrow in orative ties who ties who
victims symbols response to gathering encourage engage in
Explanatory variables known displayed the attacks attendance volunteering volunteering
Black     .098    -.326**    -.008    -.084      .220**     .080
   (.084)    (.126)    (.088)    (.087)     (.078)    (.098)
Other race     .233**    -.180     .045    -.152+      .073    -.198*
   (.077)    (.132)    (.083)    (.083)     (.074)    (.091)
College education     .254***    -.732***     .057    -.053      .092+     .310***
   (.059)    (.100)    (.065)    (.059)     (.052)    (.061)
Income     .038***     .005    -.031*     .006     -.003     .039**
   (.011)    (.018)    (.012)    (.011)     (.009)    (.013)
Female     .185**     .101     .370***     .303***     -.016    -.062
   (.060)    (.092)    (.062)    (.059)     (.055)    (.063)
Age    -.008***    -.003    -.011***    -.007***     -.003     .008***
   (.002)    (.003)    (.002)    (.002)     (.002)    (.002)
Physical heath     .063+    -.021    -.156***     .026      .006     .047
   (.033)    (.046)    (.030)    (.030)     (.025)    (.031)
# of children under 19    -.003     .102*    -.003     .047+      .021     .034
living in household    (.028)    (.042)    (.029)    (.027)     (.023)    (.003)
Working full-time     .024     .140    -.008     .079     -.052    -.073
   (.060)    (.087)    (.059)    (.055)     (.054)    (.062)
Served in military     .176*    -.071    -.175+    -.056     -.185*    -.247**
   (.083)    (.130)    (.097)    (.083)     (.077)    (.093)
Married    -.029     .387***     .107+     .122*      .053     .162**
   (.060)    (.089)    (.062)    (.057)     (.055)    (.061)
Rural    -.060    -.024    -.080     .028      .112+     .182***
   (.077)    (.097)    (.068)    (.062)     (.060)    (.069)
Notes : Standard errors are in parentheses; number of cases for all models is 2,898 individuals.
+ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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